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Abstract 
The notion of the selfish gene has been successfully deployed in the understanding of 
animal behaviour but is widely felt not to have full application at the human level.  A lot 
of evidence and argument is here assembled in support of the comprehensive application 
of that theory to the human population.  With a focus on genes giving rise to 
characteristically-human cooperation (‘cooperative genes’) it proves possible to situate a 
whole range of patterned behaviour and phenomena, even including celibacy, the use of 
contraception, and war, which at first glance seem to present insuperable difficulties.  
Crucially, the behaviour which tends to propagate the cooperative genes may be ‘at cost’ 
to the genes of some who may be party to the cooperation itself.   
 
The account builds on the primary insight that cooperation itself gives rise to full human 
conceptualization of the external world and their own place in it as embodied beings. 
Cooperation thereby structures practical action and progressively impacts on fertility, 
mortality and migration; cooperation therefore furthers the continued existence and 
transmission of the genes which give rise to it.  Human capacities underlying the ability 
to cooperate are also responsible for a vitally important long-term process - the 
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domestication of animals and plants; the geographical redistribution of such species 
means that the Earth is able to sustain a progressively larger human population.  
 
A consideration of the implications of characteristically-human cooperation helps one to 
understand the difference between animal and human sexual behaviour, and to explain 
the emergence of kinship systems, involving the social recognition of blood ties: one is 
thereby enabled to bridge the gap between zoology and social anthropology.  Cooperation 
is also the basic source of morality and hence of stabilizing regulation; at the same time it 
generates a bifurcation in respect of types of human understanding which explains the 
origin of religion.  Significantly, however, the predominating influence of religions on 
fertility is such as to incline population firmly on an upward trajectory. 
 
Competition between societies at one level of complexity tends to lead to societies of a 
greater level of complexity. The broader picture is not that various independent variables 
simply ‘cause’ growth in population but rather that various distinguishable elements – 
such as societal complexity, the rate of technological innovation (seen as evolutionary), 
food production, and population size and density - inter-affect each other. Perhaps the 
most strategic aspect of all is development or reshaping of the division and specialization 
of labour; crucially, that development tends to increase product while reducing the 
tendency for conflict to occur which may lead to violence.     
 
Everywhere humans gain access to the means of their subsistence cooperatively, but how 
they organize to do so develops in patterned ways.  In respect of prehistory and history, 
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that the same trends – towards food production, social complexity and urbanism – are 
found as independent developments in different parts of the globe points to the 
contribution of basic facets of human cooperative behaviour.  The historically important 
phenomenon of empire tended to have positive implications for expansion of population.  
Larger and more stable political entities tend to emerge over extended time – states, 
empires, nation states – providing a more predictable and secure context within which 
populations may grow.  
 
In complex societies, the built environment, writing and money contribute to sustaining 
and extending orderly cooperation.  While rationality is generally exhibited within the 
range of human behaviour, the systematic adoption of a rational approach to life is 
grounded in the emergence of institutional forms. In connection with globalization, 
humans are proceeding to reconfigure the external world so as to maximize the 
possibilities for their own cooperation within it.  Contrary to what might initially be 
thought, there are reasons for judging that the threat or experience of violence and war 
has played its part in creating the conditions for population growth. In addition, 
institutional change overtime has tended increasingly to realize a latent potential for 
cooperation without recourse to violence and war. 
 
Significantly, the increases in population experienced in differing types of society have 
sometimes tended to exceed those anticipated from the theory of the demographic 
transition, but once one foregrounds the impact of cooperative genes, patterns become 
that much more explicable.  The populations of western societies tend to be rising but the 
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overall demographic pattern can nevertheless be said to be substantially ‘at cost’ to the 
propagation of the genes of the majority of individuals who choose to limit their own 
fertility.  The use of contraception and abortion in recent centuries is to be viewed as a 
means towards fertility objectives, but those objectives are substantially independent of 
the means. The interdependence of generations – notably in the early and later years of 
life - provides a basic link between mortality and fertility, but the needs of each 
generation promise to be best served if a (slightly) larger one is following it.  The present 
sometimes ‘unwelcome’ migration into richer nations illustrates the persistent tendency 
in human experience for there to be re-distribution of the potential for population growth 
in space and in relation to economic resources which tends to keep overall population 
numbers on an upward trajectory. 
 
In future the human gene pool will be intentionally reshaped increasing the likelihood of 
there being a large and growing population with a distribution of qualities which will 
enable them to cooperate even more effectively.  The notion of the meme lacks 
explanatory power and cannot perform the role so far assigned to it.  The position is that 
cooperative genes give rise to cooperative behaviour which tends to propagate the genes, 
while memes inter alia inhere in cooperative activity; hence the only satisfactory 
explanatory framework involves a single replicator.  It is equally true to say that ‘humans 
are sometimes selfish’ and that ‘humans naturally create norms of behaviour tending to 
restrict or eliminate selfishness’.  A whole range of phenomena may be understood as 
involving the working out of the partial ‘conflict of interest’ between cooperative and 
other genes e.g. theft by a gang, the U.K. National Health Service, and (even) the world’s 
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(possible) emerging political and economic structural form. The propagation of human 
cooperative genes is potentially ‘at cost’ to the propagation of any of the other genes of 
other life forms on this planet (and conceivably also elsewhere).  That is the full measure 
of the extent to which these cooperative genes are selfish.  
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Chapter 1:  Human Cooperation and the Selfish Gene 
Introduction 
Darwin was unfamiliar with the notion of a gene.  However, in the first half of the 
twentieth century the Darwinian theory of evolution and the new understanding of 
genetics were synthesized.  Then building upon various other theoretical contributions 
(e.g. Williams, 1966) the notion of the selfish gene was introduced (Dawkins, 1976; see 
also 2006) and has since become highly influential (Grafen and Ridley, 2006).  That 
theoretical development has proved to have considerable explanatory power by 
expressing a gene-centred view of evolution as opposed to the original organism-focused 
Darwinian approach.  The notion assists understanding of such behaviour as one 
organism behaving in a seemingly selfless way in relation to another closely genetically-
related one, the most familiar example being mammalian maternal behaviour in relation 
to her off-spring. The core idea is that genes which tend to get passed on are ones which 
have consequences which in turn ‘serve the interests of the genes’ in the sense of 
increasing the likelihood of their survival and further propagation.  Thus the behaviour of 
a mother may sometimes be at risk to herself while nevertheless tending to increase the 
likelihood of those of her genes shared with her off-spring (one half) surviving.  
 
It is essential to be clear what is meant by ‘selfish’ in this context:  it is of the essence for 
subsequent argument and evidence.  Emphatically, it does not mean that individuals with 
the genes would tend to act in selfish ways.  Rather the idea is that the genes, in a certain 
sense, act only for themselves; their only ‘interest’ is in their own replication - to be 
passed on to the next generation.  Should it be the case that, because of their action, some 
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other genes, e.g. those carried by other orgamisms, lose out by failing to replicate, that is 
simply an unfortunate-for-them consequence.  Of course it is the case that genes do not 
‘want’ or ‘intend’ anything, but it has turned out to be convenient and suggestive 
shorthand to focus on their selfishness in this specific sense.  At root, what is being got at 
is the notion that genes that act in a particular way e.g. give rise to particular types of 
behaviour, are more likely to get passed on, even though this may be ‘at cost’ to other 
genes.  They have, as it were, power as replicators.    
 
This theoretical perspective which situates many aspects of animal behaviour is felt by 
many evolutionary biologists not to have application to human populations. This is partly 
because such phenomena as priestly celibacy or use of contraceptives are hardly 
behaviours which promulgate the genes of those involved.  There is also the familiar 
orienting notion that in humans cultural evolution in some sense ‘takes over’ from 
biological evolution.  Quite reasonably, it may initially be felt to be unpromising to 
attempt to subsume under a single explanatory concept, on the one hand patterns of 
animal behaviour which are sometimes properly to be characterized as stereotyped, and, 
on the other, patterns of human behaviour which may characterized as frequently rational 
and flexible.  Certainly any move in this direction would need to acknowledge cultural 
variations but without ‘culture’ forming a primary explanatory concept.  Nevertheless, 
this is an attempt to test the theory of the selfish gene in relation to the human population. 
It takes something of the form of a ‘feasibility study’, whereby the aim is to judge 
whether patterns in human life may be interpreted within that theoretical context. 
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It is envisaged that in the passage from the purely hominid to homo sapiens, genetic 
change took place so that humans could (and subsequently did) cooperate using theory of 
mind (which is not the case for virtually all purely animal interaction). What is being got 
at by reference to ‘theory of mind’ is the human ability to theorise how other humans’ 
thought processes work e.g. to grasp their intentions and reasons for action.   Since prior 
to this genetic change there would already have been patterned interaction between close 
blood relatives, it is important to make clear that, following the change, cooperation of 
the type indicated is possible between both those with and those without blood ties. Of 
course, the genetic change is taken to underpin human behaviour for all subsequent time. 
It must be noted that, while there have been attempts to understand cooperative behaviour 
in evolutionary terms, for instance by considering strategies giving rise to it (e.g. 
Axelrod, 1984), those approaching human behaviour utilizing the notion of the selfish 
gene have not focused their account - as is being done here - on the notion of genetic 
change giving rise to (characteristically) human cooperative behaviour.  It is fully 
recognized that genetic change which is here encapsulated in a phrase will have occurred 
in stages over a long period of time. There may well be differences in relevant respects 
between such beings as Australopithecus, Homo habilis, and Homo ergaster (see 
Dawkins, 2010), pp. 196-7) which are germane to their survival and eventual extinction.   
 
So, in what follows, an attempt is made to test the effective explanatory power of the 
application of the notion of the selfish gene to the human population focusing particularly 
on human genes giving rise to cooperation, or ‘cooperative’ genes as they may be called.  
Again, it is important fully to grasp what is involved in the notion that these cooperative 
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genes are selfish.  In this connection it is misleading to rest one’s attention on the idea 
indicated above of genetic change giving rise to cooperation followed by cultural 
evolution.  No, without in any sense denying the reality of culture, the fundamental 
assertion to be made is (as would be the case for other genes of other species) that the 
selfishness of the genes is manifested throughout all subsequent time i.e. it is manifested 
no more or less through the actions of stone-age peoples than it is manifested through our 
actions today.  It must also be stressed that one is concerned with the full range of types 
of human action, taking in both (what might be considered to be) the rational and the 
irrational. That a focus on cooperation may be indicative of a sound strategic approach is 
suggested by the observation that (with the exception of solitary Crusoe-like figures in 
special circumstances for temporary periods) everywhere humans gain access to the 
means of their own subsistence cooperatively; they need to cooperate in order to survive.    
 
The fact that one is concerned with tendencies manifested throughout time has 
implications for the presentation of evidence and argument.  Although extended 
consideration is here given to human development and change overtime, examples are 
sometimes presented in close conjunction that are drawn from different times or cultures.  
This assists exposition and no apology is needed since the search is for recurrent patterns. 
The first step is to clarify the characteristic and special nature of human cooperation.  
Detailed understanding of the various elements of, and potentialities flowing from, 
cooperation informs the argument of this and subsequent chapters.  No claim is being 
made that all the elements and tendencies referred to below are somehow realized 
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immediately with the advent of characteristically-human cooperation; its content must be 
understood to be developing and, to an important extent, open-ended.     
 
Cooperation 
What is distinctive about human cooperative behaviour is that it typically involves 
grasping the intentionality of other parties in context and shaping one’s own behaviour 
accordingly.  This grasping of intentionality is what is being got at in references to 
operating with ‘a theory of mind’ (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theory_of_mind). (It appears 
that this is sometimes but rarely utilised at a purely animal level.)  In terminology 
familiar to some sociologists and social psychologists one could also say human 
cooperative behaviour typically involves one person ‘taking the role of’ one or more 
others, a key idea of symbolic interactionism (Blumer, 1969).  This means that, while 
interacting with others, one’s behaviour is informed (in some sense through the use of the 
imagination) by an understanding of what those others are engaged in doing.  In the 
context of cooperation coordination of activity is achieved by the individual parties each 
doing this.  (It may also be assisted by conformity to such informal rules as not all talking 
at the same time.)   Across the generality of situations, three important types of 
cooperation are (a) one party asking and another providing a response – which may or 
may not lead to further cooperation, (b) gossip (important for conveying information), 
and (c) the exchange (or trading) relationship.   
 
It is manifestly the case that assisting another person even in a relatively simple task such 
as moving furniture involves grasping their intentionality.  For instance, one infers that 
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the other person is heading for the front door or, alternatively, moves to correct their 
mistake as they wrongly head in the direction of a cupboard.  It is indeed evident that in 
such tasks humans frequently, even continuously, monitor both the behaviour of other 
parties and their own behaviour; this amounts to doing something but then checking to 
see what has been done, followed by correction if necessary.  
 
The full analysis of instances of cooperation is particularly complex when third parties 
are involved. Two people may cooperate as they do because of their shared understanding 
of the intentionality of a third person, or their cooperation may itself amount to 
cooperation with that person – as when children play together under the guidance or 
instruction of an adult.  It is indeed routine for a cooperating individual to be 
simultaneously taking account of the intentions of two or more others in differentiated (as 
well as sometimes more generalized) ways.  Strikingly too, humans may cooperatively 
act out a scene while understanding its meaning to on-lookers. The crucial development 
in human evolution may in fact be not so much simply the capacity for one-on-one 
cooperation as an isolated phenomenon, but rather cooperation which is systematically 
informed by understanding of the perspectives of third parties.  Significantly, children 
normally exhibit the capacity to act in this way from an early age. 
 
In respect of the generality of social interaction it may be the case – for instance, in a 
relatively fleeting encounter (for instance, where a stranger is given directions in a city) – 
that an individual’s intention is grasped in relative isolation, but there are other cases 
where it is understood within a broader framework.   In this connection there is a family 
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of related concepts to which intention belongs.  Thus one may grasp an individual’s 
reasons for action or their motivation; also, their beliefs. Understanding may shift from 
shorter-term to longer-term aspects as when it is asked whether a young man’s intentions 
to a young woman are ‘honourable’.  Intentions may also be readily understood to change 
overtime, sometimes because the context changes.  
 
Given the genetic change identified, it follows also that people present themselves to 
others in – calculated and less calculated - ways which increase or decrease the likelihood 
of subsequent cooperation.  Plainly young adults dress and conduct themselves at public 
events in ways likely to attract a mate.  People present themselves at job interviews in 
ways judged to make appointment more likely.  Individuals, like actors, may be 
understood as performing for an audience. In this connection, information can be given 
intentionally or given off, where things are revealed unintentionally. (Goffman, 1959) 
Conduct is manifestly informed by ‘taking the role of the other’, just as it is when 
children in class seek either to avoid or to catch the teacher’s eye.  Importantly, too, the 
other parties to possible cooperation to varying degrees understand what is going on and 
may modify their own judgments and responses accordingly. 
 
In grasping an individual’s intention before and during an instance of cooperation there 
are differences depending upon whether or not face-to-face contact is involved.  When it 
is, any of another party’s observed behaviour up to that point is potentially relevant, but 
use of language in conjunction with facial expression is particularly important.  In face-
to-face situations, eye contact is generally critical in the initiation and maintenance of 
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cooperation (significantly, this is impaired in the condition of autism).  When individuals 
approach and wish to pass each other on a path or pavement they sometimes seek to make 
eye-contact to assist in grasping intention and thereby avoid bumping into each other; by 
contrast, they may refrain from eye contact and treat the other person as a moving object 
to be avoided (just as one would a dog).  Of course, it is the case that in a developed 
language an individual may straightforwardly express an intention (although, of course, 
particular assertions must not be taken as self-validating) but, fundamentally, it is actions 
– whether or not verbal or face-to-face in their character – which bear witness to it.  
Cooperation itself is fundamentally judged by the character of ‘performance’.  
 
Cooperation takes time and involves people being able to ‘rely’ on each other.  Hence its 
continuation and completion typically depends on normative expectations whereby the 
parties feel they ‘should’ continue to play their own individual parts as should other 
participants. In a related way one may speak of someone cooperating to some extent or 
being uncooperative; particular individuals may be criticized as ‘unreliable’.  A 
cooperative relationship is a power relation.  It may be between equals but it may be 
highly unequal. 
 
Indeed it may be furthered on a non-consensual basis:  cooperation between master and 
slave, for instance, is here called ‘coerced cooperation’.  So also could there be 
cooperation at the point of a gun; and where this occurs there is shared understanding of 
what is required between the parties.  Given the aim of this study, reference to this type 
of cooperation is not a minor point of detail but is of the essence.  The patterns in human 
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life would not remotely be as they are in the absence of coerced cooperation:  consider, 
for instance, the apprehension of criminals and the operation of prisons.  It is worth 
noting in passing that in ordinary conversation the word ‘cooperation’ tends more often 
to be used when the parties are acting (wholly) willingly; but its usage must not be so 
confined here.     
 
Language use is here viewed as a particular type of cooperative activity, but it is quite 
rightly thought of as a rather special and strategic type.  We are all only too familiar with 
purely communicative cooperation and the fact that communication tends to enter into or 
accompany virtually every other type of cooperation.  The reader may even be led to 
reflect upon whether the emergence of language among our ancestors is itself to be 
directly associated with the emergence of the tendency to utilize theory of mind and to 
‘take the role of’ the other i.e. that the tendencies develop in parallel; this may indeed be 
so, because language tends to assist imaginative understanding.  It may be that we would 
only classify some utterance as (rudimentary) speech were we to feel that these other 
kinds of tendencies were implicitly involved.  Nevertheless, for present purposes, one can 
note that there can be cooperation without any linguistic content or accompaniment 
(which could nevertheless, if required, be described i.e. represented linguistically), 
cooperation which has exclusively linguistic content and cooperation which involves both 
linguistic and non-linguistic elements.   
 
Of course it is the case that the full range of types of cooperation with which we are 
familiar is only possible given the existence of language as a resource.  In respect of 
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language as an institution it is worth pointing up at this stage that effective 
communication (a spoken exchange or writing subsequently read and understood) is 
based upon existing linguistic conventions and rules.  Importantly, language is ‘open-
ended’:  sentences never formulated before may be meaningfully uttered; from 
rudimentary beginnings overtime vocabulary may be added and an initial use of the 
present indicative may be augmented by tenses and modalities.  As a particular type of 
cooperation it too involves a normative order in that a language user is committed to 
something in front of others. (Searle, 2010, p.80)  Some more detailed points regarding 
speech acts, language and cooperation are provided in Appendix 1. 
 
It is indeed the case that a normative element inheres in cooperation of any type.  When 
an instance of cooperation is in train, whether or not individual parties will follow 
through is typically in doubt or at issue.  A whole vocabulary concerned with such 
matters as trust, promises, and reliability focuses on this key area. Thus it may be judged 
that in the generality of the human situation this is the crucible for the emergence of 
morality.  Now the pattern of cooperation would not have evolved if there were not an 
overall tendency for cooperation to be successful; it is cooperation carried through which 
delivers the benefits.  The key development in humans making this possible involves the 
process of ‘internalisation’:  basically the person has come to feel they ought to be 
‘reliable’ and, for instance, keep promises; we encourage this in children.  Morality as 
such is of course bound up with how the scope of normative expectations becomes 
extended to wider populations.  As it does so morality constitutes a source of stabilizing 
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regulation:  the achievement of goals on a cooperative basis becomes more predictable.  
(A section of Chapter 2 gives extended consideration to morality.)  
 
The existence of a normative element within cooperation has further significant 
implications.  It means that humans can have reasons for action which are ‘desire-
independent’; they can choose to ‘delay gratification’.  By contrast, pre-human behaviour 
would be ‘desire-dependent’.  What is being got at here is that humans can work towards 
something which is not intrinsically desired, but is understood to be a step towards or 
means towards something else which is desired.  It is also the origin of the phenomenon 
of inhibition, the pattern whereby an individual wants or desires something but refrains 
from its direct and immediate pursuance because of internalized constraint. Cooperation 
thus involves virtually from the outset means-ends orientation and a delayed gratification 
pattern.  This is of course the essential character of much work in modern conditions 
where it is viewed as a way of earning a living. Humans can foresee what is needed to 
achieve a desired objective, can plan, and attempt to work through the various required 
stages, some or many of which are not desired intrinsically. 
 
Finally, in this consideration of characteristically human cooperation, it is important to 
draw attention to some aspects of what may be termed ‘role-playing’.  The first is that 
cooperation directly opens the way to an almost indefinitely extended and highly flexible 
elaboration in the human division of labour, to be contrasted with the rudimentary and in 
a sense ‘stereotyped’ one observable in higher animals.  The starting point for this is that 
human cooperation involves ‘taking the role of the other’ or grasping the intentionality of 
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the other party(ies) and shaping one’s own behaviour accordingly.  Broadly speaking, 
where individuals engage in doing this, they are also able to make a rudimentary effort at 
performing the contributions or roles of the other party(ies) themselves.  Thus anyone 
who has been a pupil at school – as we all have - could have a rudimentary go at being a 
teacher or even the head-teacher.  The fact that almost anyone can minimally act on the 
stage points in the same direction. 
 
A further related phenomenon of considerable importance is that virtually any human 
being is able to dissemble and deceive others in a controlled way; it may well be that the 
vast majority of us have done this at various times.  Humans lie to others and they also 
act in calculated ways intending that others make false inferences about them.  Children 
may be observed to do both these things from an early age.  The confidence trickster is 
one playing a special kind of role which provides spectacular evidence of the human 
capacity to act in ways which lead others to operate on the basis of a false set of 
assumptions.  
 
It is also evident that in performing a new role one puts one’s own distinctive creative 
interpretation on it, just as one does to a role on stage; it is not as though, in general, role 
performance is to be likened to a train moving on a track.  Now, of course it is the case 
that certain roles require training and the acquisition of skill to enable one to perform 
them at all well, but these more specialized aspects are themselves typically imparted 
through a set of cooperative relationships in situations where there are already 
practitioners around. The elaboration of the division of labour evident in any society and 
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its massive elaboration in one like ours arise out of the phenomenon of characteristically 
human cooperation:  no other essentially different additional capacity in humans needs to 
be postulated. Yet the phenomenon of the elaboration and specialization of labour is at 
the root of both simple and complex human societies.  In Appendix 2 cooperation is 
carefully distinguished from coordination and co-action in social life; the contribution of 
‘collective actors’ is also situated in relation to the main discussion.  
 
Following this brief exploration of the nature of characteristically-human cooperation, the 
next step is to address the key issue as to the significance of the indicated genetic change 
within the context of the theory of the selfish gene i.e. to consider the precise implication 
of the notion that these cooperative genes may be considered as ‘selfish’. 
 
The importance of aggregates rather than individuals 
It follows from the theory of the selfish gene that, in becoming established, new genes 
such as these give rise to behaviour which tends in the next and then subsequent 
generations to promulgate the new genes themselves (the influence of genes may hence 
be thought of as ‘reflexive’) i.e. in this case the genetic change would tend to give rise to 
a large and increasing population of people with the new ‘cooperative’ genes.  As already 
indicated, it also follows from the theory that this tendency for new genes to give rise to 
behaviour tending to promulgate themselves may be ‘at cost’ to the promulgation of other 
genes:  as has been stressed, this is what is meant by calling the genes ‘selfish’.  
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It is envisaged that the above applies here i.e. that the promulgation of the new genes can 
be expected to be ‘at cost’ to the promulgation of other genes.  In particular, since 
cooperation always involves more than one person an absolute expansion in the 
population of people able to cooperate may be accompanied by an associated failure to 
promulgate the genes of individuals or classes of people some of whom may be party to 
the cooperation themselves.  (At the same time, there continue to be cooperative activities 
which do serve both ‘cooperative’ and other human genes e.g. people jointly hunting for 
food.)  Fundamentally, in respect of the new ‘cooperative’ genes, it is the overall growth 
in numbers of cooperating people which matters, while there may be identifiable others 
who ‘lose out’ as a consequence of that cooperation itself.  There may, for instance, be 
identifiable categories with reduced or zero fertility and others with higher mortality.   
 
Example (a) For the longest period while they have been on the planet humans were 
hunters and gatherers.  Taking a long view the population rose and they spread 
throughout the habitable continents.  We are nevertheless told that hunting groups, ‘have 
proved highly adept at population control…in preserving and developing desirable social 
characteristics, while endeavouring to prevent (often by forced celibacy) the passing on 
of any personal defects that might prevent a member playing a full part in his or her small 
community’ (Barraclough, 1978, p.35).  Population growth might indeed have been 
easier without those with personal defects, but it was nevertheless ‘at cost’ to the latter’s 
genes. 
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Example (b) The first appearance of recognizable civilization was in southern 
Mesopotamia, where the population rose rapidly. It was nevertheless the case that, ‘a 
Sumerian king and queen of the middle of the third millennium were followed to their 
tombs by their attendants who were then buried with them…’ (Roberts, 1980, p.71) 
Population growth was evidently ‘at cost’ to the genes of attendants (which loss would 
depend more precisely on their age at death). 
 
Example (c) The Roman Catholic Church has been a central institution in many societies 
and incorporates cooperative behaviour between those at the same or differing levels 
within a hierarchy.  That church has encouraged growth in the human population e.g. by 
proscribing the use of manufactured contraceptives and suicide.  The tendency to 
promote growth in numbers is nevertheless ‘at cost’ to the genes of the celibate 
priesthood. 
 
Example (d) Ancient societies such as Greece and Rome were based on slavery yet their 
populations rose for extended periods.  Within a slave-owning society the age-specific 
mortality rates and the overall mortality rate of the slaves may be expected to be higher 
than those of the slave-owners, yet there can be a tendency nevertheless for population 
numbers to rise.  The overall growth in numbers is ‘at cost’ to the genes of some of the 
slaves.  
 
The institution of slavery is - perhaps surprisingly - instructive for present purposes.  In 
an unexpected way that institution – ubiquitous in antiquity – points up the significance 
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of cooperation, albeit coerced.  Slaves tended to originate from those defeated in battle.  
They could have been killed but there is gain in product from putting them to work.  They 
could be castrated or maimed, but, again, there can be a net gain from instead allowing 
them to breed, thereby providing a continuous supply of slaves.  In connection with 
slavery cooperation is advanced while the mortality which could have followed defeat is 
reduced.  Notably too, slavery is found in otherwise widely differing cultures and 
contexts. 
 
To put the position generally, one can say that cooperation (which will be occurring 
simultaneously at differing levels within a complex society) tends to give rise to a 
growing population but also to differentials in the vital rates of fertility, mortality and 
migration between sub-populations which are governed by the nature of the cooperation 
itself.  For instance, in advanced societies social class differentials in fertility and 
mortality substantially arise in this way - one source being the differentially hazardous 
nature of individual occupations.  
 
The demographic patterns at the present time across vast swathes of the Earth’s surface 
point firmly to the emphasis here on the importance of aggregates as against individuals.  
In Western societies, but also more widely, average family size is quite modest with most 
couples having four or fewer children.  Individuals are evidently not generally acting in 
ways which maximize the likelihood of the promulgation of their own genes. Hence an 
attempt to account for behaviour by reference to the selfish gene on an individualized 
basis would plainly fail.  However, once the move is made to foreground cooperative 
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genes observable patterns become explicable.  Paradoxically, the overall world 
population is growing while most individuals are ‘paying a cost’ in terms of the loss of 
their own potential fertility.  
 
Population and population growth 
Of course it is the case that the population of the world is now vastly more than it was in 
the remote past.  That is a relevant observation but it would be absurd for present 
purposes to rest one’s case on it.  Rather, in testing the applicability of the theory of the 
selfish gene, the main task becomes showing that the possession of the new ‘cooperative’ 
genes tends towards the promulgation of the genes themselves i.e. the phenomenon of 
human cooperation tends towards a large and steadily growing population.  The emphasis 
on ‘tends’ is plainly important.  Any such tendency necessarily expresses itself in the 
context of all manner of set-backs to population growth including the impact of such 
traditional enemies as plague and famine. 
 
From the literature two main frameworks are available for explaining world population 
growth in causal terms.  The first framework focuses on the means of subsistence.  The 
population of the world cannot be greater than that which can provide itself with a 
minimal subsistence from the world’s resources. As stressed, this is achieved 
cooperatively.  Plainly, for most of the time humans have inhabited the planet, the vast 
majority have lived near a minimum level of subsistence, so significant population 
increase has only been possible when the means of subsistence could be increased 
proportionately.   
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This framework directs attention to human ecology.  Human societies are dependent upon 
other animals, on plant species, and on such features of the inanimate environment as 
water, air and temperature.  Human ecology concerns the mutual relationships of human 
populations and their biological and physical environments.  Within this framework an 
ecosystem refers to an aggregation of associated species of plants and animals together 
with the physical features of their habitat.  The observable growth of world population 
would not have been possible without human beings making substantial changes within 
their ecosystem.  Importantly, these changes could not have been simply quantitative i.e. 
our relationship to the environment is patently not a kind of multiplying up of the 
relationship of pre-literate peoples to theirs.  Rather the way in which the human means 
of subsistence has kept abreast of growing population is through qualitative change in 
their ecosystem. Some use of this framework is made in the account of Chapter 7 of 
developments in prehistory and history.   
 
The second framework for examining causes of population growth involves focusing on 
its two components, the birth rate and the death rate.  For the world as a whole, the 
population increases when the birth rate exceeds the death rate and the greater the 
difference between the two, the higher will be the rate of growth. Within this framework 
attention is directed at the causal factors giving rise to changes in the birth and death 
rates. However, the unit of analysis when considering population growth may well not be 
the totality of the human population on Earth.  A relevant unit consists of those drawn 
together within a cooperative framework which is indeed the case at the present time for 
 19 
most of the world’s population; but it was not so in the past.  Where there is an isolated 
population, for instance, as might be the case for a pre-literate society or a civilization on 
part of a large continent, then it is to be expected from the theory that the population of 
that social entity is more likely to grow than decline in the longer term.  From the point of 
view of the selfish gene that isolated population could represent the totality of the human 
population on Earth.  More generally, of course, there are movements of populations and 
societies or civilizations often come to inter-affect one another; in this connection 
migratory movements require causal analysis. 
 
So testing whether the theory applies involves examining whether in an isolated, or at 
least for purposes of analysis isolable, human group cooperation gives rise to a tendency 
for the population to increase.  Of course, at the crudest level in the absence of migration 
this has to do with whether fertility tends to exceed mortality through extended time but 
some more detailed points may be noted.  In this connection there may be important 
differences between patterns in the short- and in the long-term, the latter being of primary 
concern here.  The shape of the population pyramid at particular times is important in the 
short-term.  If, although the population is large, the pyramid is top heavy (i.e. the 
population is disproportionately elderly), numbers may be expected shortly to decline. 
The length of time between generations is also important; where this shortens the 
population will tend to rise.  Then, focusing on migration, a population may tend to rise 
in association with expansion into unoccupied habitable space.  In the human story this 
last phenomenon is of particular importance.  
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Indeed, an important basic piece of evidence that the theory here being advanced may 
apply concerns the fact that, at the stage when it consisted of hunters and gatherers, the 
human population increased in numbers as it spread relatively thinly throughout the 
habitable continents.  As part of this, the first colonization of the Americas from Alaska 
to Patagonia in perhaps as little as 2000 years is a particularly striking phenomenon. 
(Diamond, 1998, pp. 37 and 47)  The dispersal of the human population involved 
adapting to highly varied environments, made possible by cooperative activity in respect 
of such activities as hunting, provision of clothing and use of fire.  In this connection it is 
sometimes said that hunter-gatherer populations grew just enough to push the limit of the 
carrying capacity of their way of life, where this phrase refers to the number of people 
that may be sustained in an area given its physical resources and the way people use 
them. (Sanderson, 1995; Miller, 2007; Weeks, 2008, p.32) Both increasing numbers and 
the dispersal are highly significant.  As regards the latter, attention must be drawn to the 
fact that conditions on the Earth’s surface vary and are subject to change in ways 
affecting the ability to sustain population:  an ice-sheet may be advancing in one place, 
while elsewhere previously desiccated areas may be experiencing greater rainfall; some 
areas are prone to seismic activity, others not. Were one constructing a model to 
maximize the possibilities for overall population growth one would build into it this 
tendency towards population dispersal.   
 
The slow but pervasive move to a more sedentary, agricultural way of life initiated the 
phase where resources were used intensively rather than extensively. It may be judged 
that with the onset of these newer life-style patterns the dispersed nature of the population 
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continued to favour the possibilities for overall growth.  Indeed, it does so in respect of 
the present world population, for instance by helping to sustain large numbers as we face 
the problem of global warming.  The point is that there are ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ from 
global warming (even though the latter may outnumber the former).  Deserts may 
advance in certain regions while retreating in others; a Mediterranean climate may 
migrate northwards in the Northern hemisphere.  It would further sustain population 
numbers were there to be – as is very likely - some cooperation between winners and 
losers.  At the present time (but not necessarily in the future) it is indeed the case that the 
human population ‘eggs’ are all carried by ‘island Earth’, but at least one can say that the 
pattern of dispersal on the planet offers some support to overall numbers given some 
destruction of individual habitats. 
 
In proceeding further the pattern of growth of the world’s population must be noted.  The 
broad assertion that may be made is that the size of the world population grew slowly in 
fits and starts up to the date of about 1750AD when it is reckoned to have totalled 764 
million i.e. it tended to grow up to that date but the average rate of growth was low 
(Weeks, 2008, p.33).  Two hundred years later - in 1950 - the figure was more than two 
and a half billion and in 1960 close to three billion, while in 2012 the world’s population 
had come to exceed seven billion (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_population).  The reason 
why the world population is increasing rapidly is, of course, because mortality has fallen 
sharply compared with earlier times while fertility has fallen somewhat less sharply.  The 
pattern of more rapid growth of recent centuries is encapsulated in the notion that there 
has been a ‘demographic transition’ and theory relating to that notion is taken up in 
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Chapter 9.  Importantly, to assert that there is a tendency for the overall numbers of 
cooperating people to rise is not to assert that there is any naturally given rate of increase.  
Rather the suggestion would be that there is a tendency for the rate to be positive and 
sustainable and in recent centuries a rate high by historical standards has been 
sustainable.  Hence, it may be judged that, for present purposes, what is needed is an 
account linking human cooperation to a rather low average population growth rate up to 
(approximately) the mid-eighteenth century but a markedly higher one thereafter. 
 
--------------------------------- 
It is the work of subsequent chapters to develop such an account.  Plainly one initial 
thought is that people cooperate because they achieve their various goals more effectively 
together than they could or would do separately and that this manifests itself in 
population growth.  It may be judged, for instance, that cooperation in farming or in the 
use of particular farming methods produces more food enabling more mouths to be filled.  
Again, in respect of a modern society, it could be said that cooperation in industrial 
organizations yields higher incomes and overall economic growth which provide 
conditions for increases in population.  These are, of course, highly relevant ideas and 
they are examined further later.  However, there is also a need to understand how the 
advent of characteristically-human cooperation gives rise to more sophisticated and more 
productive ways of living in the first place; humans could conceivably have continued 
using the simplest technology while living in a tiny portion of the Earth’s surface, but 
they did not do so.  Again, it is clear that virtually from the outset people cooperate in a 
multiplicity of different contexts which vary greatly in the extent to which they appear to 
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link directly or indirectly to population.   Hence to begin to provide a balanced or 
rounded account linking cooperation to population growth, the multi-faceted nature of 
human life must be grasped.    
 
There is reason to judge that the impact of cooperation on population growth is not felt or 
achieved by some relatively simplistic ‘direct action’ but through the complexity of 
human life.  For instance, it is vital that cooperation affects the very way in which the 
world is conceptualized and knowledge is acquired about it.  Again, as we shall see, 
cooperation gives rise to morality which is not to be thought of as some interesting 
incidental aspect of human life but is in fact implicated in the underlying process linking 
cooperation to population growth.  It is judged also that cooperation gives rise to religion 
which institution itself tends positively to impact on population.  Despite the links being 
multifaceted, however, in what follows the aim is to clarify rather than mystify; the main 
effort is directed at laying bear and tracing the connections.  In the next chapter some 
foundational elements are considered. 
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Chapter 2:  Human Understanding, Values and Morality 
At the heart of this study is the notion that ‘cooperative genes’ give rise to cooperative 
behaviour among humans which in turn propagates the genes.  The central task is to show 
that the cooperative behaviour to which the new genes give rise has indeed tended to 
propagate the genes – through an increasing population.  This chapter provides a 
necessary foundation for the account.  To understand how populations come to grow one 
needs to inquire into the implications of cooperation for the way in which human beings 
understand the world and their own place in it; also how cooperation contributes to the 
way in which they explain to themselves what they observe and experience and then go 
on to put those explanations and understandings to further use.  
 
It is of the essence that people relate to the physical world while also relating to each 
other.  Indeed, a certain balance in this respect is (and must be) achieved within an 
overall way of life.  Also important is the pattern whereby humans sometimes behave in 
eminently practical ways but they may also be observed to act on the basis of speculative 
thought.  In particular, it is of importance to begin to understand how cooperation gives 
rise to religion.  A further significant aspect is to examine how expanding patterns of 
cooperation are regulated and stabilized in ways which make it more effective and more 
predictable in respect of outcomes.  This requires consideration of the origins and nature 
of morality.  Human life has many aspects and elements which must be situated within an 
overall account concerned with how cooperation gives rise to population growth. 
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Conceptualizing the external world; the third person perspective 
One can make progress by going back to basics and considering just what exactly does 
flow from the advent of characteristically-human cooperation. One needs to consider the 
implications of cooperation in practice, to identify potentialities which go beyond those 
which already exist at the animal level.  
 
A basic point is that full conceptualization of the external world – as a world 
(predominantly) consisting of objects which may undergo (or parts of which may 
undergo) change of relative position and which have weight/mass - does not occur at the 
purely animal level but arises in the context of human cooperative activity.  In using the 
notion of an ‘object’ in this (familiar) way it is of course already implied that a single 
object would give rise to different experiences e.g. it would look different from different 
positions; it could also undergo change of appearance as when seen in bright sunlight or 
at dusk. In partial justification of this key assertion, it is directly relevant to say that the 
utilization of theory of mind involves individuals interacting while imaginatively seeing 
or in other ways experiencing reality from the position of one or more other persons, 
which phenomenon has close affinities with the contribution of ‘triangulation’ in 
surveying. The conceptual isolation of time – which initially is purely serial - arises from 
the fact that there are patterns and correlations in the human experience of the changes in 
relative positions of objects or parts of objects e.g. when heavy objects fall from the same 
height they hit the ground after roughly the same interval; again, the multi-faceted 
changes associated with the occurrence of day and night are patterned and recurrent. 
Importantly, too, this conceptualization by humans of the external world includes an 
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understanding of their own place in it as embodied beings.  When jointly engaged in 
practical activity, the actions of each party are shaped both by their understanding of the 
position of others and by their understanding of their own position; which positions are 
implicitly understood as located within the overall world of objects. In sum, cooperation 
of the type identified is interdependent with the utilisation of a shared view of an external 
world of objects. This also amounts to the adoption of a third person point of view.   
 
To be absolutely precise, it is the combined use of (potentially) all the human senses in 
the context of human cooperative activity which gives rise to full conceptualization.  In 
philosophical empiricist accounts there is sometimes a tendency to give undue emphasis 
to the sense of sight.  The view taken here is that it is the sense of touch and the 
experience of resistance or weight (as when lifting) or of impulse when one is struck 
which is perhaps most fundamental; touching provides the interface between one’s own 
body (which becomes understood as an object) and other objects (it being of the essence 
that one can touch with any part of the body or indeed with several parts at the same 
time).  Also fundamental is coordination between the senses, as when the sensation of 
touching accompanies observation of touching.  
 
Arising together with the conceptualization of a (changing) world of objects is (shared) 
knowledge of that world; communication using language acquires extensive and 
extendable content.  No doubt the early view of the world is highly local but it is of the 
essence that it can potentially be extended and elaborated in space and time, the only real 
limits being those of a type with which we are familiar.  Importantly, arising together 
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with the human conceptualization of time is the vital phenomenon of human foresight:  
from observations and memories of observations arise expectations regarding the future 
and a grasp of potentialities for action. Thus, awareness of the world together with human 
foresight informs practical action which may also lead, in its turn, to additional 
increments of knowledge.  It is argued later that it is this incremental process which 
mediates between human cooperation and population growth. 
 
To avoid confusion, one may situate the view being advanced here in relation to the 
notion of culture.  This key notion basically refers to shared ideas and there is also 
material culture in the form of artifacts.  It is vital fully to acknowledge that human 
cultures and the differing languages which are central to them may vary considerably 
from one society to another.  Despite the existence of cultural variations between 
societies, however, the key assertion being made is that the conceptualization of the 
external world at an underlying basic level is shared among humans.  A few examples 
may help.  Suppose an individual accidentally stumbles over a tree trunk in the view of 
others; irrespective of cultural context, there will be an understanding that contact has 
occurred between that person and a physical object.  So too is there understanding that a 
mother can lift her small child but not vice versa.  Again, the general understanding 
(where it exists) that you can rely on not getting killed or injured when you dive into deep 
water is irrespective of culture.  In this connection, while a river or the sea is not itself to 
be construed directly as a physical object its occupancy of space is directly understood by 
reference to adjacent physical objects (and objects including human beings may appear in 
it).  Again, suppose some people are wandering around after getting lost during the 
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daytime in the Sahara Desert:  irrespective of culture there will be an understanding that 
there is a bright burning light above them which we know as the Sun. In this connection, 
while the Sun is emphatically not itself immediately or directly understood to be a 
physical object, it is understood at a particular time to be in a direction specified by 
reference to physical objects e.g. coming over the horizon.  Now of course it is the case 
that there are cultures where the Sun is viewed as a god and others where this is not the 
case, but that very state of affairs can help us to understand what is basic and shared and 
what may vary culturally.  
 
Humans make and use tools. When using a stone tool one is ‘relying’ on the physicality 
of it.  Also, where two hunters in a pre-literate society are crossing a river at a particular 
point they may well be relying on the fact that at that point their feet may be expected to 
touch the bottom as they walk across while their heads remain above the surface.  That 
which may be relied upon in this sense constitutes the external world; it is also that which 
one encounters or ‘comes up against’.   In the context of cooperation two or more persons 
rely on elements of that world and, as already indicated, that joint reliance links directly 
to the emergence, development and utilization of a third person point of view.  
Information concerning these matters may thus be conveyed to others; indeed the 
experience of others of the depth of water at a point of a river may be confirmatory.  
Hence beliefs of this kind tend to expand until they can be said to exist as knowledge ‘at 
large’.  Each of us at any time may know things about the Earth’s surface that no one else 
knows, but that can have the status of knowledge partly because it finds its place within 
the broader picture deriving from human experience at large.  Nor is it being asserted that 
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the external world is ‘static’ or ‘fixed’; the common experience is that this is indeed not 
so; thus the river is shallow in the dry season and deep in the rainy season; but that 
observation is itself indicative of the way in which knowledge may expand.  Importantly, 
the reality of the external world is being experienced, found to be familiar and to a degree 
confirmed throughout time; that confirmation is not to be thought of as achieved on a 
‘once and for all’ basis.  However, the experience of that reality in the long-term may be 
expected to be fully reflected in linguistic usage, which itself develops gradually 
overtime. 
 
It is a commonplace idea to say that our way of life is dependent upon knowledge and 
knowledge acquisition.  But the significance of a common understanding of an external 
world within which we are ourselves located is that one is provided with something to 
have knowledge about or perhaps, more accurately, a framework for emergent 
knowledge.  Specific items of information have a wider context in space and potentially 
too in respect of time. If someone says there is an oasis six miles away it can help to 
define an objective that may be sought.  There can be rules relating to space allocation 
and land use which we can all understand. 
 
In respect of human conceptualization it is likely that there are some ‘natural kinds’ 
which would be evident cross-culturally.  Other animals react to the presence of predators 
and prey, for instance, in much the same sorts of way however they are presented to the 
senses, which tendency would be expected to pass to the human level.  Thus it is to be 
expected from the outset that humans everywhere would grasp rabbits, dogs and lions as 
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conceptual gestalts. Here is an example illustrating the central practical importance of 
conceptualizing the external world:  seeing a lion may initiate a flight response but this 
tendency may be overcome once it is realized that the lion is behind bars – which ‘fact’ 
may be relied upon.    
 
Of course it is the case that animals sense and react to what we understand to be objects 
in their environment e.g. a predator such as a lion, but they do not have a fully developed 
concept of either an object or a lion. In a bullfight the behaviour of the bull towards the 
matador and his cloak (essentially a moving surface rather than a moving solid object) 
derives its distinctive character from the bull’s lack of full conceptualization of the 
external world.  Again, animals have extended experience of a local area but they do not 
conceptualise how that area links to contiguous ones.  Different animals may see the 
same object from (exactly) the same place but this is not publicly acknowledged; it does 
not give rise to a shared understanding among them. Although their behaviour may act as 
a signal to others, animals do not ‘compare notes’ regarding their experiences since this 
can only be done using language. Although they have memory, as compared with humans 
their behaviour is more immediately bound up with what is directly presented to the 
senses.  Cooperation mediated by language inter alia enables humans to act in ways that 
are informed by their understanding of things remote in time and/or place. Despite their 
lack of full conceptualisation of the external world animals may, of course, be said to 
have knowledge of aspects of it and to be able to communicate information.    
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The perspectives of individual humans essentially derive from contexts of cooperation.  It 
is important to affirm that humans adopt a third person point of view just as much when 
alone as when they are with others or cooperating. In this connection there can be 
confusion between considerations as to what is ‘personal’, ‘private’ or ‘public’.  For 
instance, suppose an individual is walking alone in total isolation, they still understand 
their circumstances to be ones which are in principle publicly observable.  A person’s 
bedroom may be a space no one else ever enters but they still understand the disposition 
of objects in it to be an objectively-given ‘state of affairs’.  Again, when someone is in 
pain, they understand it to be their pain rather than someone else’s, but they also 
simultaneously believe that it is objectively the case that they are in pain i.e. its validity is 
understood to be in relation to the population at large.  
 
On a rather different point, a capacity which humans possess and which distinguishes 
them from other animals is their ability comprehensively to copy i.e. to copy in any 
respect or any aspect.   This is of the greatest value in practice since it enables them to 
duplicate what are judged to be effective ways of doing things.  The point to be made at 
this stage is that this ability may steadily expand in scope given a context of human 
cooperation taken together with full conceptualization of the external world.  For 
instance, copying (duplicating) a structure such as a tool or a shelter is feasible given full 
conceptualization of the world of objects, but it may reasonably be doubted whether this 
would be possible in (say) a world of sensations.  The phenomenon of copying seems to 
be associated with the ability to adopt a third-person perspective arising out of 
cooperation.  Even in respect of the (non-material) copying of a sound, which is involved 
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in language acquisition, the degree of success with which this is done may only really be 
judged from a third-person point of view. 
 
Human understanding 
With the advent of characteristically-human cooperation, in what ways do humans come 
to understand and explain aspects of their situation and environment?  It can be suggested 
that conceptualization would consist of two primary strands which are clearly discernible 
in our thinking today.  As stressed earlier, there would be a development of concepts 
relating to the understanding of human behaviour utilising theory of mind; such notions 
as purposes and reasons would be fore-grounded.  For instance, it might be understood 
that one person injured another because of sexual jealousy.  Now this strand of concepts 
only even begins to come into play for the first time during a period when humans are 
already active in an established, patterned way in the non-human environment, perhaps 
most obviously as they gain access to food and water.  The second strand consists of 
concepts, employed for instance in this latter type of context, which do not involve 
implicit reference to theory of mind.  The identification of berries which are poisonous is 
an example.  In other cases there is understanding of how a human being works as ‘a 
physical system’.  For instance, when drinking water, use may be made of cupped hands 
to lift water towards the mouth.  The relevant understanding is:  in this connection the 
palms need to be concave upwards and with the fingers kept close together.  (Plainly a 
parent would teach their child to do it this way.) 
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It must be stressed that the use of either strand of concepts goes considerably beyond 
simply an apprehension through the senses of what occurs in a particular instance. As 
already stressed, in respect of the first strand, the concepts are employed to grasp 
intentionality and other aspects of what may be termed the ‘meaning’ of the behaviour 
(e.g. that it is ‘jealous’) i.e. that which, in a sense, lies ‘behind’ observable physical 
behaviour.  In respect of the second strand, too, additional conceptual understanding is 
involved:  as when in the example above, water is observed to fall from the hands 
because the fingers became separated.  
 
Proceeding further, in connection with the conceptual bifurcation, two differing kinds of 
explanation may be provided involving purposive (or personal) causation and non-
purposive (or non-personal) causation.  The first involves explanation by reference to 
such considerations as reasons or purposes while the second hinges on empirical 
generalisations of various types.  Thus there is a difference between saying of an adult 
that she poured the dirty water into the ground because she no longer needed it, and 
saying of a young child that the water fell from his hands because his hands and fingers 
were separated.   This last explanation points towards (or derives from) the generalisation 
that water that is not held within a continuous cupped surface falls to the ground, or at 
any rate to a lower level.  With respect to the practice of preliterate peoples it is quite 
correct to view an implicit generalisation of this type as proto-scientific in its character. 
 
In connection with explanation the time dimension is (typically) implicitly or explicitly 
involved.  Human understandings in which the two types of explanation come into play 
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also arise after the event.  Thus where the countryside is drenched it may be inferred that 
it has rained recently.  The other case – involving purposive causation - is particularly 
important because of the complexity of the ways in which outcomes ramify.  Thus given 
prior familiarity with bows and arrows, where an individual unexpectedly comes upon a – 
possibly abandoned - bow and sheaf of arrows, its purpose together with the fact that it 
has human creators/designers may be readily appreciated.  However, in the absence of 
such familiarity, a priori it may not be possible for an individual to judge its nature or 
provide an appropriate type of explanation for its existence.  There is even further 
complexity because human purposive activities have unanticipated consequences, making 
it even harder to judge the appropriateness of each type of explanation, either separately 
or in combination.     
 
A further concept which may usefully be highlighted at this stage is that of power (related 
also to ‘strength’).  This plays a part in both types of explanation. In respect of the first 
type it is correct to say that while purposes, intentions and so on may be manifested in 
behaviour, in and of themselves they are non-material: the exercise of human powers is 
needed so that empirically-defined objectives may be achieved.  In the explanation of 
human activity this contribution of human powers is being acknowledged, either 
implicitly or explicitly.  The powers may be physical or non-physical (as with memory) 
but the focus here is on the former. We recognize, for instance, that when a physical 
rescue is being undertaken a mother may lift her small child but not vice versa.   Thus, in 
respect of explanation by reference to purposive causation, there is recognition of the 
contribution made by potentially variable powers, in this case that of physical strength.  
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But in the case of the second type of explanation too there is typically at least implicit 
acknowledgement of the contribution of power.  Consider for instance the difference 
between saying a man died because a tree collapsed and hit him on the head and saying 
he died because a leaf hit him on the head; we would readily accept the former 
explanation but not the latter.  
 
It is important to note a contrast which arises from the conceptual bifurcation and, 
associated with it, the two differing kinds of explanation.  In respect of non-purposive 
causation, the general position is that the explanation is of a type understandable in 
principle by humanity as a whole.  Thus to explain that particular berries are poisonous, 
or that water is failing to pass through a pipe because one section of it is angled uphill, is 
to provide an explanation in principle understandable by anyone; indeed, if it is true, it is 
true irrespective of culture.  On the other hand, with respect to purposive causation the 
content of the explanation varies considerably and in a more open-ended fashion; indeed, 
it is as variable as is the varying character of human purposes, with the consequence that 
it may not be, in the same sense, understandable by anyone.  This last may well be true, 
for instance, where the explanation concerns a way in which humans are relating to each 
other.  Where it is explained that someone bows down because they are in the presence of 
the king, this is only readily understood by someone who understands the significance of 
bowing and the notion of kingship.  A way of putting this is to say that non-purposive 
explanation tends towards universalism, while purposive explanation, although typically 
alluding to patterns of behaviour, nevertheless tends towards particularism. 
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Arising out of the conceptual bifurcation, people understand each other and each other’s 
behaviour in two different ways.  Consider, for instance, the universal phenomenon of 
aging and the physical and behavioural changes which tend to accompany it.  In 
observing others we understand them to be children, elderly people and so on.  However, 
we simultaneously understand who they are while understanding their purposes and those 
of others orienting towards them.  The same person is an elderly lady and Queen 
Elizabeth II. 
 
An important objective of this section is to situate in an initial way the phenomenon of 
religion.  One is now in a position to identify a key source of this ubiquitous 
phenomenon.  Consider the point that in the early circumstances of mankind there is 
conceptual bifurcation.  Supposing one asks:  is there at the same time understanding of 
the precise scope and limits of application of each set of concepts?  In respect of that 
stage of human development surely the answer is negative.  At the risk of being pedantic 
it is worth spelling out that we are able to do so today because of our greater conceptual 
resources and resources of knowledge (although in actuality many people might struggle 
to order their ideas on what is a difficult topic).   The suggestion is that religion tends to 
arise in the early circumstances of mankind because explanation by reference to the 
strand involving reasons and purposes is being applied in contexts where we would 
expect to use the other type of explanation. In a related way it may also be asserted that 
the line of demarcation between the contexts of application of the two types of 
explanation could well differ as between two early social groups. (In this connection the 
reader might even be inclined to speculate as to whether people might once have existed 
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who used the former – purposive explanation - while making no use at all of the latter 
type of explanation.  A reason why that is unlikely is because the latter type figures, for 
instance, in the sort of way already illustrated in connection with access to food and 
drink, an activity which necessarily preceded the initial utilization of theory of mind.)  
 
A further consideration is germane to the emergence of religion.  Above it was noted that 
considerations of power enter at least implicitly into both types of explanation.  However, 
the power that manifestly belongs within the second type of explanation can be vastly 
greater than that entering into the first, since human physical powers are so slight relative 
to those of natural phenomena.  Yet humans depend upon those phenomena for their very 
survival.  Hence there is a motive and therefore a tendency for them to try to ‘come to 
grips’ with natural phenomena using concepts associated with the purposive explanation 
and understanding of human behaviour.  This is why religion tends to be 
anthropomorphising in the sense that concepts derivative from humans and their 
behaviour tend to be attributed more widely e.g. to gods and spirits. To take a 
(hackneyed) example, when rains follow a long period of drought it may be that this is 
explained by reference to a purposive agent answering the prayers of the population.  
There is even a faint whiff of these types of conceptual issues in the way even today we 
seek to understand the problem of climate change by reference to (a) natural rhythms in 
the internal workings and motion of the earth and the sun, (b) the unintended 
consequences of human purposive behaviour, and (c) the idea of an ‘Act of God’. Further 
sources of religion are considered in chapter 5. 
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Magic is sometimes distinguished from religion through the idea that the former is to be 
understood (simply) as a quasi-technology.  It therefore probably has its origins within 
the context of non-purposive causation.  Consideration of a couple of examples may be 
suggestive:  first, an outcome at a distance is understood to be ‘produced’ by the firing of 
an arrow from a bow; secondly, it may be believed that lightning ‘produces’ thunder, 
given that they occur in the same context and one sometimes follows the other.  In both 
examples correlation is involved but only in the former case is it the exercise of human 
agency which gives rise to the cause (release of arrow) which produces the ‘effect’.  
(N.B. No reference is here being made to human purposes.)  Hence, considering the 
generality of contexts where non-purposive explanation comes into play, some involve 
human agency generating a cause which produces an effect while others do not.  A 
further example of the former would be the human lighting of a fire which causes meat to 
cook.   Again, the crucial point may be lack of clarity as to the appropriate line of 
demarcation between the two:  hence the belief that humans can so act as to ‘cause’ 
effects where we judge it to be impossible.  Regarding the point that magic, it might be 
claimed, is only sometimes effective, it is relevant to say that we still accept the 
explanation that aspirin causes a headache to disappear despite the fact that this is not 
invariably the case.  (No doubt in some instances where supposedly magical effects are 
produced in a person, psycho-somatic factors are involved.) 
 
The main point to arise from this section concerns the bifurcation which must be 
expected to be present in the thinking and manifested in the actions of early humans, as it 
is in our own.  The implications of that bifurcation bear on religion but they ramify more 
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generally throughout human life; often both types of explanation are combined in the 
understanding of events within a single context.  Although it is being asserted that both 
types of understanding are involved from an early stage, of course there is no implication 
that any particular explanation or understanding is notably sophisticated.   
  
Rationality, values and interests 
From the outset humans may be judged to act sometimes in rational ways, in the sense 
that they are endowed with reason, just as they act in other ways e.g. emotionally, as in a 
fit of temper; one may add that this is further to (particularly higher) animals themselves 
exhibiting a kind of proto-rationality.  The scope of application of rationality is 
interdependent with what is known.  A demonstration of rationality of approach in 
respect of practical activity directed at empirically defined objectives would be as 
follows:  where anthropologists have encountered pre-literate peoples accustomed to 
using stone or bone tools for cutting and sharpening and have then acquainted them with 
the use of steel tools, the people concerned relatively quickly appreciate the power and 
value of the latter tools and wish to add them to their tool-kit.  A primary way in which 
the scope of rationality tends to become extended is through the understanding of what 
may be adopted as a means to other objectives:  there is an expansion in those ways of 
acting which are desire-independent.   
 
In this connection the types of shared understanding indicated in the previous section and 
increments therein are of the essence.  Action which is judged rational in the sense that 
appropriate or effective means are used to reach a given objective is, among other things, 
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action informed by those types of understanding.  Should you wish to assist another 
person it is rational to take the fullest account of that person’s own purposes; should you 
wish not to go hungry you would be wise to take account of the food sources understood 
to be available locally and the identification of what is or is not poisonous.  Plainly it 
could be judged rational to pray for rain.   In this regard it is not an observer’s judgment 
as to effectiveness which counts:  a correct judgment of rationality is essentially made 
taking the fullest account of the perspectives of the person(s) concerned.  However, it is 
also the case that where an increment in pertinent knowledge or understanding takes 
place, it is rational to modify behaviour to take account of it. 
 
Cooperation also comes to define and express shared values.  At the purely animal level 
there are sources of gratification, discomfort and pain. At the human level – to take an 
example - food, particular foods and the skills needed to gain access to them become 
valued.  Arising out of experience, the adoption of a rational approach will tend implicitly 
to be valued, through the understanding that it tends to be effective.  It is not just the 
skills of particular individuals which are valued but, associated with this, those persons 
may themselves be personally esteemed. From the outset, the valuation of individuals to 
an important degree derives from their prowess relative to that of others.  Again, where 
several people exhibit and usefully deploy the same valued skill, they may effectively 
occupy a valued status.   
 
In Chapter 1 the normative element inhering in cooperative activity is pointed up i.e. the 
feeling the parties have that they ought, or are obliged, to contribute. This links intimately 
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to the emergence and contribution of values.  In connection with cooperation certain 
tendencies will tend to become valued in respect of parties to it:  the tendencies to be 
reliable, truthful, considerate and helpful.  In addition, behaviour which anticipates a 
need for cooperation will come to be valued.  This is the context in which to see the 
parable of the Good Samaritan.  It is not difficult for people to see that anybody could 
find themselves in a situation where they would be more than grateful for that type of 
intervention in their own lives.  The net result is that Good-Samaritan-type behaviour is 
highly valued, although many would perhaps fall short of it in their own behaviour, 
because of the various inconveniences and ‘costs’ involved.  Indeed it is not too much to 
claim that the fundamentally new element in life flowing from characteristically human 
cooperation is the normative, given that normative expectations inhere in it and it also 
comes to define and express shared values.  To an important degree, in tracking – as one 
is attempting to do in this study - the implications of the developing structure of 
cooperation, one is simultaneously tracing the patterned changes in respect of values and 
norms. 
 
Interests are also defined.  It is revealing that in modern English this word is used in two 
connected ways:  to refer to that in which one is interested; to refer to what is in one’s 
interests.  The link has to do with the fact that one will tend, among other things, to be 
interested in that which is in one’s interests; however, the former concerns the 
individual’s outlook or orientation, while the latter is rather more concerned with an 
objective state of affairs.  Putting it very generally it may also be said that it is in one’s 
interest or in the joint interest to access that which is valued.  From the outset the interests 
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of cooperating individuals may be understood in some respects to differ (which may lead 
to breakdown), and differ also from their joint interests, providing an endless possible 
source of disputes. Most obviously, there can be argument over the division of ‘the 
spoils’ i.e. the product of cooperation where there is one.  The tendency of humans to 
cooperate is matched only by their tendency to squabble.  With defined values and 
interests there are also identifiable reasons for action. For instance, an individual may 
seek to acquire a particular skill in order to be able to achieve a valued status.  In human 
life a powerful structuring principle is the tendency for individuals to appreciate and 
strive for the esteem of their fellows.  It makes more widespread the motivation towards 
acquiring and deploying skills and capacities which generally facilitate the achievement 
of valued ends.  In connection with the structuring of behaviour it is also the case that 
humans are able to formulate and understand rules with which they may or may not 
comply.  Activity structured by values, reasons and rules taking place within a 
substantially cooperative context stems from human foresight and itself gives rise to both 
shared and individual memories.  This makes highly pertinent Tallis’s (2013, p.7) 
assertion that, ‘our lives are lived as explicit narratives that go beyond mere organic 
continuation’ (2013, p.7). 
 
Again putting it very generally, it in people’s interests to acquire knowledge pertinent to 
their concerns and involvements, both actual and potential.  Characteristically human 
cooperation itself has a direct bearing upon the tendency for knowledge and 
understanding to spread.  In this regard it is of the essence, as noted earlier, that humans 
provide their own subsistence cooperatively as opposed to their doing so on an individual 
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basis.  The latter could conceivably occur in the absence of information flow, while the 
former cannot.  The point is that cooperation necessarily yields information about what 
other parties are doing and what leads to successful and unsuccessful cooperation.  For 
instance, where cooperation with one party tends to have a better outcome than 
cooperation with another, this would be known and, quite possibly in addition, the 
reasons for it.  Of course, there are many situations where humans might be secretive.  
However, for information to be a source of power and influence implies that for at least 
some of the time the information must be utilized or imparted. There is also the 
motivational consideration that doing so may be a route to being more highly esteemed. 
The implication is that where particular human beings acquire greater significant 
knowledge about the environment – including the disposition of resources - or about the 
skills needed to utilize resources, it will tend by various means to spread, which 
emphatically is not to say that all those around will have equal access to it. A patterned 
phenomenon - again, cross-cultural in its nature - whereby information is diffused, which 
also bears witness to the value placed on it, is gossip.  
 
Morality 
It is judged that the normative element inhering in cooperation is a basic source for the 
emergence of morality, the primary type of social regulation and integration, which 
assists us in the achievement of valued objectives.  It is important to see how this arises.  
A useful starting point is to note that when cooperating one typically ‘relies’ upon the 
other parties, but there can never be certainty that they will comply or ‘deliver’; indeed, 
one may decide not to comply oneself.  When relying voluntarily on someone else one 
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typically behaves – at least initially – as if they will behave in the expected way (there is 
a forward time reference), but one may be disappointed.  A whole vocabulary concerned 
with such matters as trust, reliability, promises, assurances, and the notion of traitorous 
behaviour is used in our ordinary parlance to refer to this key area.  Yet the pattern of 
cooperation would not have evolved if there were not an overall tendency for cooperation 
to be successful; it is cooperation carried through which delivers the benefits.  Most of 
the time people do make a real effort to cooperate.  Now, as already implied, the key 
development in humans making this possible consists of the process of ‘internalisation’:  
basically, an individual has come to feel they should be ‘reliable’, ‘keep promises’ and so 
on; we encourage this in children.  Of course, as we know, there can be ‘external’ 
sanctions but cooperation would never be as widespread as it is without this ‘internal’ 
element.  It does not follow that one cannot act against internalized normative 
expectations, but one is then likely to feel ‘rotten about it’.      
 
As one would expect, morality is very much concerned with how normative expectations 
become broader in their application.  In this connection, attention may usefully be 
directed at three-person situations.  Individuals are able to judge when another person is 
in a similar position to themselves and how a third party behaves towards that other 
person as well as towards themselves (involved in each case is ‘taking the role of the 
other’).  Hence a judgement may be made as to whether ‘equal cases are being treated 
equally’.  This is the source of the fundamental moral notions of fairness and unfairness.  
It is significant that young children quickly develop a clear sense of fairness and 
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unfairness in respect of adult behaviour.  Where this notion emerges locally it is quite 
apparent that it could expand to be shared within a local community or more widely. 
 
So cooperation involves normative expectations but the character of the expectations is 
subtle and needs further clarification.  When one is cooperating with another it is of the 
essence that the unexpected may happen.  How to respond?  The preparedness of each 
party to provide ‘help’ is a main pattern.  Suppose the other person has slipped on the 
floor, one may help them up.  Not just this but one might reasonably be expected to note 
when the other person is heading for trouble – again through ‘taking the role of the other’ 
– and intervene or forewarn them. However, if they fall over six times, one may give up, 
thinking them unreasonably clumsy or careless.  Again, when engaged in a task a 
‘reasonable amount of effort’ may be called for, but what is a reasonable amount?  Given 
considerations of fairness, it may sometimes be implied that both or all parties should be 
trying ‘equally hard’, but where differing tasks are involved the extent to which they do 
so may be hard to judge.  Clearly the relation may break down where the other party 
judges one’s effort to be insufficient.  What is apparent is that the obligations 
underpinning cooperation vary with the role playing situation but are often subtle and 
diffuse; they may only be revealed when protest follows their perceived violation.  
Indeed, reflecting on life generally, one can see that it is punctuated by episodes where 
there is a breakdown of cooperation, often accompanied by quarrelling or recriminations. 
 
Once the network of cooperative relationships is dense the obligation to provide help may 
move from something inhering in a particular instance of cooperation or a particular 
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relationship to a more general obligation understood to apply on a wider basis in life.  As 
is often pointed out, reciprocity is a key underlying principle:  just as I might need help 
from people I encounter so could they from me; why should there be an obligation on 
them, if not on me?  The idea of reciprocity may partly be viewed as an extension in time 
and place of the principle of fairness.  Consider also that just as one could assist a partner 
who had fallen over there may be a passer-by who is nearer and could move to assist 
them:  so is there a general obligation, for instance, to be kind and helpful.  Significantly 
too, one may sometimes be generous but one also notices ‘breaking points’ in one’s own 
generosity.  In relation to a charitable appeal many might supply 50p but rather few more 
than £2000; of course, their means differ which is a significant factor.  In all areas there 
develop notions of what can ‘reasonably’ be expected.  Importantly, there are natural 
variations in the extent to which people have internalized a sense of obligation and 
differences in the way it might be expressed; some people are more ‘suspicious’ of 
others, some more credulous.  For good reasons we think of some people as ‘mean’ and 
others as ‘generous’.  Some people might fairly be characterized as particularly altruistic:  
they fall at the end of a continuum.  This is the context within which to see altruism – 
which has frequently been felt to present a problem for selfish gene accounts of human 
behaviour. This argument is perfectly compatible with there being large differences in 
average generosity between societies, as is widely reported.  
 
It must be acknowledged that within this account morality plays a secondary and 
dependent role in that what is being asserted is that it is the need for, and realization of, 
the benefits of cooperation which give rise to it.  Constituting as it does a distinctive, 
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central element inhering in human behaviour, it might at first be thought that morality 
could develop as some kind of independent, autonomous cultural element.  Certainly it 
may be observed to undergo change within society as well as differ from one society to 
another, there may also be expansion or contraction in its perceived scope, but it is 
judged here that its fundamental role is still to contribute to patterns of behaviour 
propagating the cooperative genes.  Importantly, in virtually any human context there is 
extensive immoral and amoral behaviour, alongside conformity to moral rules.  
Nevertheless in sum the extent to which human beings at large conform to moral rules is 
broadly commensurable with the extent to which they benefit from cooperation (which is, 
of course, not to say they benefit equally).  In Appendix 3 the related phenomena of 
empathy, torture and coerced compliance are examined and situated in relation to the 
main argument. 
 
------------------------ 
Summarizing conclusion 
The topic of this chapter has been the implications of characteristically-human 
cooperation and its developing nature.  Cooperation gives rise to understandings but it in 
turn arises out of them and is informed by them.  Strategically important are full 
conceptualization of the external world and the adoption of a third person perspective.  
Also strategic – and arising out of theory of mind - is the tendency towards bifurcation in 
respect of types of explanation or understanding:  there can be explanation by reference 
to purposive (or personal) causation or explanation by reference to non-purposive (or 
non-personal) causation.  An important suggestion is that religion tends to arise in the 
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early circumstances of mankind because explanation of the former type – involving, for 
instance, reasons and purposes - is being applied in contexts where we have come to use 
explanations of the latter type.  This, in its turn, bears upon the structuring of rational 
action; it could be rational, for instance, to dam a stream to store fresh-water, but also 
rational to ask or pray for rain.  
 
As fundamentally, cooperation – which itself has a core normative element – gives rise 
to, and also expresses, values and interests;  it is also the source of the fundamental 
socially regulative pattern, morality.   The existence of these elements makes individual 
and cooperative behaviour within a locality more understandable and predictable; there is 
a patterning of objectives whose achievement tends thereby to become more likely.    In 
the next chapter some implications for population are at the centre of attention.  
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Chapter 3:  Important Factors in the Growth of Population 
Practical action impacting on the vital processes 
The next stage in this study is to consider, in a general way, the implications of the 
changes identified so far and arising out of cooperative activity for population growth. 
Important is the point that, following the genetic change under consideration, there is the 
adoption of a shared third person point of view, and human action becomes less bound up 
with what is directly presented to the senses than is the case at the animal level.  Shared 
knowledge of the external world together with foresight inform practical action.  The 
scope of shared knowledge may be understood through the idea that initially implicitly, 
but progressively, there is grasp of the spatial-dimensionality of the physical world. There 
can, for instance, be use of signs and symbols with corresponding directional and 
relational implications (as with an arrow drawn in dust); there can also be two and three-
dimensional representations and models of physical reality.  That a doll may be used to 
represent a human figure is indicative of the conceptual grasp of space quite apart from 
considerations to do with the context of its use, which might be that of sympathetic 
magic. Combined with this there is an incipient notion of cause and effect arising from 
the human ability to change the external world directly through their own actions (as 
when food is conveyed to the mouth and consumed). There is understanding that 
something thrown alters a given state of affairs at a distance. 
 
The full conceptualization of physical reality informs actions taken in respect of it:  
humans are thereby empowered.  Of strategic importance is the point that they acquire 
knowledge of their surroundings which can be conveyed to others.  This can develop to 
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the point where one would say people possess an implicit ‘map’ of their locality, or one 
which might be explicitly represented in a drawing. At an early stage, differing highly 
local sections of ‘map’ may in effect be ‘stitched together’.  Access is thereby gained to 
an extendable ‘map’, perhaps initially crude but one to which more detail may be added 
and which may cover an ever greater area; the developing picture will also contain 
information relating to the vertical dimension.  The understanding of surroundings is also 
four-dimensional in the sense that there is an early grasp of serial time and patterns of 
diurnal and annual change. The joint grasp of space and time is reflected when it is 
asserted, for instance, that by travelling in a particular direction one will not get to a 
specific place until tomorrow.  Humans as moveable bodily forms (and existing through 
time as a process) may be delineated within the ‘map’; the human body may itself be 
‘mapped’ (on the surface and internally).   
 
Practical action in respect of all three vital processes is thereby shaped. There is 
observation of how pregnancy leads to the birth of a baby, giving rise to the possibility of 
practical action leading to abortion and infanticide. Initially there is no grasp of the link 
between penetrative sex and subsequent child-bearing but some understanding of this 
may develop, given the correlational pattern. Where there is understanding there can be 
action arising out of it as with coitus interruptus.  The growth in understanding leads to 
control being exercised over fertility given understanding of likely future circumstance 
e.g. of the diminishing or, alternatively, increasing availability of food supplies. (This is 
illustrated for the tribal society of Tikopia in Chapter 6.)  The main way in which 
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cooperation impacts on fertility is through a pattern of (gradually) increasing control 
informed by foresight. 
 
Despite the central importance of cooperation, it remains the case that much human 
behaviour simultaneously serves (in a certain sense) the ‘interests’ of both the new 
‘cooperative’ genes and the other human genes.  This would be true of most behaviours 
which tend to reduce injury and mortality and it links directly to the pattern whereby 
long-life is valued across societies.  In this context the understanding of the external 
world tends to reduce morbidity and mortality.  In coming to know which seeds, roots 
and leaves may be eaten in their locality, humans are simultaneously acquiring 
knowledge of those which are poisonous.  They also come to know the whereabouts of 
dangerous currents in streams and the sea and seek to avoid them.  At an early stage there 
is some rudimentary medical knowledge such as the recognition that dock leaves ease the 
pain caused by stinging nettles.   
 
In respect of this kind of knowledge, it is of significance that it is, in a certain sense, 
egalitarian in its implications:  it applies to people and their bodies irrespective of social 
status or access to resources.  Across the generality of societies there is likely to be 
implicit recognition that people’s needs are similar in this regard, even when the extent to 
which they are met is highly unequal.  Again, when there is accretion of medical 
knowledge at any point within a society there is a clear sense in which it could be said to 
be in the general interest for it to be widely disseminated.  On a further point, where there 
is any understanding at all that a condition is infectious it has the consequence that the 
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perceived interests of differing sections of a population become more bound up (just as 
the upper classes in Victorian Britain could not afford to be indifferent to the diseases 
particularly affecting the poor).   
 
Of course it is the case, however, that until relatively recently in human history the 
phenomenon of infection was poorly understood; we understand now how people’s 
actions and non-actions in the past contributed unintentionally to the spread of disease 
and thereby to increased morbidity and mortality.  It was the case, for instance, that 
during the centuries of European expansion, the diseases (such as measles) which 
Europeans took with them to other continents and islands resulted in great mortality 
among the aboriginal inhabitants.  However, this important fact must be correctly situated 
within the context of this study:  for one person to infect another in the ordinary 
unintentional way is not an instance of cooperation between them.  The thesis being 
evaluated here is that cooperation tended to give rise to population growth.  Specifically 
in relation to medicine that cooperation did indeed tend in that direction is more 
obviously true once one comes on to consider the institutionalization of specific roles 
such as doctor or healer; but to refer here to institutionalization is to anticipate later 
discussion.     
 
As knowledge grows there are associated changes in human attention and the implicit 
understanding of how further to acquire new knowledge.  To illustrate:  in coming to 
understand that one or two plants are poisonous there may be enhanced understanding of 
the potentiality for this to be the case for other, as yet unknown, plants.  Also, from a 
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modern perspective we would tend to say it would ‘make sense’ for particular individuals 
first to sample new varieties in small quantities to judge the effects; then if there are no 
ill-effects others could consume somewhat larger quantities.  However, that this 
constitutes a sound approach is itself something that needs to be learnt:  it is not known a 
priori. Hence advances in knowledge are interdependent with advances in the 
understanding of the means to acquire knowledge.  Of course, consideration of this 
example makes clear that those groups which make these advances sooner, other things 
being equal, are more likely to flourish and survive.  The adoption of elements of what 
would widely be thought to be a scientific approach will have survival value. It has often 
been claimed that science is ‘organized common-sense’, but it is as important to say that 
the common-sense of pre-literate peoples tends to embrace principles which we recognize 
to be elements of scientific methodology. 
 
Of course it is the case that from a modern perspective a particular belief or practice may 
be judged wrong but ancient medical knowledge tended to accrete because it was often 
helpful not because it was always wrong. It may also well be the case that such patterns 
as early urbanization may even have increased mortality in the short term i.e. as an 
unintended consequence, but it would remain true that cooperation directed to dealing 
with felt problems in urban areas (such as the possibility of fire) was more helpful.   It is 
a commonplace idea that morbidity and mortality were much higher in the past, but it is 
being affirmed here that human cooperation tended to lead in the direction of reduced 
morbidity and mortality. A primary way in which cooperation leads to growth in 
population is because it (gradually) bears down on morbidity and mortality.  Plainly, too, 
 54 
reductions in morbidity and in the occurrence of accidental injury – particularly in 
younger age-groups - have positive implications for subsequent fecundity and fertility. 
 
The ‘mapping’ of the external world is directly relevant to migration.  Given the 
availability of a map one is more confident of what one will find were one to move: for 
instance, one can avoid obstacles such as a mountain range; one can move in anticipation 
of finding a dense and occupationally varied human population as in a city or, 
alternatively, virgin territory for farming.  Hence there can be a relatively large set of 
migratory movements of differing kinds which proceed in a relatively orderly, 
undisruptive way:  the existence of a widely-shared ‘mental’ map may thus serve 
simultaneously to coordinate the actions of many people.  Given that cooperation also 
enables humans to be adaptable, two particular tendencies may be noted in respect of its 
further impact on migration.  It impacts through its tendency to distribute population 
across the greatest habitable area.  A second main way in which cooperation impacts on 
migration is that it redistributes population within the context of a broad overall spatial 
division of labour.  It can, for instance, generate movement towards areas which are 
already relatively densely populated such as cities, or, alternatively, away from cities into 
the suburbs. The impact of cooperation on migration is such as to increase potential 
numbers in association with extension in space and also to redistribute population within 
an overall spatial division of labour. 
 
Domestication of animals and plants 
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The discussion now moves to link human cooperation to the vitally important 
phenomenon of animal and plant domestication.  It is a familiar fact that the human 
presence on Earth has been accompanied by a process of increasing domestication of 
animal and plant life.  Of course, it is the case too that differing animals and plants were 
first domesticated in different places; for instance, those domesticated in (say) the Fertile 
Crescent were very different from those domesticated in the New World.  It is highly 
significant, however, that in the present context one can speak of a tendency towards 
increasing domestication overtime even allowing for cultural variations.   
 
The notion of domestication may be used in a broad sense to refer to adaptation to 
humans through genetic change or in a narrower sense where the reference is more 
specifically to human control over reproduction.  Broadly speaking human interaction 
with plants and animals generates genetic change in those plants and animals (in sum, the 
gene pool changes). When an animal or plant has been changed genetically in some 
respects, that forms the basis upon which there may be further change; in animal-
breeding this process is understood and actively pursued. Each new generation of humans 
has its own (established, but also gradually changing) life-style but it is also interacting 
with a modified set of animals and plants. The human behaviour involved here is various; 
for instance, one might be referring to eating apples, playing with dogs or shearing sheep; 
there is also use of draught animals. The way of life of a shepherd is predicated upon the 
existence of sheep of a significant weight with a decent coat of wool on their backs; 
maize farmers these days typically fertilize their own plants.  At the time homo sapiens 
appeared on Earth none of these ways of behaving would have been possible even had 
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humans possessed the requisite know-how; hence the process of domestication represents 
a source of long-term secular change.  Since animals and plants constitute the only source 
of food and are needed to sustain the pattern of human life in many other ways this 
pattern of modification is crucial.  As Petersen puts it: ‘The domestication of plants and 
animals, even at the neolithic level of efficiency, increased the potential population of the 
earth enormously.’ (1969, p.348)   The conclusion is that from the long-term process of 
the domestication of animals and plants it follows that the Earth becomes able to sustain 
a larger human population.  
 
Domestication also has a bearing upon the prospects in the event of substantial human 
mortality.  Suppose large numbers die as the result of plague or war.  The aftermath in 
Eurasia of the Black Death would constitute an example.  In respect of the build-up of 
population following each such episode the key points are these:  the land is still 
available - if it has been laid waste or vacated there is the possibility of movement back 
into it; the same types of domesticated animals and plants are (usually) still available.  In 
many cases the know-how will continue to exist even in a substantially reduced 
population to make good use of the available plants and animals. In sum, there is often 
reason to believe that population numbers may recover within a few generations.    
 
Having highlighted the strategic importance of domestication, it is important briefly to 
consider how it arises and situate it in relation to the phenomenon of characteristically 
human cooperation. Significantly, other primates do not exhibit the same tendency to 
domesticate other species. Of course, humans often themselves cooperate while relating 
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to animals but they also do so individually; they can also be observed to ‘cooperate’ with 
some domesticated animals to achieve objectives in relation to other domesticated or wild 
animals (consider a shepherd and his dog).  Properly to situate the phenomenon one must 
return to the point that cooperation between humans involves individuals possessing and 
developing a repertoire of ways of behaving, the use of theory of mind and the ability to 
‘take the role of the other’ being fundamental.  Now that particular orientation may be 
employed in relation to animals even though the animals themselves do not (fully) 
reciprocate. For instance, a shepherd signals to his dog given his (the shepherd’s) 
understanding of the view the dog has of a flock of sheep i.e. in an imaginative sense he 
‘takes the role’ of the dog. Again, a human may act towards an animal in the light of the 
observation that the animal ‘wishes to be let out of the house’ or ‘wishes to play’.  The 
patterns of domestication arise from humans acting towards animals in the light of these 
understandings; as part of this they sometimes – indeed often - act towards them in ways 
which may be viewed as exploitative of the animal.  In sum, it is capacities associated 
with the ability to cooperate in a characteristically human way which give rise to animal 
domestication.  In addition, plant domestication primarily arises from human action 
informed by forward time orientation and expectation, an orientation which similarly has 
its source in human cooperative behaviour. 
 
Fitness in social context 
Fundamentally, following the genetic change at issue, the fitness of particular categories 
of humans is increasingly to be judged relative to an environment shaped by cooperation.  
Fitness concerns differentials in survival rates which bear in their turn upon differentials 
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in reproductive rates.  Consider, for instance, the contribution to fitness of lacto-
tolerance.  This cannot be evaluated in some generalized sense without regard to the 
human as well as physical environment.  Suppose, however, there is a developing context 
of animal husbandry giving rise to growing milk consumption, then this would be 
expected to generate differential survival rates between the lacto-tolerant and the lacto-
intolerant.  The proportion in the population who are lacto-tolerant would grow.  
However, even more important, the absolute numbers in the population would tend to 
grow.  Hence the framework of cooperation – the life-style – shapes the gene pool while 
increasing numbers. 
 
Another significant case concerns alcohol-tolerance.  It is a striking and suggestive fact 
that ‘alcohol’ is etymologically one of the more antique words in the English language 
with traceable roots to ancient Sumer. (Roberts, 1980, p.68)  How exactly alcohol began 
its rise to prominence within Western consumption patterns is shrouded in mystery, but it 
is of the greatest significance because, of course, when added to water it reduces the risks 
from certain impurities. It seems likely that human familiarity with it would originate 
from leaving (perhaps) fruit juice lying around for a few days, but for it to become 
regularly consumed and at all widespread within a community there would need to be an 
established mode of production. Once there were an incipient pattern of production and 
consumption the conditions favouring the emergence of alcohol-tolerance as against 
alcohol-intolerance would exist. There is nothing inevitable about this pattern and, 
significantly, alcohol-tolerance in Western European populations is rather more extensive 
than in Far Eastern populations with their historically different sources of food and 
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consumption patterns.  Again, one can note the impact of an emerging life-style both on 
the composition of the gene pool and on a possible increase in numbers.     
 
From these examples it may be seen that in respect of ‘fitness’ the human or social 
environment is as critical as the non-human.  Indeed as civilization advances this 
tendency becomes more and more marked to the point where one might be tempted to 
affirm that the most important part of the environment of an individual human being is 
other human beings.  In earlier times individuals contracting acute appendicitis in 
childhood would probably have died young and failed to reproduce but today in many 
societies those having a propensity to suffer from this condition need suffer none of these 
consequences – although this does imply dependence on others.  Similarly, in modern 
societies, suffering from short-sightedness effectively does not imply any lack of 
‘fitness’. Consider also in this regard the massive elaboration and extension of the 
division and specialization of labour in a modern society.  One aspect is that people with 
the most extraordinary combination of qualities may be usefully accommodated.  For 
instance, people lacking practical skills to the point where they might have starved to 
death in earlier times, but nevertheless are capable of abstract thought, find valued 
employment.  These observations may reasonably give rise to the suggestion that within 
human society there is a certain tendency for humans to become domesticated in a way 
resembling the human domestication of animals. (Pagel, 2012, chapter 3) 
 
The important inference to be drawn is that, in the human case, the widest but appropriate 
context within which judgments as to ‘fitness’ are to be made is increasingly the human 
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cooperative framework itself:  it is that feature which places the cooperative genes 
fundamentally ‘in the driving seat’.   It is plainly the case that for extended periods in 
prehistory and history particular types of individual qualities will have been selected for, 
but it is also the case that, following overall change in the pattern of cooperation whereby 
subsistence is maintained, those tendencies in the selection of individuals may themselves 
undergo change.  For instance, the qualities aiding survival and in a sense favoured 
among hunter-gatherers differ in some respects from those among pastoralists. 
 
A further key point must not be overlooked.  It is readily clear to all that qualities such as 
good eyesight or fleetness of foot would have survival value given a particular mode of 
subsistence; certainly those qualities would be valued.  However, those lacking these 
qualities but possessing others of a quite different type might in practice survive as 
readily where their own subsistence is reliably and predictably maintained given the 
contribution made by the others.  Hence the qualities which go to make ‘good’ 
witchdoctors and priests could be said to be favoured given the right cooperative context.  
It will probably not escape the reader that this point has particularly sharp application in 
our own times.  Again, anyone can see the sense in which in a modern society we are all 
dependent upon scientists, engineers and medical doctors as well as farmers for the 
maintenance of our way of life.  However, the extent to which the underlying qualities 
associated with effective performance of some or all of these roles (including, for 
instance, high intelligence) are being selected for is probably rather slight without being 
zero.   Being a long-term welfare recipient and belonging to a family of welfare recipients 
– and possessing those qualities which assist in doing so more effectively – has survival 
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value as well, given a certain type of overall cooperative framework (which is in no way 
to deny that relations of dependence can generate systematic political change). 
 
The same type of point applies to psychological and behavioural tendencies.  At first 
sight, being aggressive or assertive seems to have survival value, but so too can being 
timid or meek – given circumstances where people generally have regard to or respond to 
those qualities; indeed, we are told that ‘the meek shall inherit the earth’.  In effect, 
particular types of society draw out and raise the profile of particular qualities, and in this 
regard change may sometimes be quite rapid.  Thus in Nazi Germany, the qualities of a 
fascist-minded, bullying type of male were favoured  together with a female type oriented 
to children, the kitchen and the church (and many of each type were forthcoming), but 
happily this was only for a relatively short period.  The striking feature is the way in 
which differing types of society (with large populations) each exhibit correspondence 
between social structure and the distribution of character qualities in the population.  
Again, this points to the central importance of the wider cooperative framework in 
sustaining the aggregate population.  In Appendix 4 the position of humans is considered 
in the light of the notion that fitness must be judged in relation to a species’ position 
within the ecological system as a whole.   
     
Human consumption:  the need to ‘repeat the dose’  
At this point one can usefully draw attention – in a simplified, schematic way -to a 
recurrent pattern which is particularly relevant to human access to food and water but 
also has some application to their more general access to resources which sustain the 
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pattern of life.  Suppose, for instance, that access is achieved on a particular occasion to a 
valued foodstuff or to water at a particular place or in a particular way and that it is also 
believed (given existing knowledge, which may in fact be scant) that it could not have 
been more readily achieved elsewhere or by other means.  Now it may be that some food 
or water is consumed  but so also is some removed e.g. to a home-base but there is a 
practical limit on the extent to which this could be done; also relevant is the point that 
stored food will deteriorate in quality and water cease to be fresh or become 
contaminated.  The key point arises from the fact that it is of the essence that the need for 
access to food and water continually recurs:  at some subsequent time the need will 
reassert itself.  When it does it is an expression of human rationality that a main line of 
approach will be to try to gain access again in the same way i.e. to try to ‘repeat the 
dose’. 
 
The purpose here is not to follow through with unnecessary detail but to point up some of 
the implications of recurrent need.  For a start, it is motivationally of the greatest 
significance and is a fundamental driver of knowledge, both particular and general.  For 
instance, it is essential for those concerned to be able to recall where the access point 
was, how to get there and the method employed.  Given awareness of scarcity there may 
be an attempt to control who has access to the knowledge.  Now the attempt exactly to 
‘repeat the dose’ may fail but relevant context may be supplied through the implicit 
understanding that conditions on the earth’s surface tend to vary continuously.  Given 
that one achieved access to a particular foodstuff at this point but it is not now available, 
could it perhaps be available at an adjacent point?  Given recurrent need there is an 
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incentive to get to know what is available in the vicinity.  Consider a further point.  
Several return trips may succeed but then there is failure.  Why is that?  Could the 
passage of time itself be a factor?  Yes, it could because of the factor of continuous 
seasonal change.  Perhaps therefore one could rely on other foodstuffs for a period but 
usefully return to this site at a subsequent time.  Hence there is powerful motivation to 
achieve understanding of the significance of time, particularly as it relates to diurnal and 
seasonal patterns of change. 
 
Where there is settled agriculture similar considerations come into play.  For instance, 
someone cultivating the soil may perhaps commence by sowing and later reaping a 
valuable crop.  How to respond when the need for a further crop is urgent or that need is 
anticipated?  The tendency would be to proceed as previously by sowing in the 
expectation of subsequent reaping; or even, where a greater crop would be welcome, to 
increase the area planted.  This last would be rational given the implicit understanding 
that adjacent land might have similar qualities.  Again, this could fail because of seasonal 
change.  Perhaps one can consume other foodstuffs in the meantime and sow again at the 
same time in the following year. Now we observers know that where similar planting is 
endlessly repeated on the same land the crop may deteriorate.  But if such deterioration is 
noted, how should one respond?  A reasonable first step would be to move operations to 
the immediately adjacent virgin land, which again is a kind of repetitive move.  Should it 
also be the case that further attempts are made to farm on the original land it would 
certainly be a valuable observation to make that it can sometimes exhibit ‘recovery’ after 
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a fallow period.  Hence there is powerful motivation for understanding to develop in a 
‘proto-scientific’ direction. 
 
Evident too in these types of cases is motivation to exercise control.  That was apparent 
in the first example where knowledge as to the whereabouts of foodstuffs might be 
withheld from others.  In the farming example of course it is only too obvious where 
foodstuffs are to be located.   The motivation in that case is all in the direction of 
exercising control over who has access to the site of production (or storage) of the 
foodstuffs:  the pressure is towards increasing security in respect of retention of, and 
access to, that which one is engaged in producing.   One possibility is that there are 
several adjacent farmers with some shared interests who together protect their lands.  
Another possibility is to get non-farmers to help to do this probably in exchange for a 
proportion of the produce of the land.   
 
Two differing uses in modern English of possessive adjectives are suggestive.  In the 
broader sense the reference is to that which is associated with a person or persons and is, 
in some sense, ‘of’ them:  my raspberry (which I have just picked); your shoes; his plate 
of food.  However, to say the plate of food in front of someone is ‘his’ in this most 
minimal sense may hint at, but does not guarantee, secure access; for instance, someone 
else could take it away.  Again, there is a sense in which what a farmer produces is ‘his’ 
or ‘of him’ but it does not follow from that alone that he has first claim on it.  A strand of 
the human story concerns the construction through cooperative endeavour of an 
institutional framework whereby in appropriate contexts possession in a weaker sense is 
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firmed up into possession in a stronger one.  There are many possibilities here but, of 
course, a second main use in English of possessive adjectives concerns ownership, 
implying unrestricted access to, and enjoyment of, property.  The example of the farmer 
points also to considerations of fairness and moral considerations:  humans come to feel 
that it would be ‘unfair’ if someone who worked to produce something gains nothing for 
his or her pains.   
 
These examples point to the need for institutional arrangements and they exhibit the 
motivational pressures leading in that direction.  Effectively, attention is being drawn to 
what might be termed ‘pressure points’ in life which give rise to a need for rules, thereby 
providing greater security and/or predictability.  However - a point that recurs in a whole 
variety of differing situations – a need for rules rarely or never implies that any particular 
rule or set of rules is chosen (or emerges).  Hence it is only to be expected that there will 
be many cultural variations between societies bearing upon the issues of access and 
possession.  Importantly, in identifying ‘pressure points’ in life which give rise to 
cognitive understanding, practical action, and moral and institutional change, one is also 
identifying a source of cultural variations. 
   
Despite seeming relatively obvious these patterns are very important, indeed they are 
relatively obvious precisely because they are perennial and ubiquitous, having application 
to our individual and family lives today and even to the activities of such ‘collective 
actors’ as nation states.  It need hardly be said that in present circumstances individuals, 
families and nation states wish to know where crude oil or its various refined products 
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such as petrol are located and to have controlled, predictable and repetitive access to it.  
At the present time nation states are jockeying for position in the race to secure access to 
new sources of oil on the globe, accompanied by the attempt to develop international law 
regulating, for instance, access to the Arctic and Antarctic. 
 
Regarding access to the most basic liquid of all, water, the issues differ somewhat from 
those applying to food-stuffs.   There is the important distinction between fresh and sea-
water.  Growth in (implicit) understanding of the properties of water is crucial:  it is 
heavy and a main issue concerns collection and transportation; indeed the easiest way of 
getting it in quantity from one place to another on land is downhill via a channel or pipe.  
The closest thing leading to water seemingly being ‘produced’ might be the construction 
of a well.  Certainly there will be a tendency to ‘repeat the dose’ in terms of access; this is 
most obvious in respect of use of rivers, oases and wells.  Again, understanding will 
develop as to diurnal and seasonal change particularly in respect of rainfall and flooding.  
Where fresh water is scarce there is powerful motivation towards cooperative control of 
its sources.  There is growth of understanding that water may be contaminated and a 
consequential need to cooperate where possible to prevent contamination.  Absolutely 
vital is the controlled use of water in food production.  As is well known the political 
organization and technical division of labour in early civilizations – for example in the 
near east – was critically shaped by the need to develop and maintain systems for 
distributing water. 
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The idea of ‘repeating the dose’ is also highly relevant to sustained access to the food-
stuffs of fish and sea-food.  Indeed there is a sense in which it is even more applicable 
than for the main food-stuffs on land.  This is because the initial experience is that where 
a fish is caught on one occasion, a further fish may be caught on a subsequent occasion.  
Again, in the many tidal areas of the globe, where sea-food is obtained on the sea-shore 
(say) in the area defined as between low and high tide, common experience is that it may 
similarly be found there again, particularly following a further high tide.  Plainly too an 
initial belief may be that these sources are in effect inexhaustible; although, no doubt, 
there may be (potentially identifiable) conditions conducive to availability of supply.  
However, humans may well seek to exercise control over access to these sources, 
including knowledge of their whereabouts.  Nevertheless, the motivational thrust in the 
direction of institutionalizing anything resembling ownership of areas of the sea is plainly 
less than the equivalent on land; that is more likely to come into play in respect of areas 
of the foreshore, lakes or stretches of rivers. 
 
In sum, one can say that where there is recurrent need – especially for such basics as food 
and water – a rationally-based initial orienting tendency is to try to ‘repeat the dose’ to 
gain access.  There is powerful motivation to retain and expand relevant geographical 
knowledge and knowledge of technique.  Again, problems which are experienced tend to 
enhance understanding of the significance of time:  indeed it is not too much to claim that 
progressive understanding of the significance (including correlates) of diurnal and 
seasonal variation is foundational with respect to scientific knowledge. (While not 
amounting to laws these patterns are general and law-like.)   In connection with farming a 
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key understanding with respect to sowing and reaping concerns how often one can 
effectively ‘repeat the dose’; this is a strategic topic within agricultural science. 
 
Very importantly, however, the pressures do not simply have outcomes in respect of 
cognitive understanding and, where appropriate, practical response; much more is 
involved.   The acute need for predictable, and especially controlled, access gives rise to a 
need for cooperation going way beyond that involved directly in the collection or 
production of food or collection of water.  In a search for security regarding actual 
consumption, there may be cooperation among those whose interests are aligned or, 
alternatively, cooperation deriving from a division of labour between those with 
complementary interests. This is the origin of property rights which may take many 
particular forms.  A strategic development also occurs in the moral sphere:  those who 
produce something valuable are felt to be entitled either to dispose of it or to gain 
something else of value for their pains.  This growth of moral sense links inextricably to 
the general understanding that where producers gain nothing of value from their 
production they quickly produce nothing at all; from which we all lose out. 
 
Institutionalization represents a ‘locking in’ of tendencies.   In the literature a label 
frequently applied to societies before the modern period is ‘traditional’ with people 
understood to act repetitively in ‘customary’ ways, probably implying that to ‘repeat the 
dose’ in that type of society is supported by a normative ambience.  In this account there 
is occasion more than once to refer to cooperation at differing levels i.e. that higher-level 
‘second-order’ cooperation may govern lower-level ‘first-order’ cooperation:  the 
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introduction or emergence of the former where there has previously only been the latter 
represents a qualitative step-change.  In respect of the difference between traditional and 
modern societies a not dissimilar step-change is apparent.  In particular, in the latter type 
of society to ‘repeat the dose’ is again relevant but this time it is to innovate again and 
again (in ways which include, for instance, increasing the productivity of land or the 
efficiency of water transportation or use):  the expectation of innovation is ‘built-in’ and 
derives particularly from the pattern whereby research and development are 
institutionalized e.g. in firms and universities.  The economy has a trend growth of (say) 
two percent and this is expected in forthcoming years.  To do ‘the same thing’ in research 
and development is again to produce new products and services while in respect of (say) 
dress it is to adopt the new fashions just as one has done previously:  ‘repeating the dose’ 
is again supported by a normative ambience but this time it generates incremental 
dynamism.  It is judged that social development derives to an important degree from this 
kind of iteration involving change of level.   
 
From this highly schematic account one also gains insight into the link to population 
growth, given resource constraints.  Essentially, in the earlier examples considered above, 
‘repeating the dose’ only promises increases in population where more land and – what is 
closely related – more sources of fresh water become available.  This is simply 
suggestive of population growth by spreading.  Where, however, there is the step-change 
to ‘repeating the dose’ of innovation, and where, in addition, that innovation bears among 
other things upon land and water use, there is the possibility of sustained population 
growth within a defined area.  However, it is important to note that the selected examples 
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included the two differing contexts of food gathering and of food production as in 
farming, which differ markedly in respect of the population able to be sustained in a 
given area.  
 
So far in this section the whole emphasis has been on the need for repetition in respect of 
general access to resources and consumption.  It will probably not have escaped the 
reader’s attention that similar types of consideration come into play at the micro-level of 
individual action and individual instances of cooperation which are concerned with that 
access.  This is worth pursuing as a theme because the patterning in this regard also bears 
heavily upon the creation of social relationships and institutionalization.  As has been 
stressed humans possess serious foresight.  What they are interested in is not simply 
successful sex today but preferably also tomorrow and tomorrow; again, they are not 
simply interested in this meal or this night’s sleep with a roof over their heads, but the 
next one and the next.  In a broad sense individuals wish to have secure access to 
resources into the future which may provide personal security and that of near ones and 
dear ones. The predictable achievement of these interests for at least some is what social 
relationships and institutionalization are all about.  Patently, marriage and the family are 
concerned with secure and predictable sexual access, and meeting the repetitive 
consumptive needs of family members including otherwise vulnerable youngsters.  (The 
topic of kinship and marriage is systematically taken up in Chapter 4.)  
 
Where an individual instance of cooperation is successful, frequently there is excellent 
reason to want to ‘repeat the dose’.  Indeed there can be a rapid build-up in ‘vested 
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interests’; this is a source of some types of social relationships.  Supposing in a hunting 
and gathering society one has partnered a particularly effective hunter, one will be 
conscious that it will be in one’s interests to continue the association.  Indeed, a major 
fear would be that the association might be discontinued, so every effort will be made to 
assist in any way one can (even when, given the power relation, one may receive a 
disproportionately low share of the overall product). Not just this, but one would have 
learnt from prior experience how to cooperate with particular individuals. Hence there is 
every incentive to convert instances of successful cooperation into something more 
permanent - a cooperative relationship.  Some social relationships originate from the fact 
that interests are at least partly defined out of prior cooperation and thereby act as 
incentives for them to continue. It may also be the case that other relationships of a 
similar kind are evident in the locality.  Where there are two cooperating pairs engaged in 
roughly the same kind of activity, were it to be the case that one of each partnership were 
to drop out or die, the remaining participants could themselves fruitfully combine. This is 
indicative of the process leading to the creation of distinctive roles, which may be 
identified apart from particular incumbents.  In the next section, attention moves from a 
focus on the need to ‘repeat the dose’ in connection with consumption, to consideration 
of the mode of production and the significance for population of change therein. 
 
Development of forces and relations of production 
The view is taken here that the build up in the human population both among hunters and 
gatherers but also in later forms of society is in part interdependent with the development 
of what might be termed the ‘forces and relations of production’.  The use of the term 
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‘forces of production’ is taken to refer to know-how (including skills) together with the 
provision of tools and materials which are to be brought to bear upon a productive task.   
By ‘relations of production’ is meant the differing contributions people make in the 
actual performance of the task and the way in which they combine to effect it e.g. one 
person may act as a leader, while another contributes a specialized skill.  Following upon 
a particular quantity of product becoming available there can also be discernible stages 
when it is distributed and then parts or the whole of it may be traded (so one may also 
speak of ‘relations of distribution and exchange’).  Importantly, cooperation is typically 
at the heart of each of these elements.  However, it is not to be thought that a build-up in 
the forces and relations of production straightforwardly ‘causes’ population growth.  For 
one thing a particular build-up may only be possible given a recent increase in numbers.  
Economic growth must be understood as being interdependent with population growth 
i.e. strongly implicated in it. 
 
For illustration let us note that during the very long period of hunting and gathering in 
pre-history there were some highly significant advances in food acquisition.  For 
instance, hunters (who originally may have been little more than scavengers) became, on 
the archaeological evidence, sometimes able to tackle large animals such as mammoths – 
and even in numbers.  There is evidence pointing towards operations such as driving 
game – perhaps using sticks but also even fire – towards bogs in which heavy animals 
might flounder, or driving them towards and over precipices.  It may be judged that a 
whole number of elements need to be brought together to achieve this.  For instance there 
must be knowledge of the mammoth as a potential food source, knowledge of the 
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movements of herds of mammoths and their nearness or otherwise to a bog or a cliff; if 
fire is to be deployed there must be the skill to make and sustain it. On the relational side 
there must be sufficient people available, clarity as to how they are to be disposed, who is 
to do what and when; also foresight is needed as a preliminary to a plan being put into 
operation. 
 
The complications are of course not yet over.  A mammoth may be lying dead at the foot 
of a cliff but no meat has yet passed down anyone’s neck!  The mind boggles at the 
thought of what is involved in dismembering the mammoth and removing a substantial 
fraction of the meat to one or more home-bases where it may be consumed not just by the 
hunters but also by (say) women, children and perhaps the elderly.  Manifestly 
considerable organization is involved, and if things are to run smoothly there must be 
agreement e.g. about who gets the best and worst cuts and in what quantities.  It is plain 
in fact that cooperation is needed at this distributional stage and one can envisage too, 
particularly given the vast quantity of meat  which becomes available, that some could be 
traded with third parties. 
 
It is apparent also that many such attempts might be made before a mammoth is 
successfully tackled, but those involved could usefully learn from each attempt, whether 
successful or not.  The position is taken here that any potentially relevant retention of 
information or acquisition of skill amounts to enhancement of the forces of production.  
(It has been shown that pre-literate peoples have vast knowledge of vegetative sources of 
food in their vicinity; any increase in such generally-held knowledge constitutes such 
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enhancement.)  The increment in knowledge or understanding could also give rise to 
enhancement of the relations of production.  For instance, it might be realized that a 
greater number of people is required for the task or there is a greater need for their 
contributions to be coordinated.  In Chapter 1 the assertion is made that cooperation 
virtually from the outset involves means-ends orientation and a delayed gratification 
pattern.  It may be readily judged that that is the case here. If some people drive animals 
towards a point where they expect others to have lit a fire, then each of the two groups of 
people are orienting towards the other as a means; each activity is itself understood to be 
a means.   Also to attempt to kill a mammoth is not to kill it; successfully to kill a 
mammoth is not to eat it:  sub-goals must be reached which are necessarily less satisfying 
than the final goal itself - or more likely totally dissatisfying without it. 
 
This is but a single example but it is judged the process whereby population growth is 
interdependent with enhancement in the forces and relations of production is general in 
the human situation:  it is as true today as it was for hunters and gatherers. Furthermore 
the view is taken here that change in this respect is to be understood as occurring 
incrementally.  Of course, this leaves open the issue of timing:  change may have been 
very slow in the hunting and gathering period while being rapid today.  However, there 
was a tendency for there to be change in a discernible direction from the outset. At an 
early stage humans were tool users but perhaps even more crucially they were tool 
makers; this seems a distinguishing feature compared with other animals. Tool-making is 
an example of action directed towards something which may not be intrinsically desired 
but which is understood to be a step or means towards something else which is desired.  
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As time passed stone tools were used for a greater variety of precise purposes, by such 
means as striking flakes from a prepared core.  Also bone and antler were added to wood 
and flint, the bone needle being a key development in respect of the elaboration of 
clothing.  
 
In respect of both the forces and the relations of production, felt problems are the 
proximate causes of incremental change. (Basalla, 1988)  In respect of the former, given 
any particular configuration in respect of know-how, tools and materials, problems may 
be experienced and solutions sought. The existing configuration and the problems to 
which it gives rise are the essential crucible for the incremental advance.  Progress could 
be made by trial and error or by serendipitous means; there can be analogies drawn from 
one situation to another.  In a more complex society one might be able to identify an 
incipient set of ideas – ‘theory’ – perhaps warranting the name of pure science and an 
incremental advance in that sphere could give rise to applications. Similar considerations 
apply in respect of the relations of production. In any existing context of cooperative 
action, problems may be experienced which require and eventually give rise to a 
cooperatively applied solution.  To take an example:  population expansion may give rise 
to a need for greater organizational complexity, perhaps a modified division of labour, 
but that greater complexity has itself to be created.  
 
Patently humans are to a degree creative or innovative but, contrary to what is sometimes 
thought, there is no need to postulate that that degree is particularly high.  This is 
basically because many can benefit from a relatively modest technical advance where 
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they are in a position to observe it or hear of it.  As noted above, the quality which people 
do possess in abundance is the ability to copy; hence a relatively modest improvement in 
technique which obtains appropriate recognition may sometimes then be relatively widely 
adopted. In addition in any particular circumstances it may that a whole number of what 
one might term ‘candidate’ innovations are available to be observed or adopted, many 
arrived at in unintended ways, from which some may survive by a process of ‘survival of 
the fittest’.  It is really only in the modern world where research is institutionalized and 
there are established roles such as scientist and engineer, so that practical innovations 
may be expected to come on stream continuously.  (In Appendix 4 there is discussion of 
the human position within the ecological system as a whole and attention is there drawn 
to the contribution of values and also to the strategic importance of the progressive 
development of human understanding of elements of that system.)  
 
------------------------------------------------ 
Summarizing conclusion  
In this chapter some basic implications of characteristically-human cooperation for 
population growth have been brought forward.  Firstly, it was suggested that stemming 
from the genetic change under consideration, human practical activity directly and 
progressively impacts on the vital processes themselves:  on both fecundity and fertility; 
on morbidity and mortality; on migration.  The fact that some of these impacts are 
initially slight does not detract from their cumulative and long-term importance.  A 
further long-term process of the utmost significance for population growth is the 
domestication of animals and plants.  Given the theory being evaluated, it is highly 
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significant that it is human capacities inhering in, or arising out of, the ability to 
cooperate which give rise to domestication.  There again, through time multifarious 
qualities of differing types are selected for in the human population - the gene pool 
changes in patterned ways for extended periods – but a key point is that judgments as to 
the ‘fitness’ of particular categories can only be made relative to an environment 
increasingly shaped by cooperation.  The qualities selected for in animals and plants tend 
to serve cooperatively-defined human interests, while those selected for in the human 
population tend to make the overall pattern of cooperation easier to sustain or expand. 
 
It has been argued that in connection with human consumption – for instance in respect 
of such basics as food and water – a rationally-based orienting tendency is to try to 
‘repeat the dose’ to gain access.  This has implications for growth of cognitive 
understanding, but it also generates a need for security which is the origin of 
cooperatively-maintained property rights and an associated growth of moral sense.  At 
the micro-level interests expressed within, and arising out of, individual instances of 
cooperation give rise to certain types of social relationships and foreshadow the 
emergence of social roles.  In a traditional society ‘repeating the dose’ refers to people 
acting repetitively in customary ways, but in a modern society it can also come to have 
application to innovation itself.  Predictability and security are conditions conducive to 
population growth.  As fundamentally, the latter phenomenon is interdependent with 
incremental change of the forces and relations of production. 
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Chapter 4:  Kinship, Economic Life, Neighbouring, the Social World 
Sexual behaviour 
The theory of the selfish gene provides considerable understanding of patterns in animal 
behaviour between close blood relatives.  On the other hand, social anthropologists and 
sociologists have provided detailed accounts of the working of human family and kinship 
systems.  Kinship is fundamentally concerned with social recognition of blood ties – a 
significantly different focus from that of biologists. It is argued in the next section below 
that cooperation played the central role in the emergence of kinship organization.  The 
early establishment of stable and secure family and kinship systems is an essential 
prerequisite for population growth.  The discussion can, however, usefully commence 
with a brief consideration of the distinctive character of human sexual behaviour.  
 
Animal sexual activity changes with the passage to the human level. The loss of oestrus 
by the female is important for several reasons:  it links to the prolongation of infancy but 
also leads to the phenomenon of sexual love.  At the broadest level the coming of 
characteristically-human, cooperative behaviour refashions sex, giving rise to a range of 
options.  This impacts upon both the character of individual sexual acts and of continuing 
sexual relationships.  
 
There is impact on sexual activity because the actions of either party may 
(paradoxically!) be ‘desire-independent’ in the sense used earlier.  Because of this, the 
two parties can, for instance, cooperate in trying to produce near simultaneous orgasms 
or, alternatively, to produce a climax in one.  Despite the predominantly expressive 
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character of sex there can be instrumental orientation.  For instance, given appropriate 
understanding, a couple can cooperate to maximize the likelihood of conception or to 
minimize it – as is illustrated by the use of the rhythm method.  Kissing another person 
may be the spontaneous expression of emotion at a moment, or – slightly different – one 
may kiss another because it is understood to be an expression of love.  In a related way it 
seems that, despite the predominant character of sex being expressive flow, it is next to 
impossible to engage in that activity with another person without at some point at least 
orienting to the body of the other person, or to one’s own, as an object or a means.  
(Sexual behaviour as play is considered on p. 255.)  Plainly there may also be variation in 
respect of what it is felt ‘right’ to do in the context of sex.  That there is a ‘range of 
options’ is dramatized for us by the fact that within the ethos of the post-war consumer 
society more conventional ideas have given way to the notion that choice may be made 
from something resembling a ‘menu’ of practices including, for instance, sado-
masochism.    
 
Some of these points bear upon the variable character of on-going sexual relationships or 
relationships where sex is at least an element.  The fact that there is cooperation giving 
rise to a range of options means that the parties may shape their relationship so as to 
achieve other non-sexual objectives; there can be integration of significant life activities.  
Given foresight, people can embark upon a longer-term sexual relationship partly or even 
wholly for non-sexual reasons.  Sexual relations may then constitute a basis or ingredient 
- perhaps a motivational thrust - towards the creation of what may be thought of as other 
kinds of ties, including notably the economic.  In this connection - in a way with which 
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are familiar - the family (or couple) may be an economic unit of production and/or 
consumption.  Behaviour in prehistory is inevitably shrouded in a certain mystery, but 
Scarre nevertheless feels able to make some helpful and suggestive remarks regarding the 
emergence of this type of pattern:  ‘H[omo] ergaster was the first hominin species whose 
anatomy and behavior fully justify the label human…H. ergaster was the first hominin 
species to resemble historic hunter-gatherers not only in a fully territorial lifestyle, but 
also in a social organization that featured economic cooperation between males and 
females and perhaps between semipermanent male-female units.’ (Scarre, 2005a, p.12)  
On a related point regarding pre-literate societies, it is to be expected that patterns of 
behaviour will change once some insight into the link between penetrative sex and child-
bearing arises.  Population control in a tribal society is illustrated in Chapter 6. 
 
Given that there are sources of power both internal and external to sexual contact, 
equality between the parties in this regard is rarely achieved.  We are familiar with the 
way in which differences in respect of such matters as sexual experience, age, looks, 
wealth, and status, as well as the outlook of ‘significant others’ such as parents have a 
bearing upon who comes together.  For our purposes here what is most striking is the 
extreme variability and flexibility exhibited in the relation between sex and power.  For 
instance, no doubt it has tended to be the case that in patriarchal systems sexual activity 
focused on satisfying men; but there is also the pattern whereby young men may ‘service’ 
the sexual needs of moneyed or higher status women.  The fact that two (or more) people 
can cooperate in the production of a climax in one plainly gives rise to the phenomenon 
whereby sex may be traded as in prostitution.  Beyond this, particularly with the 
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assistance of various technologies, all manner of other patterns of behaviour may be built 
up with sexual interest as an underlying factor. For instance, through the media vast 
numbers may ‘share in’ the sight of a beautiful person.  In a way paralleling the usage of 
the previous chapter, one may speak of change and development in the ‘forces and 
relations of production’ of sexual stimulation:  the rapidity of change in this respect in the 
last century is evident. 
 
Kinship organization 
Attention next turns to the task of explaining the role of cooperation in the emergence of 
kinship systems.  The existence of patterned behaviour among close blood relatives is to 
be expected from the perspective of the theory of the selfish gene in its application to 
animals.  Dawkins (2006. p.297) has explained, for instance, how this gives rise to the 
hypothesis that, ‘in a society with a high degree of marital infidelity, maternal uncles 
should be more altruistic than “fathers”, since they have more grounds for confidence in 
their relatedness to the child’, an hypothesis which has been tested with favourable 
results.  However, it is plain that kinship and marriage as such are not illuminated in any 
fully rounded sense by the selfish gene theory as it has been applied to animals and it 
therefore becomes pertinent to inquire how human cooperation may have led to the 
emergence of such systems.  The view taken here is that a focus on cooperation enables 
one to bridge the evident gap between the perspective of zoologists and the social 
scientific work on the social recognition of blood ties.  Particularly valuable in this 
connection are such detailed accounts of the workings of human systems of kinship and 
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marriage as that provided by Fox (1967).  Of course, the transition from the animal to the 
human level must be understood to be ‘seamless’. 
 
Following the genetic change under consideration, all the relationships between close 
blood-relatives become cooperative in their general character, including the most basic 
one of all that between mother and infant.  That relationship becomes cooperative in the 
same sense as other relationships, but, of course, from its birth it is usually the mother 
who introduces the child to cooperative behaviour.  The relationship with the young child 
is most definitely a power relationship but also patterned by the mother’s tendency to 
behave in relatively selfless ways.  Rather rarely is the pattern one of coerced 
cooperation, but instead she dominates the child in a physical sense (including 
transporting it) and by shaping the context of its behaviour. 
  
Following Fox (1967) attention may next usefully be given to some basic points. The 
attachment of the mother to her own (young) child is centrally important in the human 
situation and, since she may have more than one, so is the sibling bond between her 
children which tends necessarily to arise because they are co-present with her (in 
actuality the children could conceivably be half-brothers and -sisters).  Of course, both 
male and female are needed to create a child but there is a basic lack of symmetry 
between the situation of women and men which goes deep into the character of kinship 
systems.  For one thing she knows which children have come out of her body but he for 
his part does not know this for sure even where there is some grasp of the link between 
sex and subsequent child-bearing; certainly he may easily not be similarly attached to his 
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‘own’ young child.  However, the basic unit of mother and young children is vulnerable 
for she is in need of a man or men who can supply her and her children’s needs e.g. for 
food and protection. A central reality is that she needs a man or men on whom she can 
‘rely’.  Now this need could conceivably be supplied by the man (or men) with whom she 
has ongoing sexual attachment, or conceivably her (now adult) male siblings with whom 
she has an existing relationship could play a part. Either way this contributes to the 
pattern whereby the cooperating relation between man and woman may have the form of 
a power relation. Where men are, in addition, cooperating in gaining access to food this 
would contribute to the broader pattern of them tending to dominate more broadly or, as 
one might say, ‘politically’.  
 
Given the existence of possible alternatives, an operative kinship system amounts to a 
way of answering various questions:  who is responsible for this woman and her 
children? Who is allowed to have sex with whom (and when)?  Is there recognition of 
perhaps exclusive long-term attachments between particular men and women with their 
associated obligations (as is the case with marriage)?  Following marriage where do 
people reside?  More generally, who shares a home-base?  When someone dies who has 
control of significant property, who subsequently has control of it (the issue of 
succession)?   Following genetic change of the type described, where the human 
population locally is relatively tiny the need (implicitly) to answer these questions in any 
wider sense might not be particularly pressing, but as the population locally grows the 
position would change.  This is because there could be all-manner of disputes without 
clear resolution. Cooperation and failed attempts to cooperate give rise to shared 
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understandings which inform future action.  For instance, someone may be felt to be 
cooperative who accepts responsibility for what others see as his (or his wife’s) children.  
It could be the case that certain patterns of behaviour would tend to become recognized 
as problematical while others are felt to be relatively unproblematic. Overtime those 
leading to less conflict would acquire normative weight, would become institutionalized.  
Hence those groups would tend to flourish – there would be less internal conflict - where 
they tend to have (implicitly) a relatively integrated set of answers to the above questions. 
The general point is that the emergence of rules helps generate orderly systems of co-
action; there emerges an extended cooperative framework.  (In a rather different context 
the links between cooperation, coordination and co-action are reviewed in Appendix 2.)  
 
Importantly, it does not follow that every successful group will come up with the same 
set of (implicit) answers.   Importantly, this is another instance where in accounting for a 
developing tendency, one is also explaining a source of cultural variations. In fact, the 
number of possible variations in answering the above set of questions is quite great (Fox, 
1970, p.39), but the point is that for a population of any size answers need (implicitly) to 
be provided.  There is the broad contrast in pre-literate societies between matrilineal and 
patrilineal systems, the latter reckoned by Fox to be ‘neater’ (1970, p.114).  This seems to 
have arisen from groups which have, on the one hand, in effect put greater weight on the 
different functions men and women perform in procreation, or, on the other, those groups 
(the larger number) who have implicitly put weight on the greater male participation in 
the mode of production i.e. emphasized the male ‘bread-winning’ role .   
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Given that at an early stage the human population was thinly and highly dispersed it is 
germane to point out that the same types of issues would have arisen for many relatively 
isolated small groups at differing times.  Differences in their precise circumstances might 
tend to push arrangements in one direction rather than another.  What is being asserted is 
that where a group tended to converge upon increasingly normatively regulated patterns 
of behaviour which implied a reasonably clear and integrated set of answers was being 
given to the above questions, this would diminish the level of conflict; correlatively a 
failure to do so might lead to conflict and increased mortality.  Hence the former type of 
group would tend to survive and flourish as against the other. 
 
In this context the institution of marriage primarily has to do with the social position and, 
in a sense, welfare of offspring.   Marriage may be thought of as a union of a man and a 
woman which is such that the children born to the woman are the recognized legitimate 
offspring of both partners.  The conferring of this status on the offspring is material in 
connection, with, for instance, inheritance and succession.  Marriage must also be thought 
of as a relationship between two groups. Again, it is apparent that there are institutional 
options.  For instance, marriage may be monogamous or polygamous; if polygamous, it 
may be polygynous (one husband, two or more wives) or polyandrous (one wife, two or 
more husbands), the latter being very rare.   There is an association between the existence 
of polygyny and a tendency for women to outnumber men.  The emergence of these 
institutional arrangements is at the heart of social order. 
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Of considerable significance too are rules of endogamy and exogamy and patterns 
suggestive of the idea that marriage may be seen as involving a patterned exchange 
between separate groups of men; the associated types of rules are widespread but vary in 
their detail.  An important effect of exogamy is that groups which might be separate and 
therefore potentially hostile are brought into relations of interdependence; there is also a 
sense in which groups are cross-fertilizing one another.  Hence, there is an expanding 
framework of affinal and kinship links whereby the society is being both renewed and 
integrated. (Beattie, 1993, p.122)  Again, an emergent pattern may be judged to diminish 
the likelihood of conflict between potentially hostile groups.  The societies in which these 
types of arrangements crystallize would have relative advantages.  
   
At this stage it may be worthwhile interjecting a point regarding the content of morality.  
A section of Chapter 2 deals generally with that topic and the view taken that morality 
develops out of the normative element inhering in cooperation and cooperative 
relationships.  In that discussion no particular mention was made of sex, although it is a 
familiar fact that it often figures prominently within the content of morality.  Having 
examined the impact of cooperation on the emerging nature of kinship (involving the 
elaboration of rules) one is in a better position to draw out a recurrent theme, of particular 
pertinence to patrilineal systems.   
 
As already noted, consistent with the theory of the selfish gene at the purely animal level, 
adults naturally tend to feel attachment to their own young children rather than those of 
random others, but for men as opposed to women there can be genuine doubt regarding 
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which is their own issue.  Where a man takes substantive responsibility for - and is 
expected to have responsibility for - a growing child understood to be biologically his, it 
will be recognized to be in his interests that he is not deceived in this respect.  Hence 
within the wider cooperative framework (within which men dominate politically) it will 
be felt important that the female partners of men potentially in this position should not 
‘cheat’, the primary responsibility being upon them because the potential problem is 
realized when they give birth to children.  Given the time interval between sex and 
subsequent childbirth, assurance that a woman is a virgin at marriage would also 
contribute to her husband’s security in this respect.  As is familiar, there may also be a 
secondary pattern whereby, among men particularly, it may nevertheless be felt to be in a 
man’s interests – at any rate he then becomes a recipient of sneaking regard - to have sex 
with a woman in circumstances where others would be responsible for any consequential 
childbirth.   
 
Although kinship rules and expectations most obviously are concerned with the 
regulation of relations between blood-relatives, it is particularly important to realize that 
they bear just as heavily on relations between non-relatives.  This is the case, for instance, 
where a man is effectively ‘warned off’ another man’s wife, or where he is obliged to 
respect another (unrelated) man’s claim on property acquired through inheritance.  In 
addition, the influence of kinship ramifies through the extended network in this kind of 
way:  where person A has a close kinship connection to, and hence interest in, person B, 
while B has such an interest in person C, then A may well need to take account of C and 
vice versa; these links reach out for some distance even though they become attenuated. 
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It is the very fact that kinship is so multi-faceted in its implications that contributes to it 
being so predominant an institution in pre-literate societies.  In a related way it is easy to 
underrate its relative importance in a modern capitalist society.  Consider, for instance, 
the fact that during one’s lifetime one is required to respect not just the ownership of the 
private real estate in the country at a given time, but also the continual transfers of 
ownership which are occurring governed by the laws of succession.  In passing, one may 
note that this (arguably, highly unfair) pattern is as integral to the functioning of modern 
capitalism as is the competition between individuals and firms, but it is the putative value 
of the latter which is always being advanced in ideological justifications of the system. 
 
Be that as it may; on a final general point, from the perspective developed here, there is 
no naturally given affective tie between non-relatives, hence there is a distinct possibility 
of conflict arising between them.  However, where cooperation occurs which draws 
together both kin and those who are not kin, a key point of interest concerns how these 
may inter-affect one another.  In fact, tension arises because relationships between kin are 
particularistic and ascriptive i.e. they are ‘given’ and therefore hardly optional, while 
there is a tendency even from the outset for those between non-kin to take on something 
of an achievement-oriented character, involving greater exercise of choice. As one would 
expect cooperation between non-kin is likely to be, to a greater degree, centered on 
performance.  People may become specially attached – as friends – but this tends to 
follow cooperation or arise out of it rather than to precede it.  The tension between the 
two types of bases for cooperation is evident in every type of society. 
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Economic life and social differentiation 
Attention next turns from kinship and marriage to a further centrally important aspect of 
human life, economic and property relations.  Of course it is the case that these two 
aspects connect up, that people relate to kin while gaining access to the necessities of life; 
indeed they would be expected to favour kin while doing so.  However, it also follows 
from the foregoing discussion that advantages would flow to those cooperating 
effectively not just with kin but also with non-kin.  In what follows it must be continually 
borne in mind that in the early circumstances of mankind there would be lots of small 
groups to a considerable degree acting independently but also occasionally or more 
systematically coming into contact and potentially interfering with each other; hostilities 
would never be that far away.  Hence those groups who cooperate most effectively will 
be that much more likely to survive and flourish; the cooperation could be in 
economically significant activity itself or it could be in the furtherance of hostile activity.  
It is also significant that, in respect of the latter, numbers of combatants affect outcomes.  
 
Economic and property relations concern how people extract the physical necessities of 
life from the environment, and how they distribute the goods produced.  Regarding the 
former aspect, the first and, in a sense, most basic method involves directly extracting 
what is required from the environment; this is done by means of hunting and gathering 
and sometimes fishing.  On the evidence we have from anthropological studies, the 
effective social unit often takes the form of a small group of a few dozen who live in 
relative isolation from other similar groups which may together make up the society.  
Such groups are often on the move since the resources of one area become used up 
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prompting the move to a fresh area.  (The way in which human activity is shaped by the 
need to ‘repeat the dose’ is considered in Chapter 3.)  These types of groups possess few 
material goods which are easily portable.  All the emphasis is placed on the solidarity of 
the group:  interdependence is maximised with each individual being dependent upon the 
cooperation of the others. 
 
Many on hearing about this method are struck by evident continuity from the purely 
animal level.  However, the methods employed – for instance, in respect of hunting or 
fishing – would represent considerable technical advances associated with enhanced 
human understanding.  This is plainly the case for hunting with bow and arrow and 
fishing with the assistance of any tool or constructed device.  The growth in human 
understanding flowing from human cooperation is the subject of much of Chapter 2.  
Taking full account of the cooperation involved in the development of the methods 
employed together with that involved in their use, it is evident that the methods arise 
from human cooperation and are sustained by it; indeed they represent an intensification 
of it. 
 
A second pattern arises from animal domestication.  It then becomes possible to sustain 
life on the produce of flocks and herds.  Societies are found which are virtually wholly 
dependent upon their herds while others have a mixed pastoral and agricultural economy.  
Those belonging to the former type are generally nomadic peoples or they may practice 
transhumance.  Pastoral people tend to be independent and resentful of authority.  They 
 91 
are often also adapted to raiding and warfare; it being the case that property in the form 
of livestock is easily stolen and moved. 
 
A third pattern, agriculture, makes possible a more settled way of life.  This may be of the 
‘slash and burn’ type, which nevertheless allows relatively long residence in a particular 
area.  There develop in association differing systems of land-holding.  Typically, the land 
is not regarded as the property of individuals, but is vested in social groups, such as 
extended families, lineages or tribes.  As is fully discussed in Chapter 7, agriculture 
makes possible a greater population density and the establishment of wider-scale political 
units.  
 
Given this brief review what needs to be pointed up is the contribution of cooperation in 
giving rise to these patterns and in sustaining them.  No doubt there are variations in the 
range and scale of cooperation among hunter-gatherers but cooperation is at the heart of 
economic life.  Domestic cooperation in food preparation and the rearing of children is 
ubiquitous.  In the frequently arduous conditions of simpler societies economic 
cooperation is a foundation for social life generally.  Proceeding further, anthropologists 
have made a number of distinctions in characterising the means of production.  For 
instance, Malinowski contrasts communal labour and organized labour:  in the former, 
the same kinds of tasks are performed by several people in association (as in berry-
picking); in the latter, several socially and economically distinct but related tasks are 
performed by separate individuals or groups (as in dwelling-construction).  (Beattie, 
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1993, p.188)  Without amounting to it, the latter pattern is perhaps pointing towards the 
emergence of a sustained division of labour. 
 
Turning next to the issue of how goods are consumed and exchanged, it is of the essence 
that people are living at or near the subsistence level.  This means that people who 
produce the goods consume most of them themselves.  However, this is a deceptive way 
of putting it because hunters, for instance, are putting food into the mouths of others 
besides themselves.  It is also the case that they are not simply eating but consuming in 
ways patterned by values, such as feasting or occasionally marking the importance of 
certain social occasions, such as births or rites of initiation.  The latter phenomenon has 
to do with sustaining a pattern of orderly cooperation across generations and through 
extended time.  
 
Exchange as such is especially characteristic of situations where there is some form of 
specialization; where communities produce different kinds of commodities they can 
cooperatively come together to exchange surpluses to their mutual benefit.  Significantly, 
however, the patterns of exchange are of more than narrowly-conceived economic 
significance, and take in social aspects; but since people value aspects beyond the 
narrowly economic this need not be surprising.  Particularly important is a pattern 
whereby the presentation of a gift to a potential enemy can be fruitful because it creates 
an obligation.  Well-known examples concerning the extra-economic significance of 
seemingly economic activities studied by social anthropologists are the kula of the 
Western Pacific and the potlatch of the American Indians of the North-West coast. 
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Among other things participation in the kula is an indication of social status; a further 
point is that the possession of a kula partner in a different region provides protection from 
dangers from human and spirit inhabitants.  Potlatch has to do with claims to status and 
their public acknowledgement. (Beattie, 1993, pp.197-9) These patterns tend to diminish 
conflict. 
 
At this point it is valuable to link cooperation to the bases of differentiation likely to be 
found within an early society.  In this connection one may distinguish organization into 
groups, that is people with common interests and leadership, and classification into 
categories, which is people viewed as having something in common.  One would expect 
the lineages considered in the last section to be basic groups in society. 
 
Also linking in with that discussion, one would expect differentiation by sex or gender to 
be the most elementary social classification.  Plainly this has to do with the fact that 
women bear and suckle the children, which tends to tie them in to the domestic scene.  
Where the economy is one of subsistence production it is not uncommon for a large share 
of agricultural work to fall on them.  Meanwhile men’s tasks tend to be those calling for 
greater strength and agility and which take them away from the home-base, such as 
hunting, sea-fishing and warfare.  As already indicated they also tend to exercise political 
authority, to which may be added the performance by some men of important religiously-
defined ritual roles. 
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Basic too is differentiation by age.  Plainly there are children so young they cannot 
perform adult tasks, and older people who lack the strength for them.  However, in a 
relatively unchanging social setting importance attaches to seniority and the idea that 
wisdom increases through life.  Aging in the strict sense necessarily occurs continuously, 
but there are significant markers such as those indicative of the onset of puberty.  Taking 
this into account recognition of adulthood typically involves passage through a ritual of 
initiation the main effect being that it qualifies people to marry.  Arising out of this there 
are sometimes age-sets formed by those initiated in a given period and a connected 
pattern whereby these sets pass through age-grades, a grade being a stage reached in the 
life-course.  Tasks may be allocated accordingly: for instance, younger men being 
required to take on those requiring physical strength such as fighting, while the older 
engage in those requiring ‘wisdom’ such as the arbitration of disputes. 
 
Differentiation by age is one way of ranking people.  However, there are other recurrent 
bases of ranking, stratification and hierarchy.  Linking in with what has been said about 
kinship, it is sometimes the case that rank is ascribed on the basis of descent:  persons 
belonging to certain such lines are accorded greater respect than others or receive 
privileges.   In respect of hierarchy and stratification more generally a very important 
factor concerns protection or the outcome of warfare.  For instance, there can be 
situations following the establishment of independent chiefdoms where outsiders become 
subjects because they have been conquered or are offered allegiance in return for 
protection.  There can also be a division of a society into full citizens and those with 
limited freedom.  In European history there has been the important distinction between 
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free men and others who are slaves or serfs, the slave being an item of property while the 
serf is not.  (Mair, 1970, p.55) 
 
Neighbouring relations 
In this section there follow some very general observations on a type of human relation 
which is on its face very different from kinship or economic relations but is almost 
equally basic.  The proposition being considered in this study is that cooperation – 
involving blood relatives and non-relatives, kin and non-kin – tends to give rise to 
population growth.  Since space is finite, population growth would itself tend 
increasingly to give rise to circumstances where non-relatives would be brought into 
close proximity i.e. circumstances where they would be more likely to inter-affect or 
interfere with each other (if only by accident).  However, since there is no naturally given 
affection between non-relatives, conflict could easily arise with all its attendant risks to 
life and limb. The implication is that for population growth to be sustained some other 
process must come into play enabling those in close proximity more readily to co-exist:  
neighbours must be able generally to ‘get on’. It is worth noting that the issue can arise at 
several levels e.g. between neighbouring householders or those sitting at adjacent tables, 
but also (say) between differing nations such as the U.K. and France.  How these 
situations are handled is thus basic to the human situation; the comments here seek to 
grasp that generality. 
 
Let it be said straightaway that a possible response to the presence of potentially 
interfering, close neighbours is hostility leading to an attempt to drive them out or even 
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kill them, but of course that would involve risk to oneself.  However, the potentiality to 
cooperate with them is there.  What can be said is that those people who find they are 
able to sustain cooperative relations with neighbours will tend to survive and flourish 
rather more than those for whom this is not possible i.e. the local populations of the 
former types of people will tend more readily to grow.  
 
It is significant that the term ‘neighbours’ is most often used in respect of equals or near-
equals.  A major way that the relation becomes important is that there can be chance or 
unanticipated occurrences where people can benefit from help:  obvious examples would 
include observing that one’s neighbour’s house was on fire or about to be burgled; a more 
minor item might be having regard to the safety of a neighbour’s pet which has climbed a 
tree.  Again, poor people especially can find themselves short of something like a food-
stuff which they could usefully borrow.  So one can benefit from help, but this must be 
reciprocated for the relation to persist and flourish; that is what is involved in a 
cooperative relation.  As stressed already cooperation involves a normative element 
implying that one may act in ways which are ‘desire-independent’. Thus when a 
neighbour requests help one may well immediately feel irritated, but nevertheless respond 
positively because one feels one ‘ought to’.  Given that these types of situation are 
recurrent among people at large, as with other contexts of cooperation, there emerge 
norms regarding what may reasonably be asked of a neighbour; which implies that there 
are also breaking points.  In particular it is important that neighbours understand that they 
must not encroach uninvited onto a neighbour’s territory, hence the saying, ‘good fences 
make good neighbours’. 
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In Chapter 1 it is made clear that cooperation is so defined as to include instances where 
the element of coercion is involved, so that phenomenon must be situated here.  Plainly 
there is the possibility of someone trying, and indeed succeeding, in coercing someone 
proximate to them.  However, it is important to assert that typically people cannot and do 
not conduct all their relations in that way.  Consider for instance patterns of behaviour in 
slave-owning societies.  Further to the observation that neighbouring is between near-
equals, the neighbour of (say) a slave-owner will not be understood to be a slave but 
rather another – proximate - slave-owner.  These two slave-owners could well have 
amicable neighbourly relations in no way diminished – in fact even enhanced - by their 
dependence on slavery.  Indeed one centrally important way in which they are likely to 
help each other is by keeping an eye out for, and apprehending, each other’s runaway 
slaves. 
 
Not dissimilar patterns are evident in neighbouring relations even where nation states are 
involved.  Take the case of the U.K. and France.  The two populations with their differing 
languages and traditions are widely recognized not always to get on that well: affection 
between the British and French is not always foregrounded e.g. in the popular press.  
However, each state can benefit from the assistance of the other.  When there is peak 
demand the British are quite prepared to receive electrical power into their National Grid 
by cable under the English Channel. The two states can usefully cooperate – and do – in 
apprehending fugitive criminals. The issue also arises regarding what is ‘too much’ to ask 
of a neighbour.  Thus relations between the U.K. and France have at times become 
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fraught on the topic of whether the French are doing enough to stop illegal immigration 
into Britain. 
 
The social and cultural world 
Given the advent of cooperation there is multi-faceted qualitative change in the character 
of life.  As noted values, norms and interests come to be defined within a developing 
cultural context.  Crucially, people become dependent both on relatives but also on some 
with whom they have no close blood ties.  They are vulnerable both in their relation with 
the immediate human and non-human environment.  In relatively stable circumstances it 
is often possible to identify something resembling ‘local communities’ within which the 
whole round of life may be led.  People can be said to have ‘vested interests’ in particular 
sets of arrangements.  What implications are this likely to have for their relations with 
wider humanity?  This way of setting the question up rather invites the answer ‘they will 
be defensive’.  Perhaps the truth is that they will tend to combine a defensive with a 
potentially exploitative outlook. 
 
It will generally be the case that resemblances are set up locally such that most people 
will operate with some idea of ‘our kind of people’.  The origins of this are twofold.  
Where blood ties exist there will be discernible resemblances; to this are added all 
manner of culturally rooted patterns.  In respect of the latter language is particularly 
strategic:  no one is particularly keen on being dependent upon someone with whom they 
do not share language, which is not to say that they will not enter such relations where the 
inducements are sufficient. Importantly, too, with regard to the structure of norms and 
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values – in which there is ‘moral investment’ - there will be suspicion of those who 
clearly depart from understood local practices; for one thing, there may be an expectation 
of reciprocation which is not forthcoming.  Religious differences promise to be extremely 
thorny since religion is concerned with highly strategic ideas which legitimise many 
courses of action. A consequence is that people are likely to be suspicious and potentially 
hostile toward those outside their particular cultural ‘bubble’. (see Pagel, 2012, Chapter 
2)  However, considering the whole generality of situations, there is considerable scope 
for variation in the numbers of people found within these kinds of cultural groups.  
Again, there is no reason a priori to believe, regardless of context, that the behaviour of a 
selected individual is to be understood simply by reference to a single cultural ‘bubble’; 
much more complex patterns are evident within modern western societies. 
 
In these circumstances ideas are likely to develop regarding the differences between ‘our 
kind of people’ and others; or between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  Also, use is likely to be 
made of ethnic markers (including sometimes racial differences) to firm up the labelling 
of the categories; in the corresponding understandings there is every reason to expect 
confounding of natural and cultural differences.  The fact that there is much more 
communication (including gossip) internal to a community rather than between 
communities lends itself to the formation of stereotypes i.e. expectations which are 
unreasonably rigid. Where people are felt to be different there will be a tendency not to 
extend to them, or at any rate not to the same degree, the expressions of concern for 
others and even altruism which we have argued arise within a cooperative context; at 
least, they may be put ‘on probation’ – they have something ‘to prove’.  However, 
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returning to basics, it remains the case that there are gains to be had from cooperation 
between insiders and outsiders but problems may be encountered on the way to their 
realization. 
 
Where it is evident that there is a difference of power between those in two proximate 
local cultural ‘bubbles’ and there is interference or conflict over scarce resources, early 
resort to the use of force by the more powerful is plainly more than possible since the 
‘costs’ of so doing may be slight.  A group may be driven out or there may result a 
system of forced cooperation as with slavery or the paying of tribute.  A more benign 
development from contact would be trade or some other system of regularized exchange 
(such as kula or potlatch referred to above).  There can be patterns where generosity may 
have the consequence of tying the other party into a system of obligation, or that seeming 
generosity conveys the meaning that a group is not to be meddled with because it has 
access to considerable resources.  
 
Given reference to ‘cultural bubbles’ and the related notions of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, 
it is important finally to note a change in the character of cooperation once numbers 
become at all large:  plainly there is an identifiable contrast between the functioning of 
very small and large communities.  Whereas in a small community of fewer than (say) 
150 people an understanding of the whole may arise out of personal knowledge of the 
others involved, this cannot be the case where the population is numbered in many 
thousands or even – as with most nation states - millions.  Nevertheless, in the latter case, 
people clearly act in ways informed by their understanding of the whole.  For instance, 
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they respond to symbols (such as flags) and representative groups (including national 
football teams).   
 
Particularly to understand the phenomenon of nationalism, Anderson (1991) introduced 
the notion of ‘imagined communities’, but others have widened its application beyond 
simply national groups.   The idea here is that members of the large group may hold in 
mind a mental image which underpins their identification with it.  In a related way 
Anderson draws attention to the contribution of print to the functioning of early national 
communities, and no doubt the mass media are very important today – in providing a 
stock of appropriate images.  Thus in drawing attention to the importance and sources of 
an imaginative element inhering in action arising within and sustaining large groups, 
Anderson’s contribution is particularly valuable.  However, in situating it in relation to 
this study one must return to the point that (even) a national group is to be understood as 
an entity arising out of human cooperation and sustained by it.  The content of someone’s 
imagination is not in itself behaviour, rather it inheres in or in some sense informs their 
behaviour; again – as one is reminded by mention of the mass media – cooperative or 
collective behaviour may be – indeed typically is - informed, in effect, by shared 
imaginative elements.  Virtually all action could be said to be shaped or informed by 
imaginative elements of some kind – including, no doubt, action expressing identification 
with small groups.  In Appendix 2 cooperation, co-action and coordination are 
distinguished and there is discussion of how the on-going reality of large groups such as 
nation states is sustained. 
 
 102 
-------------------------- 
Summarizing conclusion 
In this chapter the concern has been with how elements of the social fabric are built up 
and acquire stability.   Given our animal nature, plainly sexual bonds and relations 
between blood relatives represent a vital starting point but both are changed with the 
coming of characteristically-human cooperation.  Regarding sex the key point is that 
there arises a range of options, which means that the potential for sex to be an ingredient 
of differing types of cooperative relationship (no doubt characterized by differing 
patterns in power relations) and, in particular, its ability to be economically significant, 
increases; the ‘umbra’ of sexual intercourse potentially has a substantial ‘penumbra’.  Sex 
can be transitory and disruptive but more often it is (at least for extended periods) 
stabilizing in its implications.    
 
Absolutely vital is the way in which cooperation, on the basis of on-going ties between 
blood relatives, gives rise to kinship meaning the social recognition of blood ties; but it is 
abundantly apparent that, at the same time, this is the source of a variety of kinship 
systems i.e. an important source of cultural variation.  In this context marriage comes to 
define the position of off-spring, bearing, for instance, on inheritance and succession.  An 
expanding framework of affinal and kinship links both renews and integrates society.  
This is the primary system of co-action and coordination. 
 
Economic and property relations are as basic as kinship and marriage.  In respect of the 
former, cooperation may be judged to give rise to, and sustain, distinctive modes of 
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production.  Importantly, patterns of exchange may often be of more than narrowly-
conceived economic significance.  Kinship and economic considerations bear heavily on 
the bases of differentiation found in early societies:  sex or gender; age-grading; ranking 
and stratification.  An important source of stratification is a need for protection or the 
outcome of warfare.  Further and more extended consideration is given to modes of 
production in the review of developments in prehistory and history of Chapter 7.  
 
Although it may not seem immediately apparent the neighbouring relation is also basic in 
the human situation; as the population grows, it acquires greater importance and it 
operates at differing levels (e.g. that of individuals, communities and of nation states).  
Neighbouring tends towards being a relation of equals (implying reciprocity) but it can 
even have a bearing upon the stability of situations involving coerced cooperation, such 
as slavery.  Consideration has also been given to the character of local communities and, 
in particular, to patterns in the outlook on ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  Patterns change as 
numbers rise but – notwithstanding the value of the idea of an ‘imagined community’ - 
larger as well as smaller groups arise out of cooperation and continue to depend upon it. 
In this chapter some important sources of stabilizing regulation have been identified, an 
essential condition for sustained population growth.   
 
 
 
 
 104 
Chapter 5: Religion  
Nature and origin 
Cooperative activity may express or concern speculative thought just as it may be 
directed at more immediately practical concerns; indeed, the two may be found in 
combination.  Certainly, speculative thought is typically highly strategic within culture 
generally. The position may be briefly clarified by situating religion.  Although reference 
has been made to early man achieving full conceptualization of the external world, this is 
in no way to imply that the outlook at that stage could possibly have been a kind of 
simplified version of a modern, secularized or humanistic one.  As anthropological 
studies amply illustrate, religion and magic tend to permeate social life in pre-literate 
societies.  Magic is limited in its scope while religion possesses various aspects or 
dimensions:  the practical and ritual, the experiential and emotional, the narrative or 
mythic, the ethical and legal, and the material. (Smart, 1993, pp.12-23) Despite there 
being an elaborate narrative or mythic dramatis personae – for instance, of gods and 
angels - the only facticities which one ‘comes up against’ or can rely on are people acting 
in religious ways, or buildings, works of art, and other material creations. Religion is 
strongly integrated and highly strategic in the social, including cooperative, life of a 
society through its role in legitimating the widest range of action. 
 
It is important to stress that a religion is built up cooperatively over many generations and 
there may be said to be a religious tradition.  Although the approach is partial it has 
proved possible to utilize the notion of a belief system in respect of religion, given that 
various elements interconnect in complex ways.  There is a certain ‘freedom of action’ in 
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the cooperative elaboration of the ideas overtime flowing from the fact that the 
constraints in terms of the facticities are indeed relatively limited. Religion may be said 
to meet human needs but in no sense is it a straightforward manifestation of them; people 
experience it as meaningful as a result of acculturation (plainly, often from early 
childhood).  Correlatively, it is often the case that those adults encountering a religion for 
the first time experience the whole, or at least some elements of it, as bizarre (consider, 
for instance, the doctrine of the Trinity within Christianity or the idea of original sin). 
Complexity flows also from the point that it is simultaneously making several differing 
types of contributions to the life of the society.  
 
In Chapter 1 some brief points are made by way of explanation of religion and the 
intention is somewhat to extend the account here. (Stark, 1990) There the nature of early 
human conceptualization is considered and judged to have two primary strands:  one 
consisting of concepts – such as purposes and reasons - relating to the understanding of 
human behaviour utilizing theory of mind;  the other consisting of concepts which do not 
involve implicit reference to theory of mind.  Associated with this, were two differing 
kinds of explanation, one involving purposive (or personal) causation, the other non-
purposive (or non-personal) causation. The further suggestion was made that in the early 
circumstances of mankind, religion (and magic) arose because the strand involving 
reasons and purposes is being applied in contexts where we would expect to use the other 
type of explanation.  A further suggestion was that, since human powers are so slight 
relative to the power of natural phenomena on which they depend, there is a motive and 
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tendency for them to seek to ‘come to grips’ with the natural world using concepts 
associated with the purposive explanation and understanding of human behaviour. 
 
The notion is that early humans would be unable to distinguish sources and types of 
power in the way with which we are familiar; there would be awareness of purposive 
agency but what would be unclear would be the nature and limits of agency.  In this 
connection it is revealing that we have come to use the term ‘power’ both in the physical 
sciences and in human affairs while being fully aware of the underlying conceptual 
differences.  In science power is defined as the ability to do work in the mechanical sense 
and could be used for instance in respect of a machine or a hydro-electric plant.  In 
respect of human affairs it refers to the ability of one agent to get one or more other 
agents to comply with their wishes or instructions. There is also a usage where one refers 
to a human being’s ‘powers’ meaning their potentialities in terms of action; this rather 
bridges the two contexts since we understand a human being as able to do work in the 
mechanical sense as well as being able to influence others. We fully recognize that it 
might make sense for a subordinate to ask a favour or plead with someone exercising 
power, while recognising that this would be pointless in relation to an inanimate power 
source. The very fact that in modern languages this single term has crystallized out into 
these two differing meanings and contexts bears witness to the fact that they were 
scrambled at earlier times.  The same goes for the two differing meanings of ‘law’, the 
one – descriptive - concerning generalizations about the external world and the other – 
normative - concerned with how humans should conduct their affairs; the two contexts 
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would have been conceptually merged, or at least much less sharply distinguished, in the 
remote past.   
 
As regards power the position of early man may be put in these terms.  There would be 
general awareness that humans have the ability to produce desired outcomes.  This may 
be done directly by individuals (by their exercise of their powers) but it can also be done 
for instance by way of instruction to another party; it may also be done using animal 
power as when draught animals are employed.    In that respect there is awareness of 
intelligent or purposive agency but what would be unclear would be its scope and limits.  
The point is that a desired outcome may be forthcoming in contexts where, though it may 
be clear to a modern observer that no such agency is involved, that would not be the case 
for participants. Although familiarity with human action itself is the source of the idea of 
agency, a priori there is no reason to believe that agency is lacking from (say) a waterfall 
or cloud; after all each of these may generate desired outcomes. In addition, it may be 
altogether unclear what the scope of the power of humans or groups of humans is or was 
(recall the story of King Canute).  Humans encountering a structure such as Stonehenge 
for the first time might easily have been led to believe it to be a superhuman product. 
(Potentially, there is lack of clarity regarding the source or location of collective agency.)  
In an instance of witchcraft directed by one person towards another a priori neither party 
can be sure of its efficacy or its inefficacy (although in actual practice usage is typically 
under-pinned by tradition).   Agency could indeed be felt to inhere in any particular 
object or in the world at large. Indeed since so many desirable or undesirable outcomes in 
life – both major and minor - are properly understood by us to occur ‘by chance’ (a more 
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sophisticated idea than may initially appear; probability and statistics as a science 
seriously progressed only in the twentieth century), there is abundant scope for agency to 
be felt by early man to inhere in the world at large.   
 
Long-term in the human story beliefs concerning powerful external agency to which we 
humans are subject inform cooperative – extending into collective - action. That action 
may take many forms but tends to incorporate a repetitive, stereotypical elaboration of 
types of behaviour which are experienced as meaningful in relation to actual human 
agency e.g. something is asked; something is given; people prostrate themselves; there is 
an effort to placate:  in sum, there is a tendency towards anthropocentrism.  Importantly, 
the publicly-observable, repetitive, collective behaviour is self-validating in the sense that 
aspects of it may themselves be taken as manifestations of external agency. The 
orientation to the wider world would not be of the purely neutral or utilitarian type which 
we tend to adopt.   
 
In sum, one would say that in the early circumstances of mankind, although they 
possessed spoken language, they had very limited linguistic and conceptual resources and 
resources of knowledge.  There would have been no readily available route to 
understanding the sharp distinction between purposive and non-purposive agency which 
is basic for us.  An additional way of putting it is to say that they lacked secure access to 
the distinction between personal and non-personal causation.  (An intermediate type of 
explanation is teleological in its character as when the Ancient Greeks forwarded the 
suggestive idea that water ‘seeks out’ the lowest point.)  Hence the strong 
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anthropomorphising tendency: the entities believed to exist to varying degrees partake of 
the qualities of human agents; they can, for instance, be wrathful.  Smart (1992, pp.299-
300) summarises the character of traditional African religion in these terms:  ‘gods and 
spirits, those unseen forces which explain and affect human life, are thought of and 
related to in human terms’.  There is no avoiding the point that major religions exhibit the 
same tendency to this day:  regarding Christianity, the suggestion would be that far from 
God having created man in his own image, man has instead created the idea of God with 
qualities derived from man.  
 
In earlier times too the past would have been shrouded in great obscurity; as always the 
future is uncertain and gives rise to apprehension.  Linking in with purposive agency 
there is development in a narrative or mythic dimension.  Thus early Christianity 
provides an account of the creation; it goes on to tell us that the original humans 
disobeyed God and were driven from paradise; God wished to save the human race and 
the people of Israel were chosen as His instruments for this; Christ on earth died for 
human sins and made available God’s grace to the faithful; at the end of time God will 
come with saving power.  Of central importance, this narrative situates and normatively 
guides present behaviour:  the faithful are the church community and grace comes in 
particular through ritual participation in Christ through the Eucharist. 
 
Religion is highly symbolic in its character and it also seems possible that the way in 
which it is expressed and understood may involve confusion between the symbol and the 
thing symbolized.  Disagreements between Protestants and Catholics regarding the 
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doctrine of transubstantiation point in this direction, as does the way in which people 
relate to icons in eastern orthodox Christianity.  In respect of religion, that which is called 
forth by words, images, architecture, music, and ceremony can hardly be deemed not to 
exist. 
 
Thus religion exists at least partly because of the attempt to understand events in the 
world as meaningful and in the same sort of way as one understands the behaviour of 
people.  To see the position even more clearly it is worth going back to the basic notion 
of this study that humans cooperate using theory of mind.   What this means is that each 
of us is constantly ‘going beyond’ the externalities of someone’s behaviour to grasp 
intentionality, motive and related aspects.  (When someone is observed to enter a bank 
and we say that they are withdrawing money, at that point no money is observable at all.)  
Given a highly personal starting point, there is generally in human life a constant 
tendency to ‘go beyond’ physical externalities to make events meaningful and provide 
explanation: this is a major source of religion.  (So is it of science, but in that case there is 
use of concepts which belong to the context of non-personal {or non-purposive} 
causation. On a different point, the tendency being considered here may even have a 
bearing on the ubiquity of ‘conspiracy theories’ in modern life.) 
 
In a suggestive early work Frankfort and Frankfort (1961, pp.11-13) characterize the 
outlook in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia as being of an ‘I – and -Thou’ type.  
Significantly, three elements seem to be implied here:  (a) both self and world are 
construed in terms of agency; (b) there is felt to be an intimate relationship between 
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them; (c) ‘Thou’ has greater power.  From the outset the orientation to the greater power 
in the world is bound up with ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy. One has familiarity 
with how ordinary people conduct themselves in the presence of someone of high status 
who has the ability to affect their welfare:  something of this particular outlook may have 
been an ever-present feature of the orientation of early peoples to the world. As part of 
this, to get someone of high status to act in a desired way a subordinate typically has to 
acknowledge or implicitly accept a context for the legitimacy of the exercise of power. 
Thus from the outset the orientation to the greater power in the world is bound up with 
ideas of legitimacy and illegitimacy (the devil, for instance, forming part of a duality). 
(Atran, 2002) 
 
Frankfort and Frankfort (1961) are focusing on near-eastern peoples.  Thinking more 
generally, there seem to arise two main alternatives in terms of orientation in respect of 
power. Considering matters objectively, one would say that although an individual (or 
local human group) evidently has some power (as well as, or incorporating, some 
powers), the power located elsewhere in the world is – almost literally – infinitely greater 
(as demonstrated by such natural phenomena as the Sun rising and setting; or, in a 
modern context, by our understanding of how life on Earth is dependent upon there being 
a continuous supply of energy from the Sun).  Therefore the perspective may be that the 
individual (or local group) is set over and against massive power, but there is an 
alternative. There is also the possibility that power may be felt to inhere in the massive 
totality of the world but that the individual (or group) is understood to partake in it or 
draw from it temporarily.  (The underlying logical distinction is between identifying this 
 112 
as distinct from that, as against identifying this as part of that.) The former of this pair of 
conceptualizations seems to feed into the dualist perspective characteristic of western 
peoples while the latter fits more into the non-dualist (or monist) outlook found in the 
orient. (Wilkinson, 2003)   
 
In this connection an indicative idea within Hinduism is that of Dharma, ‘[t]he pattern 
underlying the cosmos and manifest in the ethical and social laws of humankind’. (Smart, 
1992, p.85) In a related way a distinction is sometimes made between ‘this-worldly’ 
occidental religions and ‘other-worldly’ oriental religions, but this is perhaps no more 
than a tendency or an approximate summation of not-always-consistent elements.  
However, there is a highly specific but suggestive contrast between saving souls on the 
one hand and loss of self on the other.   In their origins, these modes of thinking and 
orienting are emphatically not to be considered as some kind of ‘mistake’, rather they are 
consequences of the way in which conceptualization develops. (Mithen, 1999; Wright, 
2009) 
 
It need hardly be said that, given the religious outlook, where it is felt that particular 
individuals or groups can release the more general  or overarching power, or invoke it, or 
be understood to act in conjunction with it, this itself massively enhances their ability to 
achieve outcomes in the face of other human beings.  In the modern world this is in fact 
one of the main ways in which religion is experienced.  The non-believer does not feel 
that he or she has access to, nor is their life ‘overlooked’ by, any such non-human 
agency.  On the other hand, believers feel themselves to be acting in harmony with and 
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even able to invoke massive power, generally also viewed as the source of legitimacy.  
Not infrequently believers feel they gain advantages or privileges against non-believers; 
not infrequently it is felt the ‘wrath’ of cosmic powers could vent itself on non-believers 
or those adhering to other religions.  The point being made is that religion itself is a 
source of power (quite irrespective of putative sources of power of supernatural origin), 
which is an underlying reason why people in the modern world are so reluctant to give it 
up. (Wade, 2009) 
 
A consideration of the origin and nature of religion is bound to refer to the human 
familiarity with the occurrence of death and realization of its inevitability. Importantly, it 
is not just the thought of one’s own death which is troubling but also those of near ones 
and dear ones; also critical is the point that this could occur at any time.  Not just this, but 
there is underlying fear of illness, potentially distressing in itself but which could also 
presage early demise.  Other animals are similarly situated in an objective sense, but with 
the passage to the human level there is understanding of the reality, which threatens to 
hang like a dark cloud over life.  It is not uncommon for humans implicitly to feel that 
they are better placed than other animals but in this respect they are not.  Particularly 
awful is the fact that throughout time many adults have had to live with the experience of 
the death of children, and young children with the loss of their parents; virtually all of us 
greatly fear these possibilities.  Added poignancy is provided by the fact that, as has been 
stressed, humans are to a high degree future-oriented and concerned with security; yet, 
ultimately, future-oriented action will be interrupted or frustrated.   
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There is little doubt that religious ideas and practices have taken the various forms they 
have as a way of coming to terms with this ‘dark cloud’:  the objective phenomena are 
subsumed within a wider interpretive and speculative framework. (In a broad sense, 
religion mediates the relation between the living and the dead; Boyer, 2001.) Given 
familiarity with Christianity, it is hard not to concur with Russell (1925, pp.18-19):  ‘If 
we were not afraid of death, I do not believe that the idea of immortality would ever have 
arisen.’  Yet this is to pluck a single idea from one religious context.  It is essential to 
stress that religious ideas and practices take many forms, are highly integrated and 
perform several differing functions; but as one element they typically interpret or situate 
these disturbing phenomena in ways which people find meaningful, perhaps particularly 
in an emotional sense. This is illustrated by the notion that good people will go to heaven 
and the bad to hell, which makes the cosmos seem fairer, while giving expression to the 
desire for retribution.    
 
The ubiquity of fear of death, together with the realization of its inevitability, is of central 
importance for this study, however, because of its motivational importance in spurring 
cooperatively-undertaken efforts to delay it and generally to reduce morbidity and 
mortality; it thus provides a basic link between cooperative activity and the tendency for 
population to grow.  The full conceptualization of the external world is a cross-cultural 
phenomenon and it is that which gives rise to the general understanding of the reality and 
inevitability of physical death (despite there being marked cultural differences in, for 
instance, the religious meaning of death).  Although the changing methods used to tackle 
illness and potential mortality prior to recent centuries and the understandings informing 
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them often seem to us slight and pretty inadequate, the ‘direction of travel’ is clear, and it 
is towards the massive reductions in morbidity and mortality of which we are so 
appreciative. 
 
It is also the case that to understand the early religious outlook, in this and other respects, 
attention must be given to more subjective elements.  Taking a modern perspective it is 
readily appreciated that experience does not consist solely of experience of the external 
world.  For instance, one is conscious of the content of one’s own thoughts and of one’s 
own dreams, both of which may or may not be conveyed to others.  To orient to the 
external world is not to grasp the whole of experience, which was as true for early human 
beings as it is for us.  But what sense is to be made of such elements as dreams?  A priori 
there is no way of understanding their significance or non-significance.  However, since 
interconnections are often initially grasped through correlation some significance is likely 
to be attributed to them.  From a modern perspective it is abundantly clear that there are 
meanings to be extracted from dreams, and it is not at all surprising that they have been 
taken, for instance, as indications or predictions.   
 
Freud is, of course, a writer known for his interpretation of dreams but he is suggestive 
on another point too.  In his later work (Freud, 1949 [1923]; 1955 [1920]) he proposes 
that the human psyche may be divided into three parts:  id, ego and super-ego.  The id is 
the completely unconscious, impulsive, portion of the psyche that operates on the 
‘pleasure principle’ and is the source of basic impulses and drives; it seeks immediate 
gratification.  On the other hand, the super-ego is the moral component of the psyche, 
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which has no regard to special circumstances when the morally right thing to do might 
not be best for a particular situation.  The third element, the rational ego, is usually 
reflected most directly in a person’s actions in which context it attempts to achieve 
balance between the impractical hedonism of the id and the impractical moralism of the 
super-ego.  Particularly pertinent here is this last which is the internalization of finger-
wagging parental figures:  you shouldn’t lie, you shouldn’t steal etc; ‘conscience’ is a 
word often used for it.  Now there is modern understanding of internalization but did 
people understand the phenomenon in that way in earlier eras?  An important suggestion 
is that the source of the prohibitions and finger-wagging may be judged to be, or 
interpreted as, external e.g. God.  Where God is understood as the source of the moral 
order and one hears one’s own conscience, that experience could be viewed as 
communication from God. Paul’s conversion on the road to Damascus can perhaps be 
partly understood in these terms (involving God speaking to him). Again, where one can 
seemingly hear the voice – or advice - of (say) a dead parent, could not that be 
communication from the next world?  Something ‘internal’ may hence be ‘externalised’.  
(No doubt, in evaluating the significance of subjective experiences for religion account 
must also be taken of the widespread use of hallucinogens and other mind-altering 
substances.)  
 
Dreams and private thoughts are significant in an additional and somewhat different way.  
Importantly, they establish that physicality does not exhaust what a human being is.  This 
has a bearing upon how death is construed.  Basically, the central observational 
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experience of the death of another is that that person will never move again ‘under their 
own steam’ or never do anything in a publicly observable bodily sense; in addition, the 
body will generally decay.  But the existence of private thoughts and dreams makes clear 
that one is not totally made up of bodily form and publicly observable actions:  there is 
more.  This leaves open the possibility that the subjective elements form the basis for 
persistence of the individual beyond death (and, conceivably also, prior-existence before 
birth or even conception), so the widespread existence of beliefs of this type is only to be 
expected.   It is indeed the case that in many preliterate societies people orient towards 
ancestors in a religiously and socially significant way; they are highly significant in the 
present (where they may be invoked, for instance, to secure or challenge rights or 
responsibilities asserted).  The modern expectation that oblivion follows death (and 
precedes conception) is well-grounded, for instance on evidence demonstrating the 
interdependence of the mental and the physical, but this fuller understanding is 
essentially a product of science. (Dawkins, 2006)   
 
There are other religious topics where a modern secularized understanding will differ 
from that of early human beings.  It has been noted that pre-literate peoples generally 
understand that there is a link between sexual intercourse and subsequent childbirth while 
interpreting it in their culturally variable ways; no doubt the underlying basis of the 
understanding is again correlational.  But do they understand as we do that birth cannot 
take place without prior sexual intercourse (i.e. in the absence of recently developed 
technologies)?  There is no reason to think they would be confident on this point.  Hence 
the notion that a virgin birth could take place, probably as a relatively exceptional or even 
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special event, is one that could easily have currency.  Again the general thrust of the 
argument is that the religious type of outlook is to be expected in the earlier 
circumstances of mankind.  However, that outlook is being expressed in conjunction with 
full conceptualization of the external world; indeed, it is difficult to envisage religion 
existing without it. 
 
Thus in the passage from the animal to the human level, magic and religion inevitably 
make an appearance. (Bloom, 2007) In a modern secular context, as indicated above, we 
are used to taking the contours of the external world as a neutral, factual ‘given’ to which 
we may orient instrumentally.  While the orientations of early humans include 
instrumentality as an element, the latter is embedded within a wider religiously- and 
magically-shaped worldview.  For us, as Max Weber indicates, there has been a 
‘disenchantment of the world’.  Associated with this, there has been systematic change in 
how power is felt to be exercised.  From a modern secularized perspective, the exercise 
of agency is now felt to be substantively confined to humans and (higher) animals.  There 
may be a certain implicit feeling of loss or vulnerability flowing from the fact that desired 
outcomes cannot be achieved through, or by appeal to, other putative external agents; 
notions such as ‘fate’ and ‘bad luck’ bear witness to this.  On the other hand, the external 
world from its smallest to its largest manifestations is understood to be law-governed and 
to a degree predictable; in addition, our powers are greatly enhanced as we generate 
desired outcomes utilising our understanding of the external world (including our own 
bodies).  However, this in turn gives rise to greater individual vulnerability as against our 
fellow human beings, who can now, for instance, make powerful weapons and even 
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adversely affect the earth’s climate: few developments in life are an unmitigated gain or 
advantage.  
 
It may be useful briefly to situate some other recent contributions to our understanding of 
religion. Rather different – and seemingly with more direct links to evolutionary theory – 
are recently developed cognitive approaches which seek to illuminate the origins and 
varieties of religion.  In this connection it is relevant to note that evolutionary theory has 
greatly expanded since Darwin’s day and is judged to bear effectively upon disciplines 
such as anthropology and psychology.  As one would expect the key idea is that one can 
understand how we think through understanding the human mind as a product of 
evolution i.e. it developed as it did to facilitate the survival of the species.  (As is well-
known, one can understand differences between male and female outlooks and behaviour 
in respect of sex in this kind of way.)  
 
Illustration of the relevance to religion is provided by reference to Boyer’s ‘modularity of 
the mind’ thesis, which hinges on the idea that the human mind consists of various 
‘modules’ processing different types of information and giving rise to differing 
expectations and inferences about the world. (Boyer, 2000 and 2001)  This leads on to the 
idea that religion is the consequence of the functioning of differing domain-specific 
modules:  beliefs about the supernatural originate from core knowledge being misapplied 
from one domain to another i.e. by a kind of cognitive malfunction. These concepts 
‘excite’ the mind and propagate readily because they have the power to generate many 
inferences. (Boyer, 2001, p.164)  However, the anthropologist, Bloch, is unconvinced 
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partly on the grounds that our core knowledge is shared with other animals which, 
nevertheless, manifest nothing resembling religion in their behaviour.  (The view taken 
here differs in the respect that human but not animal knowledge is based upon full 
conceptualisation of the external world.)  Bloch reckons that religion arises out of, and 
gives expression to, humans’ imaginative powers. (2008, p.2060)  From the perspective 
developed here a further comment would be that Boyer focuses on cognition but religion 
is essentially an associational phenomenon and religious orientation is attitudinal rather 
than simply being of a cognitive type.   
 
Again cognitive in its emphasis but also bearing upon issues as to how religion is 
expressed is Whitehouse’s (2000; 2004) ‘modes of religiosity’ thesis.  This author draws 
from psychological theories of memory and views forms of religious experience as 
deriving from specific cognitive systems.  A key distinction made is that between 
‘semantic’ memory and ‘episodic’ memory, the former being concerned with abstract 
knowledge of the world, the latter concerned with actual occurrences in a person’s 
experience. (Whitehouse, 2000, p.113)  The suggestion is that the differing forms of 
memory underpin different types of religious life.  Whitehouse traces links between 
semantic memory, the relatively anonymous character of communities and relatively 
unemotional and doctrinally-organised forms of religion; in addition, he points to links 
between episodic memory, highly cohesive social ties and intense and imagistic forms of 
religion. Whitehouse judges that, while the modularity thesis bears upon universal 
features of religious thinking, his modes thesis accounts for religious variation.  
However, it has been suggested that there is no ready explanation for – what is frequently 
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observed – ‘oscillations between both modes within the same traditions’ (Tremlett, 2013, 
p.111). 
 
Ingold’s (1996; 2001) work has a different emphasis for it involves a move away from 
putative universal mental mechanisms back towards anthropological scrutiny of everyday 
life.  Indeed he rejects the picture of the mind as involving fixed mental systems in favour 
of a developmental model. Our human capacities are attributable not so much to genetic 
inheritance but to what he refers to as a development system which is ‘the entire system of 
relations constituted by the presence of the organism in a particular environment’ (Ingold, 
2001, p.261).  Within ‘the environment’ he appears to include both the natural world and 
culture and relationships.  Clearly in some respects complementary to that of Boyer, his 
approach probably recalls for some the nature/nurture controversy, but though it feeds 
into the study of religion within particular societies, it remains to be demonstrated how it 
would contribute to understanding the origins of religion or its development in the sense 
of systematic change over time in religious beliefs or institutions. 
 
It seems that fully to understand the phenomenon of religion there is a need to consider 
both cognitive and other capacities of individuals and the nature of cooperation and 
cooperative frameworks.  Indeed both the individual and the relational are brought to 
attention when consideration is given to the familiar question:  do we need religion?  
Responses to this question are informed by approaches and contributions within social 
anthropology which have been characterised as ‘functionalist’ or ‘structural-functionalist’ 
in their character.  Consideration of the so-called ‘functions’ of religion is helpful as long 
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as it is understood that it bears rather less on the issue of origins and rather more on the 
contribution to social integration and stability.  The suggested functions of religion are 
sometimes for individuals and sometimes for society as a whole.  For example, 
Malinowski (1948) says that religious ritual relieves anxiety when people are embarking 
upon a risky venture.  On the other hand, it may be suggested that religious ritual draws 
people together; it integrates society.  Evidence from social science suggests that 
societies held together by some kind of religious practice may survive more effectively or 
for longer.  The notion here might be that among humans there is evolutionary adaptation 
to the use of shared rituals; they may indeed have tangible benefits.  The imagining of 
invisible agents could play a role, for instance, in underpinning cooperative social 
behaviour.  Religious sanctions have been prominent in systems of social control. Rather 
different but potentially pertinent too is Girard’s theory that religion was necessary in 
human evolution to control the violence that can come from mimetic rivalry.  (Fleming, 
2004)    
 
Of course, there are important differences in relevant respects between simpler and more 
complex societies. A feature of modern societies is that they contain many ethnic and 
religious differences.  Nevertheless some would probably say that a society like the UK is 
partly integrated, not so much by being Christian, but from the fact that it arises from a 
Christian civilization.  With regard to functions of religion for individuals this point 
arises:  were it suggested religion relieves anxiety regarding (say) death it might be added 
that the construction of heaven, hell and Day of Judgment introduces new sources of 
anxiety which otherwise would not be there.  Again, supposing it is agreed that religion 
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may be integrative and increase group identities and loyalties, then at the same time this 
may sharpen hostility between religious groups, as it has for extended periods in Northern 
Ireland.  A very important feature of major world religions has been the tendency for 
schism to occur e.g. within Christianity, between Roman Catholic and Protestant, and 
within Islam, between Sunni and Shia. 
 
Evidently religion takes many forms and has had a variety of functions attributed to it.  
Yet, seemingly, it may both address the issue of individual anxiety but also reshape and 
even intensify it; again, it may be integrative in respect of a particular social group but 
divisive as between groups; in addition, it may tend to be explicitly or ideologically 
conservative in its political implications, but it can also be radical (consider, for instance, 
the religious concerns of the two sides in the English civil war).  While it has unintended 
consequences, it seems religion both arises out of and in a sense addresses (i) aspects of 
individual psychology, and (ii) more localized as well as the widest social concerns. 
However, a basic point is that its own emergence and development are interdependent 
with the more general development of human conceptual resources and resources of 
knowledge.  It is of the essence that humans are symbol-users:  religion is highly 
symbolic and probably arises and is shaped at least in part by confusion between the 
symbol and that which is symbolized (consider, for instance, debate as to the precise 
meaning of the Eucharist).  While specialising in the symbolic, it is an aspect of the 
cooperative and the associative life of a community:  religious traditions and institutions 
are a central context within which ideas and practices are endorsed and disseminated. 
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The influence on fertility and contraception 
Throughout extended time religions have brought together the largest human groups, the 
largest contexts of, and frameworks for, cooperative activity.    Each religion possesses 
its own normative order concerned with what adherents feel they should, or should not, 
believe or do.  At first sight a concern with the normative directs attention towards the 
ethical and legal dimension of religion but, given the high degree of systemic integration 
of religion, the normative may also be judged to bear upon the ritual, narrative, doctrinal 
and philosophical dimensions. Here the concern is with whether human cooperative 
activity tends to give rise to population growth.  In this connection religious groups are of 
central importance not only because, at least until the modern period, they have been the 
largest such groups, but also because, as indicated above, religions play a primary role in 
legitimizing the widest range of human behaviour, the main and most significant thrust 
being via the legitimation of marriage and the arrangements in respect of family and 
kinship.  In stabilizing and securing these central institutions, there is thereby less social 
disruption which would itself threaten survival and population numbers.   
 
In assessing their overall influence it must also be readily acknowledged that religious 
teachings and practices in some respects serve to increase and in other respects to 
decrease population, the latter tendency being exemplified by the practice of celibacy and 
the monastic tradition, as well as human sacrifice (considered below).  Before proceeding 
further it is also worth noting that, since religions are actually or potentially in 
competition, and any particular religion claims to know the truth and right conduct, it 
serves its interest to grow rather than decline in overall numbers, both relatively and 
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absolutely; indeed the religions of any era may be thought of as the longer-term survivors 
from a larger potential pool. Plainly a main way in which religious numbers will grow is 
by natural increase within the group.  This is despite the familiar fact that religions vary 
in their tendency to proselytize and their tendency to be antagonistic to their rivals.  
 
With an eye to modern circumstances, it is suggestive very briefly to review what various 
religions have to say about fertility and contraception (with the particular assistance of 
Stacey, 2012).  Though religions are sometimes marked by the existence of quite detailed 
rules concerning, for instance, when couples may or may not have intercourse, it is the 
broader tendencies that must be identified.    
 
Jewish law considers children a blessing, so a man may not abstain from procreation or 
get sterilized before he has fathered a child. There are differing tendencies within 
branches of Judaism, but the Torah promotes prolific childbirth and orthodox rabbis 
believe that being fruitful and multiplying is a male duty.  Regarding family limitation, 
because of ‘Onan’s crime’ in Genesis, the birth control pill is preferred over barrier 
methods so as to prevent ‘the spilling of seed’. 
 
The Roman Catholic Church forbids sex outside marriage, so its teaching about 
contraception must be understood in the context of a husband and wife. The Church 
teaches that sex must be both unitive and procreative, or, specifically in the words of the 
catechism, serve the following two-fold purpose:  ‘the good of the spouses themselves 
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and the transmission of life (2363)’. Natural family planning such as periodic abstinence 
is the only approved contraceptive method. 
 
Protestant and Episcopalian Christian notions about birth control stem from church 
tradition and teaching rather than scripture since the Bible says little about contraception.  
Contraception was condemned as a barrier to God’s procreative purpose of marriage until 
the start of the 20
th
 century.  More recently it is stressed that members use birth control as 
dictated by their consciences:  the institution of marriage may be strengthened where 
couples do not feel threatened by the possibility of having children they cannot support. 
 
Islam emphasizes that procreation within the family is a religious duty, so there is 
unanimous rejection of sterilization and abortion. Because contraception is not expressly 
prohibited in the Qu’ran, many Muslim scholars approve of family planning, but others 
believe that birth control is forbidden since the Qu’ran contains the command to 
‘procreate and abound in number’.  Most Islamic traditions will permit the use of birth 
control where maternal health is an issue or where the well-being of the family may be 
compromised. 
 
Traditional Hindu texts praise large families, though some Hindu scriptures that applaud 
smaller families also exist, which also emphasize the development of a positive social 
conscience.  Hinduism encourages procreation within marriage, yet there is no explicit 
opposition to contraception. Some Hindu texts describe birth control methods while other 
scriptures contain advice on what couples should do to promote conception. 
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Traditional Buddhist teaching favours fertility, and there is reluctance to tamper with the 
natural development of life.  Buddhism urges the importance of parents taking care of 
their children, so they can grow up with a good quality of life. There is no really 
established doctrine on contraception, so a Buddhist may accept contraceptive methods 
with differing degrees of hesitation, the worst of all being abortion or ‘killing a human-to 
-be’.  
 
Chinese religions emphasize the importance of balance and harmony in the individual, 
the family and society.  Since having too many children can upset this balance, family 
planning has been a valued aspect of human sexuality.  Confucians, unlike Taoists, put 
more focus on procreation than on the joy and art of sex; they are not as open to birth 
control since they are more sensitive to any restriction on their God-given right to 
procreate. 
 
These highly abbreviated summaries bear witness to differences between major religious 
traditions and also to change overtime. A familiar position within Christianity is that 
God’s purpose or the ‘function’ of sexual intercourse is to procreate the species, but 
sexual enjoyment as such is rather more valued within the oriental religions. All of these 
religions or religious tendencies date back to times when fertility was higher than today:  
it needed to be and was expected to be, not least because of much higher child mortality.  
It is therefore very significant that one can fairly say that those religions which persisted 
for extended time traditionally encouraged that high level of fertility:  that is a level such 
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that had all the children born survived into adulthood, the overall population would have 
tended to grow, probably quite rapidly.  Thus, while in many of the societies of earlier 
times fertility and mortality were in actuality roughly in balance, the impact of religion 
was such that the former stood every chance of exceeding the latter.   
 
More recently the religions have tended to modify their approaches somewhat in changed 
population circumstances.  Of course, family planning in the strict sense is a concept of 
the last century or so, but in the main the religions have conceptual resources enabling 
them appropriately to guide members and to varying degrees they acknowledge the 
contribution of contraception in present conditions.  Nevertheless it broadly remains true 
that if religion were the sole or predominating influence on fertility practices, population 
size would be firmly on an upward trajectory.  It continues to provide an upward thrust to 
population numbers in the modern world. 
 
Religion and suicide 
Of strategic importance is the religious outlook on committing suicide, which is to be 
understood as action undertaken with the intention of producing one’s own death.  Rather 
different is action undertaken in the knowledge that one’s own death will or may result, 
or preparedness to lose one’s life in the service of some other goal i.e. where the loss 
would be collateral.   Taking account of the full range of human circumstances there is no 
reason a priori to judge that the losses from suicide in the strict sense need be tiny or 
negligible.  The precise approaches of major religions arise out of their respective 
 129 
narratives and theologies but the tendency is to be at least generally discouraging of the 
practice; brief illustration follows. (en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Religious_views_on_suicide)  
 
As regards Judaism suicide has been frowned upon and traditionally suicides have been 
buried in a separate part of a cemetery, and may not receive certain mourning rights.  
However, suicide is sometimes acceptable in Jewish law e.g. as a preferred alternative to 
committing certain cardinal sins.   As is well-known there are significant differences on 
the topic within Christianity.  For Roman Catholics suicide is objectively a sin while 
among some Conservative Protestants it is seen as self-murder, the sin being akin to that 
involved in murdering another person.  Some other Christian denominations do not view 
committing suicide per se as committing a sin but that course of action is still viewed 
unfavourably or regrettably.   
 
Within Islam suicide in the strict sense is viewed as one of the greatest sins and 
detrimental to one’s spiritual journey.  (This is to be distinguished from martyrdom or 
dying in battle for the faith.)  Within Hinduism the dominant tendency is to view 
committing suicide as a violation of the code of non-violence and therefore wrong, but 
there may be acceptance of the right of elderly yogis with no ambition remaining to end 
their lives by the non-violent means of fasting to death.  Among Buddhists a basic 
precept is to refrain from the destruction of life, and the view is taken that reasons for 
suicide tend to be negative and thus counteract the path to enlightenment.  Among several 
religions there is acceptance or understanding of suicide where an individual has been 
dishonoured. 
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Religion and human sacrifice 
Given that one is evaluating the thesis that cooperation tends to give rise to population 
growth, it is appropriate too to consider the impact of religion on mortality.  Religion 
may, for instance, be a direct or indirect cause of war; religious schism is one source of 
conflict while the integration of religion with nationalism is another important 
phenomenon of the modern era.   The topic of war is taken up more generally in a later 
chapter.  At this point attention is given to a practice that seemingly flies in the face of 
the central thesis.   At least in the case of war loss of life tends to be viewed as 
unfortunate collateral to the objective sought (and could typically be avoided or 
diminished by early capitulation), but there are situations where religion is directly 
responsible for the promotion of death.  
 
Strikingly there are indeed contexts in which religion has legitimized human sacrifice.  
Most often this is by way of offering to a deity; there is a degree of parallelism with the 
ritual slaughter of animals and the practice is to be understood within the context of 
religious sacrifice in general, although its human consequences differ.  A further pattern 
is that of ‘retainer sacrifice’ where (say) a dead king’s servants are killed and buried with 
him to continue to serve their master in the next life.   
 
The perspective offered here is developed through consideration of the following account 
of human sacrifice in respect of the Mexica or Aztecs:  ‘It was at the Temple Mayor that 
the most extravagant human sacrifices took place, to ensure rain, energize the sun, and 
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guarantee military success… the primary concern of ritual was to maintain balance in the 
universe and to suppress the forces of disorder that might destroy the world.’ (Webster 
and Evans, 2005, p.635)  Hence, importantly, the practice is being understood in quasi-
rational terms with human sacrifice being viewed as a means to an end.  In this 
connection the ‘end’ is partly but not wholly specified in empirically identifiable terms.  
For instance, ‘to ensure rain’ is extremely vague – in respect of quantity and timing – but 
the occurrence of rainfall as such is an empirically identifiable state of affairs; ‘military 
success’ is similarly vague in respect of degree and probably also time-frame but again 
has some empirically identifiable basis.  On the other hand, it may be reckoned that a 
condition of ‘balance in the universe’ is not empirically identifiable, although this might 
need qualification in respect of ‘forces of disorder’. 
 
As already indicated, with the coming of characteristically-human cooperation, there is 
from the outset straightforward means-ends rationality in the context of many practical 
activities; indeed the very notion of using an effective means to reach a specified goal 
originates and gets its sense from there.  Integral to the whole idea is that the choice or 
use of means bears upon success.  Where success is not observed to occur or occurs only 
rarely there is pressure to adopt another means or even to abandon the end.  Now it has 
already been pointed out that humans may not make the same distinction between 
purposive and non-purposive causation which we tend to make and may judge that 
outcomes may be achieved in ways mediated through the purposes of such agents as gods 
and spirits.  Hence people quite reasonably continue to use means-ends language in 
religious contexts where they judge means may be effective in reaching the end.  
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However, it is a mistake to assume they are abandoning the notions of ‘effectiveness’ or 
‘success’ in this respect simply because there is a religious setting.  The position is that 
where the actions being employed to reach a given end are not demonstrably effective, in 
the long-term there is a tendency for that putative means or route to be abandoned.  To 
take an example:  humans may sometimes pray for rain but given that it is not 
demonstrably effective – since praying or non-praying are uncorrelated with subsequent 
rainfall – the practice of praying when rainfall is sought tends to decline. 
 
Where human sacrifice is undertaken as a means to an end, the practice will tend to 
decline in the long-term because of the ‘costs’ involved - in producing the supply of 
victims - together with the failure for it to be demonstrated that the means is effective in 
achieving the goal.  This last can be for one or other or both of two reasons:  the means 
appears to have no bearing upon the achievement of the empirically-identifiable goal; 
confirmation of the achievement of the goal is lacking because the goal is not empirically 
identifiable.  So, for instance, in the case of the Aztecs it could be the case that no rainfall 
or military success follows; or, there is no identifiable evidence one way or the other as to 
whether there is ‘balance in the universe’ at any particular time.  At this point in the 
discussion there may be a tendency for the reader to respond by saying that where there is 
no rain the religious authorities will simply respond by saying that not enough people 
were sacrificed or respond in an ad hoc way by reference to some other factor.  They may 
well do so but the error is to fail to realize that there is a ‘cost’ to be paid in their so 
doing.  Again the religious authorities may well respond by saying in effect that they are 
the only arbiters as to whether or not there is ‘balance in the universe’, but this familiar 
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type of move does not in itself demonstrate the achievement of that state of affairs.  
Another way of putting it is to say that gradually religious authority in these respects will 
tend to be undermined.  In the short-term effects of this kind will generally be slight 
partly because of the limited conceptual resources of the people and their resources of 
knowledge; also because religion ramifies and performs many functions simultaneously.  
Nevertheless there is good reason to judge that in the long-term the practice will tend to 
decline and be discontinued. 
 
To understand developments in the short-term attention must be given to the ‘costs’ 
involved and the magnitude of additional and potentially-countervailing interests and 
concerns.  The Aztecs were able to sacrifice large numbers (at any rate temporarily) 
because they could draw victims from neighbouring peoples whom they were able to 
dominate; but seizing such victims required a considerable in-put of effort.  Also the 
Aztec actions served to increase the likelihood that other surrounding groups might 
combine against them (in fact, some at least initially did side with the Spanish invaders).  
Had the leading Aztecs sought to draw these same large numbers from their own ranks 
there could have resulted internal rebellion.  In fact, they did draw smaller numbers of 
victims from their own ranks and, in this connection it must be fully recognized that these 
people and their families would have shared in the religious mind-set.  Nevertheless, 
because of other interests, there is the potential for internal resistance to be generated, its 
magnitude depending, for instance, upon the social location of the selected victims.     
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Similar points may be made in respect of ‘retainer sacrifice’, where the rationale is again 
of a means-ends type, it being intended that the attendants serve the dead king in the next 
world.   The underlying issue concerns the failure to demonstrate the effectiveness of the 
means.  The achievement or non-achievement of the goal is not demonstrable; ultimately 
more is needed than an assurance by the religious or political authorities.  For this reason 
alone, in the long-term, the practice may be expected to decline.  In the shorter term the 
strength of countervailing interests is again pertinent.  In particular there is the matter of 
whether there are independent reasons as to why it might be worth preserving the lives of 
the attendants; in this regard their status and possible future contribution to the 
community is relevant.  Countervailing concerns may be expected to prevail in due 
course. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Summarizing conclusion 
Religion is highly variable in its precise nature but virtually ubiquitous.  In the early 
circumstances of mankind it arose partly because purposive explanation was being 
applied in contexts where we would expect non-purposive explanation to be used i.e. 
there was familiarity with purposive agency but lack of clarity about its precise scope and 
limits.   
 
A central concern of this study is the relation between religion and population.  The 
major religions existing at any particular date are to be understood as the survivors from a 
much larger pool.  There is good reason to judge that these ‘survivor’ religions have 
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traditionally encouraged a high level of fertility, partly because it is in their interests to do 
so.  A high level here means one which is sufficient to promote gradual longer-term 
population growth despite such persistent and familiar patterns as high age-specific 
mortality - of particular salience being high child and high maternal mortality.  In recent 
centuries, following rapid declines in age-specific mortality rates, the major religions 
have demonstrated flexibility by modifying their outlook on fertility to varying degrees, 
acknowledging the contribution of at least some types of birth control and family 
planning methods.  Nevertheless religion’s overall contribution is still such as to promote 
population growth.  A specific way in which it does this is by discouraging or 
condemning suicide.  
 
A striking practice pointing in quite another direction is human sacrifice, where it seems 
that religion may directly promote mortality.  This can indeed be a meaningful way of 
acting given a particular world view and understanding of circumstance.  However, 
reasons have been given as to why, where it is viewed as a means to an end, the practice 
would tend to decline and disappear in the longer term.  In the short term it may be 
undermined by countervailing interests.  
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Chapter 6:  Simple and Complex Societies 
In this chapter the aim is to begin to explore the nature of the link between cooperation 
and population in differing types of society.  Firstly, some evidence derived from an 
anthropological study of a tribal society is considered.  In this connection it is of course 
relevant to point out that virtually all such societies studied by modern anthropologists 
were already undergoing significant change as a result of contact with westerners 
(generally in a colonial context) i.e. it would be false to consider them as genuinely 
isolated; but, nevertheless, insights may be gained regarding their character even prior to 
such contact.  Second, there is consideration of a small, but important, analytical part of 
Diamond’s (1998) work throwing light on the understanding of types of society, 
interactions between them and the possible implications for population size and density.  
Among other things that analysis draws attention to the significance of a society’s 
division of labour and change therein.   In the remaining two sections of this chapter there 
is general discussion of the significance of that phenomenon in differing types of society, 
followed by the specification of a distinctive pattern linking cooperation to population 
growth.  It is reckoned that that pattern is exemplified by some of the important 
developments traced in Chapter 7.  
 
Food supplies and population control: a case study   
The general direction of argument points to cooperation leading to an increasing 
population.  Of course, all manner of factors can intervene to prevent this happening for 
extended periods.  It is valuable to gain insight into the human response for example to 
failing food supplies. 
 137 
 
An instructive early study providing information on population control in a tribal society 
is provided by Firth, based on his fieldwork in the 1920s.  Given their relative (but not 
total) confinement on a Polynesian island it is not surprising that Firth tells us that, ‘the 
population of Tikopia was normally in a state of equilibrium with its food supply’ (1970, 
p.373-4). What is rather more surprising is the sheer number of differing mechanisms of 
population control which he identifies:  celibacy; prevention of conception (including use 
of coitus interruptus); abortion; infanticide; sea-voyaging; war.  Thus there is action to 
reduce sexual intercourse, to alter its character, to impact on gestation and to kill children 
(by smothering); in conventional terms, there is direct action in respect of both fertility 
and mortality.  Sea-voyaging involves the practice of men, especially the young 
unmarried, setting out on sea voyages from which they are unlikely to return.  This is 
striking in that it hints at the idea – which may apply elsewhere - that social action may 
be taken which increases the likelihood of ‘accidents’ or which is tantamount to 
encouraging near-suicidal behaviour.  War seems to involve driving out a section of the 
population, perhaps a clan or those belonging to a lower stratum. 
 
Given present concerns a point of particular interest is when exactly the population 
resorts to killing infants. Apparently, infanticide is at the discretion of the father, ‘and the 
motivating factor is said to be primarily the comparison with potential food supplies’ 
(Firth, 1970, p.374).  When half-starved the women are less fecund anyway and it is 
notable that were there to be an excessive number of youngsters, they could compete with 
their own mothers for food.  Hence the action taken has the consequence of maintaining 
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the condition of the population so that numbers may recover quickly once a sustainable 
increase in food supplies is achieved.  Indeed, given that action is rationally informed by 
forward time-reference, the potential for population numbers to recover is to an 
identifiable extent greater than it might be in the case of an animal population.  As 
regards the social meaning of the actions, it is significant in the present context that the 
view seems to be that it is not that drastic to kill an infant not yet ready for social life. 
The actuality from the anthropological evidence is some way removed from the picture 
(due partly to Malthus) of catastrophe resulting from accelerating population growth 
‘overtaking’ food supplies.  
 
It is clearly significant that the dispersion of the human population on Earth extended 
eventually even to the settlement of many - even tiny – islands.  It is known, for instance, 
that many islands were populated from an initial ‘primary dispersal centre’ in the 
Marquesas Islands from around 400AD onwards (Barraclough, 1978, pp.48-9); that 
centre was itself supplied from Polynesia and Melanesia.  Those settled from the 
Marquesas include Easter Island and Tahiti, and this source may even have been the 
origin for settlement in New Zealand.  In that light one may be led to reflect further on 
the evidence from Tikopia of sea-voyaging in circumstances of food shortage.  
Presumably some of these voyages would be successful with landfall being made 
elsewhere.  In that case population control on this specific island may be judged to 
provide a stimulus to population growth on other islands.  Hence insight may be provided 
into a population process contributory to dispersal across the islands, bearing in mind 
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that, as pointed up in Chapter 1 it is that process of dispersal which leads ultimately to a 
greater aggregate population. 
 
In respect of pre-literate societies more generally, it is important to clarify that population 
control forms an established pattern and is not to be thought of as simply operative at 
times of anticipated food shortage.  It seems all pre-literate cultures have the ability to 
limit family size, and traditional restrictions are not such as to maintain balance between 
fertility and mortality at a subsistence level, but rather to maintain an economic surplus.  
As Douglas affirms, ‘It is the demand for oysters and champagne, not for the basic bread 
and butter, that triggers off social conventions which hold human populations down.’ 
(1966):  in this respect modern societies may not be so very different. 
 
Societies:  simple and complex 
From the perspective developed here, while there are among close blood relatives 
genetically-rooted, affectively-governed behavioural tendencies which are further shaped 
by the superposition of kinship ties, between non-relatives – in the absence of sexual 
interest - there is no naturally given affective tie.  Affect – such as that expressed within 
friendship – tends to follow cooperation between non-relatives or arise out of it.  In 
addition, within wider patterns of cooperation, as discussed in Chapter 1, there are felt 
obligations.  Yet the possibility of conflict arising between non-relatives who are brought 
together is relatively high:  the potential for cooperation is there but it needs to be 
realized.   
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Diamond (1998) has provided some suggestive, if necessarily schematic, ideas assisting 
the understanding of types of society, their interactions and the implications for 
population size and density.  His four types of society are the band, the tribe, the 
chiefdom and the state (1998, pp.268-9).  Importantly, in his account there is no 
simplistic suggestion that one or more variables may be identified which purportedly 
‘cause’ population growth.  Rather variables such as societal complexity, food production 
and population size and density are judged to inter-affect one other.  For instance, he 
argues population growth leads to societal complexity, but societal complexity in its turn 
leads to intensified food production and thus to population growth. 
 
Diamond (1998, pp.286-88) first draws attention to differences between smaller and 
larger or denser groups in respect of social control and economic transfers.  Regarding 
social control the suggestion is that the differing characters of the two kinds of groups 
may be grasped once one gives attention to the basics. In the terms developed here the 
starting point is that genetic change enables both those with blood ties and those lacking 
them to cooperate – which they may do with advantage - but, critically, while a degree of 
attachment may tend to exist between close blood-relatives, no such attachment may be 
assumed to exist between unrelated strangers.  Not just this but when strangers quarrel, 
where relatives of either party are in the vicinity they may take sides as well which could 
lead to a destructive brawl.  As already noted, humans have a marked tendency to 
squabble and quarrel, but the way in which this may be handled differs depending upon 
the nature and size of the social group.  
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In smaller groups or bands e.g. of hunters and gatherers where people are closely related, 
relatives of two quarrelling parties may come in to mediate.  Even in a tribe where many 
are still close relatives and at least everyone knows everyone else, again possible 
mediators of quarrels may be forthcoming. There is evidence that solidarity and a sense 
of community may be sustained in this kind of way within a social group up to a size of 
about 150. (Dunbar, 2011) But once numbers get much larger – say into the thousands – 
the possibility of quarrels breaking out between unrelated strangers in the absence of 
natural mediators is altogether higher.  Supposing this leads to murder or serious injury 
there is the added prospect of retaliation by relatives of those dead or injured, leading to a 
destructive cycle of violence.  Hence a larger group which left conflict resolution to 
ordinary members in this kind of way would be in danger of breaking up.  Therefore in 
order to continue in existence the larger group may need to develop centralized authority 
to seek to monopolize the use of force and promote conflict resolution. 
 
Somewhat similar considerations concerning size of group come into play in the 
economic sphere.  It is in people’s interests to transfer goods.  For instance, individuals 
differ in skill and consequently some may find themselves with an excess of some 
desirable commodity accompanied by a shortage of another, while for others the position 
is reversed.  This gives rise to the cooperative pattern of transfers of goods made on a 
reciprocal basis.  However, while pairwise economic exchange may suffice in a small 
group it might not do so in a larger one.  What would help would be a way of 
redistributing goods in addition to the reciprocal pattern.  One method would be for there  
to be transfers of surpluses to a central authority which in turn redistributes them. 
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But if simpler societies differ in these ways from larger, more complex ones how, 
according to Diamond, do the former tend to be reduced in number in favour of the 
latter?  In accounting for this he embarks upon ‘evolutionary reasoning’ (1998, p.288). 
He points to the fact that there are many smaller ones which differ among themselves.  
For example, they may differ in respect of how effectively they resolve conflict and 
redistribute goods.  They may differ in respect of the richness of their resources given the 
land, rivers, coast etc to which they have access.   Supposing smaller groups then impinge 
on each other, this could generate conflict particularly where there are no close relatives 
mediating between them. There are several possibilities.  For instance, where population 
densities are low one group might simply drive out the other.  However, where this 
possibility is lacking there could be some process of partial merging or accommodation; 
this could involve the paying of tribute by the dominated group.  Perhaps more likely is 
the case where one group dominates but also becomes more integrated with the other 
probably giving rise to some element of stratification in a larger entity.  Importantly, 
these arrangements involve cooperation but often of the coerced-cooperative type.   
 
Diamond affirms that, ‘competition between societies at one level of complexity tends to 
lead to societies on the next level of complexity if conditions permit’ (1998, p.289; italics 
in original). Thus, for instance, tribes conquer or combine with other tribes to reach the 
size of chiefdoms, which conquer or combine with other chiefdoms to become states, and 
similarly states may become empires.  The important conditions which must be met 
concern whether large units can solve the problems that come with their larger size e.g. 
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concerning internal social control and economic integration.  No doubt elaborations in the 
division of labour including hierarchical organization may contribute to the solution. 
 
Diamond points up the contribution of war, or threats of war, to the amalgamation of 
societies.  Importantly, outcomes differ depending upon, for instance, population density 
locally and the presence or absence of intensive food production.  Where population 
densities are high and the defeated have nowhere to flee, two important possibilities arise 
(Diamond, 1998, p.292).  One is that the defeated can be used as slaves, another that the 
defeated are left in place, but are deprived of political autonomy and pay tribute.  Again 
organizational issues need to be dealt with. From the perspective developed here it is to 
be expected that, following war, once a reasonably stable social entity has emerged its 
overall population would tend to grow, even where it is based on coerced-cooperation. 
 
Hence there are clear reasons for the emergence of social groups with larger and denser 
populations and insight may be provided into their changing character.  Among the 
variables which interact to facilitate population growth would be changes in technology, 
especially that of food production. As stressed previously, the extension of knowledge 
and enhancement of technology must be understood as occurring incrementally. This 
might include understanding variations in the land and its suitability for crops, the 
introduction of new crops or the use of draft animals. The ‘evolutionary’ development of 
the plough – through many small changes – has been traced from ancient times through 
into the twentieth century.  In respect of the economy, there is interdependence between 
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food production, the division of labour, patterns of exchange (reciprocal or redistributive; 
via tribute or taxes) and control of the land. 
 
The division of labour 
In Chapter 7 key developments in prehistory and history are traced in order further to 
clarify the implications of cooperative behaviour for population growth.  Within that 
account changes in the division and specialization of labour are highly strategic.  At this 
point the aim is to provide insight into the contribution of that particular phenomenon and 
the direction of argument is influenced by Durkheim’s classical study (see particularly 
Durkheim, 1964, pp.233-82).  A general discussion of the significance of the division of 
labour overtime in differing types of society precedes the presentation of an abstracted 
model focusing on a discernible pattern linking cooperation and population growth; that 
pattern is exhibited by some important developments highlighted in the account of 
Chapter 7.  
 
In general, population expansion is accompanied by a tendency for patterns of 
cooperation to become more complex and involve differing levels within a discernible 
hierarchy.  This may be illustrated through simple examples bearing upon the highly 
strategic organizational principle of segregation in time and space. Suppose, for instance, 
that in a hunter-gatherer society pairs or groups of hunters are found to interfere with one 
another; they may agree to hunt at different periods of the day.  Again, suppose that 
several families are found to be seeking to set up their home bases at the same desirable 
place; they may agree to set up their bases at differing places.  However, suppose in these 
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cases, despite seeming agreement having been reached, further squabbling and 
interference breaks out, then recourse may be had to adjudication by a group of village 
elders.  So cooperation at the higher level may give rise to renewed cooperation – at any 
rate in the form of compliance – at the lower level.  The same pattern is evident across 
differing types of society where reference upward within a hierarchy generates 
coordination at lower levels.  This is a marked feature of centrally important aspects of 
social control such as legal systems. 
 
Again, for settled populations, difficulties arise in respect of organization and control, 
particularly as population grows.  Typically, central importance attaches to securing food 
production and distribution and the provision of a water supply.  Solutions are arrived at 
employing differing levels of cooperation together with expanded communication 
between those levels; the solutions also involve segregation of activities in time and 
place. In the way cooperation comes to be structured, the single most important 
organizational device is the division and specialization of labour.  It is crucial in two 
respects:  it tends to increase average product per person while diminishing the tendency 
for conflict to arise, conflict which might lead to maiming and increased mortality. An 
elaboration in the division of labour may change a situation of intense competition into 
one of mutually beneficial cooperation.  Notably too the division of labour is manifested 
both within a framework of work tasks – as in an industrial organization – but also 
spatially and residentially; it also progressively bears upon the time dimension (including 
the pattern whereby a single individual performs differing activities at predictably 
different times). 
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Concerning the link between population and the division of labour it has been noted in a 
suggestive way that the population of settlements has been found to correlate positively 
both with the number of occupational specialities and the number of types of social 
organization (Petersen, 1969, p.348).  From historical evidence it is apparent that 
frequently solutions to organizational problems are borrowed from elsewhere, for 
example in the way that the early Christian Church’s organization into bishoprics was 
taken over from political organization within the Roman Empire. Of course, every facet 
of the division of labour needs to be tried out and prove itself in practice.  It is worth 
stressing that, in respect of modern populations, were the overall division of labour 
somehow to be instantly dissolved there really would soon follow something approaching 
the Hobbesian ‘war of all against all’ with the lives of people being ‘ugly, brutish and 
short’.  Within the broader context of the division of labour is to be found a specific 
cooperatively-arrived at organizational device, the rational bureaucracy, described by 
Weber as ‘man’s greatest social invention’ (Gerth and Mills, 1998). In summary people 
have cooperated in developing ways by which they may cooperate more effectively or 
remove impediments to cooperation. 
 
For settled populations, there is an important pattern which may provide a link between 
expansion in space and population growth. The basic point is that, as part of the spatial 
division of labour, settlement typically involves the designation of space from which 
people are substantially excluded. Putting it this way round may sound initially odd 
because it would be more common to think seemingly more positively in terms of land 
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use. It can though be readily seen that the implication of a designated land use is that 
people wishing to engage in some other activity – not that designated - must keep out; 
that is the whole consequence of land-ownership, for instance.  This phenomenon of 
exclusion of population is particularly well-known from the case of Great Britain’s 
Enclosures Acts of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century and the highland clearances of 
1750-1840AD.  The consequence of patterns of exclusion is to move people on to other 
land, when available, where the population can grow.  This single process contributed 
strongly to the expansion of population into the American west, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand.   
 
Co-operation and population growth:  a discernible pattern 
The account being presented here is in one sense necessarily simple since, at root, it 
concerns the link between expansion in the extent and scope of human cooperation and 
population growth.  Proceeding further there is an important discernible pattern 
(illustrated at certain points in Chapter 7) which is again relatively simple and may be 
encapsulated in the single paragraph which follows.  However, that particular formulation 
– though intended to be accurate and precise – leaves various aspects implicit which need 
properly to be spelled out.  The following three paragraphs round out the account of the 
pattern by making these specific aspects explicit.   
 
As humans cooperate there is a tendency for them overtime to inter-affect one another in 
ways that give rise to additional cooperation of wider scope and especially to higher-level 
cooperation (which regulates lower-level activity and cooperation, and, in particular, 
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generates lower-level coordination and co-action); another way of putting it is to say 
there is a tendency for there to be enlargement of the framework of cooperation.  In this 
connection it must be understood that some of the cooperation will (in general) be of the 
coerced type. Although the process commences in the quintessentially local it has no 
clear limit short of embracing the totality of mankind. The tendency for the cooperative 
framework to build in this way is interdependent with the tendency for population 
numbers to grow.  The reference here is to gradual, incremental change. 
 
This formulation refers to ‘additional’ and ‘higher-level’ cooperation but, so far, has said 
nothing explicitly about the utilization of material resources, without which population 
growth would be impossible.  It must therefore be made clear that the additional 
cooperation tends to manifest itself through elaboration in the division and specialization 
of labour of a technical kind.  On the other hand, the higher level cooperation already 
referred to may be said to be elaboration in the division and specialization of labour of a 
social or organizational type.  Therefore it is also correct to say that the elaboration of the 
division and specialization of labour is interdependent with the growth of population.  
 
This last formulation, however, is insufficiently clear as to how elaboration in the 
division and specialization of labour of either kinds tends to arise; for the account being 
presented and evaluated here to be sound it would need to be generated from the 
character of cooperation itself.   As discussed in the last section of Chapter 3, felt 
problems experienced at particular points (within an already existing cooperative 
framework) are the proximate stimulus to incremental growth of understanding 
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concerning either technical or organizational matters;  the originating source of 
innovation is typically highly local.  However, it is notable that cooperation by itself 
gives rise to a tendency for relevant information and understanding to spread.  Where 
there is reference above to ‘labour of a technical kind’ what is meant is skilled labour 
(quite possibly using tools) or labour informed by specialist knowledge and it is now 
being asserted that cooperation itself tends to give rise to a spread of expertise. (A 
particular institutionalized arrangement within which this would occur is master and 
apprentice but this pattern could, for instance, be informally approximated in particular 
instances e.g. as between cooperating father and son.) Again, cooperation itself may lead 
in the direction of an understanding that leadership is required:  firstly it may be informal 
and implicit across instances of cooperation, then this may become explicit, and finally 
there is an understanding that one or more individuals may be expected to specialize in 
this way. 
 
Finally, not enough has been said so far which sufficiently acknowledges the fact that 
material resources occupy space and are geographically distributed.  Further to the 
tendency for information and its utilization to spread, it is worth noting the distinction 
between the consequential elaboration in the division and specialization of labour locally 
within an already given cooperative framework and its elaboration elsewhere, perhaps 
remote from the original source.  This last may occur, for instance, where there is 
knowledge of the geographical distribution of material resources (often in the form of 
raw materials) which are required.  The latter may lead to the multiplication of a pattern 
over an extended area.  Furthermore there can be understanding that a particular 
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development is only possible in a particular circumstance (say, where running water is 
available).  Consequentially, there will tend to develop a discernible division of labour in 
space. 
 
A further comment regarding this description of a general pattern may be helpful.  The 
reader may be inclined to respond by pointing out that no explicit reference to culture is 
made, especially given that societies differ markedly in this respect.  Hence there may be 
felt to be a significant omission.  In this connection, the culture of a society is to be 
understood as the shared ideas – incorporating knowledge, values and standards - and 
material culture as the artifacts utilized; together these make up a shared way of life.  The 
appropriate response is to say that shared ideas are to be understood as a constitutive 
element of cooperation or a wider cooperative framework within which artifacts are 
employed.  The shared ideas of a society, including those relating to the production and 
use of artifacts, change as the pattern of its cooperative life changes; hence the 
contribution of changing ideas is fully, if largely implicitly, acknowledged.   
 
In the description of the pattern there is in fact mention of ideas in that there is reference, 
for instance, to specialist knowledge and its utilization spreading; pedantically – in the 
terms of Chapter 2 -  that  knowledge may be said to concern aspects and processes 
evident in the ‘external world’ (which incorporates our own bodies).  Examples may 
help.  There could, for instance, be an increase in the numbers of people able to make a 
bow and arrow and/or those able to shoot deer with it, or there could develop a more 
marked division of labour between makers and shooters of bows.  Alternatively, the 
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ability to make and sustain fire within a population, or to cook with it, could spread 
(Wrangham, 2009), or there could arise an associated division of labour; again, the 
numbers of people successfully accessing a particular food source might grow.  One is 
here concerned with practicalities bearing upon the means of subsistence and therefore 
also upon population and its components, births, deaths and migration.   
 
--------------------------------------- 
Summarizing conclusion 
In this chapter the nature of the link between patterns of cooperation and population 
growth has been explored, taking in simpler and more complex societies.  A much more 
extended consideration of complex societies is provided in Chapter 8.  A purpose here 
has been to direct attention to the division and specialization of labour and change therein 
which may be the single most important means by which cooperation sustains larger and 
growing populations.    
 
A surprise in respect of population control in the simpler tribal (island) society is the 
sheer number of differing mechanisms involved.  The response to diminishing food 
supplies is informed by an understanding of future probabilities, thereby maintaining the 
condition of the population, so that numbers may recover quickly once a sustainable 
increase in food supplies is achieved. A further feature is that population control 
evidently contributes to a process of dispersal across various islands which itself leads 
ultimately to a greater aggregate population.  More generally, it appears that in simpler 
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societies population control forms an established pattern geared to maintaining an 
economic surplus. 
 
Diamond (1998) assists in the understanding of types of society, their interactions and the 
implications for population size and density.  The tendency for population numbers to 
increase is interdependent with changes in patterns of social control and of economic 
transfers.  When certain conditions are met, competition between societies may give rise 
to societies of greater complexity.   As numbers grow, systematic change in respect of the 
division and specialization of labour is crucial in two respects:  it tends to increase 
average product per person while diminishing the tendency for conflict to arise, conflict 
which might lead to maiming and increased mortality.  Paradoxically, in settled societies 
the designation of space from which people are substantially excluded may indirectly 
give rise to population growth.  An abstract model has been presented – again 
foregrounding the division of labour – concerning the interdependence of incremental 
change in the cooperative framework and the tendency for population numbers to grow.   
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Chapter 7:  Developments in Prehistory and History 
The central notion being explored in this work is that characteristically human 
cooperation tends to generate population increase.  In this chapter an outline 
interpretation is presented as to how this has occurred through prehistory and history.  
Initially, there is scrutiny of the tendency for the population of hunters and gatherers to 
grow through expansion in space, a key phenomenon already referred to for illustrative 
purposes in Chapter 1.  There then follows a consideration of developments occurring 
since the end of the last ice age – the period beginning around 9600BC.  The main form 
the exposition takes is not to trace developments in particular regions of the world but 
rather – with the considerable help of Scarre (2005b) – to point up the various patterns 
and tendencies evident across the world and to comment on their significance.   The 
particular pattern described in the last section of Chapter 6 and concerned with the 
phenomenon of increase in the division and specialization of labour is exhibited by some 
of the specific changes identified.  There follows scrutiny of the nature and significance 
of a phenomenon of central historical importance, empire, and then one of paramount 
importance in the modern world, the nation state.  Arguably those modes of political 
organization and subsequent developments arising out of them underpin the tendency for 
population to be kept on an upward trajectory.   
 
Hunters and gatherers 
In respect of population growth the crucial phenomenon of prehistory was the tendency 
for hunter-gatherers to spread.  Both push and pull factors must be understood to be 
involved. It is often asserted that the tendency to migrate or for the population to spread 
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stemmed from the fact that hunting-gathering populations (who may well have been 
nomadic) grew just enough to press upon the carrying capacity of the land utilised, by 
which is meant the number of people who may be sustained in an area given its physical 
resources and the way people use them (Sanderson, 1995; Miller, 2007; Weeks, 2008, 
p.32).  Clearly conflict resulting from population pressing upon resources could generate 
violence and a consequential rise in mortality.  Alternatively, there is the possibility of 
migration or a tendency for the population to spread which is achieved on a cooperative 
basis; that cooperation might or might not be to a degree coerced.   Furthermore, given 
human foresight, a crisis over resources may even be anticipated and the situation eased 
by movement of a segment of the population at an earlier stage.  Those groups who could 
deal with the situation on a cooperative basis would tend to grow in numbers and 
influence relative to those prone to episodes of internal violence.  
 
Taking the longer-view it is apparent that human groups spread widely to occupy the 
habitable parts of the globe and, in addition, there were systematic changes in the 
technology used throughout space and over extended time and within particular regions 
(for example, in the precise character of stone tools).  A point to stress here is that 
conditions on the earth’s surface tend to vary continuously, facilitating movements to 
adjacent areas.  However, plainly what differentiates humans from other animals is their 
ability to adapt to changing or even substantially changed conditions in a relatively short 
time (or number of generations).  For instance, as they spread, humans adapted through 
changes in the food hunted or gathered, they modified their tools and they altered their 
clothing or shelter in response to climatic change. At the same time they continued to 
 155 
provide their own subsistence cooperatively.  Therefore these movements of people were 
fundamentally associated with changes in respect of the division and specialization of 
labour; they would not have occurred without them. People emerged with the ability to 
identify new sources of edible food, or to fish, or with the ability to make new types of 
clothing.  A striking example is presented by the first human occupation of the Americas 
– achieved in approximately two thousand years – involving adaptation to territories as 
different as tundra and sub-tropical rainforest.  This type of population growth – through 
extension in space – was thus evidently interdependent with changes in the division and 
specialization of labour of a technical type.  
 
The tendency for the population of hunter-gatherers to spread was also accompanied by a 
tendency for their changing way of life to effect an expansion in the carrying capacity of 
the land. For instance, where there is a slight improvement in the sharpness of stone tools 
or arrow-heads a given area may be able to sustain a greater number of hunter-gatherers. 
More generally, one can say that where humans migrated or spread while adapting to new 
conditions in any of the types of ways indicated above, the carrying capacity rose as 
compared with what it would have been in the absence of that adaptation.  Most 
obviously where humans in moving to a new area acquire knowledge of some additional 
food sources, the carrying capacity of that new land is effectively greater than it would 
have been had they moved without that increment of knowledge.  These kinds of changes 
may well have occurred relatively slowly or even extremely slowly – as with technical 
improvements in stone tools - but it is the tendency for them to occur which is the crucial 
phenomenon.  Plainly, too, the improvement of tools for hunting allowed for an increase 
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in population.  For instance, the spear was for many purposes more efficient than the 
club, and the bow and arrow more efficient than the spear.  Inventions such as these 
facilitated the development from small, nomadic hunting bands to more settled tribal 
societies.  Plainly cooking, when it emerged, contributed greatly to the effective carrying 
capacity of the land. (Wrangham, 2009) 
 
So far, the discussion has proceeded as though humans are simply moving into areas not 
already occupied by other humans, but plainly any initial tendency for things simply to 
proceed along those lines will not last for long:  groups will tend to come into contact and 
begin to inter-affect one another. When they do so there are a number of possible 
scenarios.  For instance, one group could essentially try to drive out or displace the other; 
one group could enslave the other or bring them into relations of tribute. (In passing the 
generality of the situation may be noted:  what happened when Europeans first arrived in 
North America or Australia was that the indigenous population was displaced, but in 
those cases the ‘technology gap’ was enormous.)  Particularly in cases where the 
‘technology gap’ is small or virtually non-existent, the resort to violence or threat of 
violence is plainly a possibility, but will it always be profitable?  The point is that 
violence is always undertaken at risk to oneself; also those groups who too readily resort 
to violence may become depleted in numbers and influence relative to others who can 
avoid or foreshorten it.  What may be asserted is that routine and automatic resort to 
violence will not in general prove to be the most effective pattern for a group to further 
its own interests. (Again there is a certain degree of generality:  Hitler got a long way by 
threats and violence but ultimately failed and ‘at cost’ both to himself and his own 
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national population.)  No, typically groups will tend to prosper which adopt other 
approaches which implicitly involve some degree of compromise.  Groups which can 
achieve and maintain workable arrangements of co-existence albeit based on coerced 
cooperation will tend to gain in the long-term, relative to those with a more routine resort 
to hostilities.  However, the establishment of the former types of arrangements involves 
patterned changes in behaviour e.g. leading figures using their influence to control ‘hot-
heads’ or arranging the payment of tribute.  Typically, there is again a modification of the 
division of labour primarily of a social or organizational type and this may be considered 
as interdependent with the greater potential for population growth.  
 
From hunter-gatherers to states and empires 
Let us next focus on developments occurring since the last ice age (beginning around 
9600AD), a period which is reviewed utilizing work of Scarre (2005b).  A single-
paragraph summary of these developments may help to orient the reader. By that early 
date anatomically modern humans were established on all continents except Antarctica. 
There followed environmental change and the human response to the new opportunities 
offered by a warmer climate.  Of particular importance is the domestication of plants and 
animals which led to the establishment of farming economies able to support larger 
communities.  The result was growth in world population to levels unsustainable by 
hunting and gathering alone.  Expanded food production and demographic increase were 
themselves directly associated with changes in social complexity and technological 
development. As they grew in size societies became more complex in internal 
organization and during the 4
th
 and 3
rd
 millennia BC, new kinds of settlement appeared in 
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the form of cities, associated with the invention of writing and the development of the 
state. Of course, hunting and gathering continued to be practised down to recent times in 
conditions hostile to agriculture. 
 
As already indicated, in addressing these developments in greater detail, the emphasis is 
still on the identification of patterns and tendencies.  However, it is essential to 
distinguish that way of proceeding from the familiar but mistaken one of regarding the 
human story as one of ‘progress’ or inevitable passage through readily specifiable stages. 
As is well known, in the nineteenth century the early anthropologists Morgan and Tylor 
viewed the development of human society as a movement from ‘savagery’ to the 
‘barbarism’ of early farming societies and culminating in the ‘civilization’ of 
Mesopotamia and Egypt; several more sophisticated such schemes of stages have been 
presented more recently.  There is little doubt, however, that these schemes fail to grasp 
or encapsulate the degree of complexity of actual human experience.  Nevertheless in 
what follows it is important to draw attention to tendencies.  For instance, where it is the 
case that a crucial development arose independently in several different regions of the 
world at different times, one may well be entitled to talk about the tendency for it to 
occur. Since the argument being presented concerns the tendency for changing patterns of 
cooperation to be associated with demographic increase, it may prove possible to 
subsume such crucial tendencies within the wider framework.  A further point to note in 
what follows is that the general pattern of the account involves viewing increasing 
population or increasing population density as interdependent with the other critical 
changes rather than being a simple cause or consequence of them.  
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It is of the essence of the argument being developed here that, on the best available 
evidence, the crucially important phenomenon of agriculture arose independently in at 
least seven different regions of the world.  It was not the case that agriculture was a 
chance discovery made in one region which then spread rapidly and globally once its 
advantages were experienced. However, in spreading inexorably from its various origins 
the shift from food collection to food production greatly increased the human carrying 
capacity of the planet. Before considering what might account for this parallel process of 
change it is important to clarify the meanings of some associated concepts.  
 
The following definitions are provided by Scarre (2005b, p.183). Agriculture is to be 
understood as the establishment of an artificial – local human-created - ecosystem in 
which selected species of plants and animals are cultivated and reared.  At its heart are 
the intentional propagation of food and the isolation of the domesticated species from 
their wild relatives.  There are several related concepts.  Domestication is a biological 
process involving changes in the genotypes and physical characteristics of plants and 
animals as they become dependent on humans for reproductive success; it may well be 
unintentional.  Cultivation is a cultural phenomenon involving intentionally preparing 
fields, sowing, harvesting, and storing seeds or other plant parts.  It requires significant 
and deliberate changes in technology, subsistence and, particularly, time-perspectives.  
Herding also requires intentional changes in the relationship between humans and 
animals.  Agriculture itself may be considered as a commitment to this relationship 
between humans and plants and animals.  It results in more people, more villages and 
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impetus towards more complex social and political organization. A further key idea is 
sedentism, a residence pattern of permanent year-round settlement, which replaced the 
mobility associated with most hunter-gatherer groups.  In at least some regions of the 
world (particularly Southwest Asia) these kinds of settlements are believed to have 
preceded the shift to cultivation. 
 
With the assistance of these definitions, a set of tendencies may be identified. Evidently, 
close relationships between humans and their food sources stretch back tens of thousands 
of years into the Paleolithic; the domestication of the dog as a hunting aid occurred at this 
early stage. There is then a tendency for agriculture to develop from hunting and 
gathering (even ahead of the use of cultivation some hunter-gatherers may have exhibited 
a tendency towards sedentism); as part of that development the general tendency for 
humans to domesticate animals and plants is manifested. Further tendencies are the 
adoption of farming by hunter-gatherers from their neighbours, and the displacement of 
hunter-gatherers by expanding farmers. In connection with the latter phenomenon the 
tendency for humans to force the issue generally had positive overall demographic 
implications.  There followed a tendency to use technologies of intensification in 
association with increasing population numbers or density, including particularly 
irrigation, ploughing and terracing.  In this connection plough agriculture only developed 
where suitable animals for traction were available and hence traditional world 
agricultural systems may be divided into two types:  hoe agriculture and plough 
agriculture. In connection with the expansion and elaboration of agriculture the 
development of domesticates (an essentially irreversible feature) served to anchor the 
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process, with species carried by human action far beyond the geographical range of their 
wild ancestors. 
 
It is highly significant that the most frequently cited reasons for these parallel processes 
of change are demographic increase and environmental change (Scarre, 2005b, p.186).  
This helps to make clear that the processes underlying the tendency for hunters and 
gatherers to expand their geographical range and for agriculture to emerge from hunting 
and gathering exhibit basic similarities.  In each case there is a tendency for population to 
exceed the carrying capacity of the land and for the problem to be overcome with the help 
of technical advance; however, in the former case the ‘solution’ is extensive in its 
geographical implications while in the latter it is intensive.  Thus population pressure 
may lead hunters and gatherers to expand or spread in ways made possible by technical 
modification, but that same source of pressure may also be relieved by intensive 
adjustment involving technical and organizational change.    There is a pattern of 
feedback between population and the pattern of cooperation, whereby change in each has 
implications for the other. 
 
Turning to environmental change as a causative factor, this is equivalent to saying that 
there is change in the physical resources locally and conceivably more widely.  This 
could occur naturally i.e. independently of human activity (as is usually the case for, say, 
climatic change) or it could stem partly or wholly from that activity itself (as when 
animals are over-hunted). Its significance concerns the precise way in which resources 
are being used. In terms of the carrying capacity of the land the change plainly could be 
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favourable in the sense that it could conceivably enable larger numbers to be sustained 
without any technological change occurring; in that sense it would represent an 
opportunity.  The alternative – and because of the great generality of types of 
environmental change the more likely possibility – is that the change is adverse and 
reduces the carrying capacity of the land i.e. given the precise way resources are being 
used; here the change represents a challenge.  Among hunters and gatherers this could 
bring forward the time when population pressure prompts movement or expansion in the 
range of population.  Again, it may bring forward the stage at which there is a more 
intensive adjustment. 
 
Of course it is additionally important to appreciate that humans can anticipate change and 
they can also note changes in relativities.  They may note the build-up of population 
pressure and act in advance of it becoming acute.  Again, they can note environmental 
change of a type which changes the relative value of their local physical resources 
compared with those observable, or to be anticipated, elsewhere.  There can also plainly 
be change in both the physical and social environment.  Thus hunters and gatherers can 
become aware of the nearby practice of agriculture, potentially changing their 
understanding of the range of options in life.  All these types of understandings may give 
rise to change. 
 
Given that agriculture allowed the growth of larger and denser populations, a further 
evident tendency was for there to emerge more institutionalized social formations (states) 
and complex concentrated settlements (cities).  Again the human tendency towards 
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aggression played its part in furthering the pattern as non-state communities adjacent to 
an early state felt obliged to form themselves into states to protect themselves from their 
more powerful neighbouring state - the phenomenon of secondary state formation.  
Finally the tendency for writing to emerge in early state societies must be noted.  It has 
been stressed that demographic increase is interdependent with or implicated in these 
important developments but it is rarely properly to be viewed as a simple cause or effect.   
 
The genetic change at the centre of this account concerns the ability to cooperate with 
others whether or not they are kin. Plainly there are net advantages to be had from 
cooperation on either basis, but it must be stressed that there is no reason (in either case) 
to expect the products or gains from cooperation to be shared equally; far from it, 
particularly where cooperation is coerced.  Throughout it is the case that humans are 
gaining access to their means of subsistence cooperatively, but the patterns of 
cooperation exhibit a tendency to undergo systematic change.  The tendency is for kinship 
to decline in its relative dominance as a structuring principle although it always retains 
importance.  Among hunters and gatherers it is the central structuring principle.  
However, with the emergence of farming communities important changes become 
evident connecting greater social complexity to settlement, material culture and warfare.  
As Scarre indicates, ‘There is a constant tension between centrifugal tendencies (the well-
being of the community or village) and centripetal tendencies (the success of the 
individual household).’ (2005b, p.190)  It may be judged that the immediate and narrower 
concerns of kinship tend to be articulated through the latter.  Furthermore as Scarre 
affirms, ‘Sedentary settlements also provide fixed points within the landscape and 
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become a focus of identity (the place where you live), ethnicity (the community to which 
you belong), and ancestry (where you and your forebears were born and buried).’  
(2005b, p.191) More generally, in respect of social complexity, despite kinship remaining 
the key structuring principle, new types of social organization emerged.  Social 
distinctions became increasingly institutionalized, as status at first based on individual 
prowess became transferred to individual lineages or families.  There emerged systems of 
hereditary leadership.  There was an elaboration in the division and specialization of 
labour going beyond the requirements of kinship. Material culture not only created an 
increasingly artificial world in which people lived and worked, but also signalled social 
diversity and difference.  As regards warfare, the growing size of agricultural 
communities led to a gradual escalation in the scale of human conflict that has broadly 
continued to the present day.  Plainly the investment of labour in fields and dwellings 
which could be raided or seized, along with food stores and increasing numbers of 
valuables, provided an incentive encouraging group-organized violence.  Hence there was 
a growth in social organization oriented to defence and attack.  
 
The advent of cities and states pushed further the decline in the relative importance of 
kinship as a structural principle.  There was coalescence into larger and more 
institutionalized social formations and complex concentrated settlements. As numbers 
increased the cooperative framework expanded in both a horizontal and a vertical sense, 
an elaborated division of labour dealing with technical matters as well as issues of 
authority.  States by definition possess centralized political institutions with ruling elites 
exercising control.  Importantly, while ‘kinship plays a less prominent structuring role in 
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states than in non-state societies, much of the internal history of states is focused on 
struggles for power and the succession among kin groups within the elite, in the form of 
ruling families.’ (Scarre, 2005b, p.194)   
 
At this point it is worth reminding oneself of the basic proposition that while those who 
are close kin have an already-given attachment to, and interest in, one another (which is 
not to say they may not quarrel!), this is not the case for non-relatives. Critically, in a 
state the leader or leaders stand in the latter relation to most of the subject population; 
hence there is a serious implicit need for their exercise of control to be legitimized.  The 
fact that they may share identity and ethnicity with subjects may be relevant in this 
respect but is in itself insufficient.  This is the context in which to understand the 
elaborate social organization concerned with the stylized or idealized portrayal of leaders 
and deities, together with the evident propaganda and stage-managed public 
performances.  For the relationship to be maintained it is necessary for the subjects to 
comply:  some (but not all) may do so because of coercion but the leaders are more 
secure where the subjects widely accept or even revere higher authority.  
 
In connection with leadership there are clear potential problem areas.  The issue of 
succession is one:  when a leader dies who should take over?  Since the whole of the 
population at least understands the institution of kinship that is one possible basis for 
choosing a new leader.  But what if the leader has no offspring or their child/son is not 
yet adult?  Also basic is the point that leadership always has instrumental aspects, for 
instance the need to respond to crises and war:  where a leader is manifestly incompetent 
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how to respond?  Close kin of a leader may expect to benefit from the leadership but they 
are also in a better position to judge competence than others and less likely to be totally 
taken in by propaganda; also the effective status and wealth gap between leaders and their 
own close relatives may be large.  There is plenty of scope for struggles over power and 
succession within the elite. 
 
Plainly the adoption of writing within states is of massive longer-term significance.  Two 
points of early importance are that it is relevant to administrative competence and 
relevant too to the scope of cooperation over time and at a distance.  Where revenues are 
gathered from subject populations written records increase the likelihood that this is done 
predictably and – where relevant – fairly:  writing represents a (potentially) shared 
reference point which may come into play in dispute-resolution. Written content also 
offers greater certainty or predictability in circumstances where there is likely to be a 
considerable time delay in executing an intention (illustrated by the operation of a will) or 
where there is a need for accurate communication at some physical distance or involving 
intermediaries. Writing gives rise to new bases for cooperation and facilitates cooperation 
between larger numbers of people. 
  
In this section, many tendencies for similar developments to take place independently 
across societies have been identified and pointed up.  Part of the reason for so doing, 
concerns the issue as to the significance or otherwise of human culture, by which is 
meant shared knowledge, values and standards or a shared way of life.  In connection 
with the explanation of developments in human life it is commonly said that these depend 
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upon culture and that societies and groups differ in respect of their cultures.  In response 
it must be said that cultural differences are indeed extremely real, but one must 
nevertheless be wary of leaning too heavily on the explanatory value of the notion of 
culture or cultural difference faced with these patterns.  Scarre summarises the position in 
these terms (2005b, p.41; italics in original):  ‘The fact that these same trends – towards 
food production, social complexity and urbanism – are found as independent 
developments in different parts of the world suggests that they correspond to basic facets 
of human behaviour that are common to all of us’ i.e. that which all human beings share 
is fundamental rather than what divides them. Now regarding the explanation of that 
overall pattern, most would agree that common elements in the situation of human beings 
everywhere have a bearing upon it e.g. the availability of animals and plants which may 
be domesticated.  Proceeding further what seems to be involved is not so much culture as 
the systematic or patterned changes which cultures may undergo – as in the change from 
hunting and gathering to agriculture.  This last is primarily to be characterized in terms of 
change in social and technical organization i.e. in the pattern of cooperation. 
 
The view is also taken that changes of the same kinds are to be associated with the further 
developments in human society, which may be judged as in conformity with the pattern 
identified in the last section of Chapter 6.  One might consider for instance modern 
societies where subsistence is obtained largely through the application of inanimate 
sources of energy, and much or most of the population lives in cities.  This type of 
society allows a population of a given size to procure a yet greater supply of goods and 
services from a given territory.  Yet this is plainly done utilizing a very complex division 
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of labour.  The number of specialized, technical tasks performed in an industrial society 
is vast.  Not just this, but new social configurations are employed; for instance, the 
rational bureaucracy developed to effect the administration of large enterprises.  These 
types of society are further characterized by the existence of an elaborate spatial division 
of labour. Hence, in sum, there is interdependence between population growth and the 
enhancement of the division and specialization of labour both in respect of its technical 
and social and organizational aspects.  
 
Before proceeding further it may be helpful also to summarise how these developments 
from hunter-gatherers through to industrial (or post-industrial) society may be viewed in 
ecological terms.  The growth of world population would not have been possible without 
humans making radical changes in their ecosystem.  Plainly these changes have not been 
merely quantitative; that is our relationship to our biological and physical environment is 
much more than an enlarged replication of the relationship of hunter-gatherers to theirs.  
Indeed, because of the economists’ ‘law of diminishing returns’, the additional supply of 
labour occasioned by an increase in population usually has less productivity than the 
existing labour supply.  Hence usually the means of subsistence does not increase 
proportionate to an increase in population.  Rather, the mechanism by means of which the 
means of subsistence has kept pace with growing population is a qualitative change in the 
ecosystem i.e. a change in technology and organization serving to increase the production 
possible on a given territory with a given input of labour.  It seems likely that this type of 
change was occurring – but with greatly varying rapidity – both during the extended 
period in prehistory prior to the advent of settled agriculture, and during the shorter 
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period thereafter, but with the difference that responses to population pressure were more 
extensive in their territorial implications in the former case and intensive in the latter. 
 
Empires and beyond 
The evidence is that early states arose in lowland basins with fertile soil that could 
produce high agricultural yields with the benefit of irrigation, but cities and states 
subsequently developed in a much wider range of environmental settings.  The human 
tendency to threaten and sometimes use organized violence is again centrally involved in 
subsequent developments, since frequent warfare between cities and states and their 
neighbours resulted in the formation of ever larger political entities.  Factors driving the 
process included:  the desire for security (through neutralizing or conquering potential 
enemies) or economic gain (by controlling greater resources) or personal ambition on the 
part of rulers and elites.  The process appears sometimes as a series of recurrent cycles, 
by which individual states became powerful and achieved regional dominance, only to 
fracture and fragment as they failed to establish durable systems of integration and 
administration.  There is evidence for such cycles in south-west Asia, and in Central and 
South America. 
 
At their most expansive, these accumulations took the form of empires, such as the 
Roman Empire around the Mediterranean basin, or Peru under Inca rule.  The distinction 
between state and empire is not an easy one to draw (Morrison, 2001).  Empires are 
territorially more extensive and organizationally more complex.  However, what they do 
represent, despite cycles of growth and decline, is a general process of global 
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development leading to the formation of larger and larger political units.  The Spanish 
and British colonial empires are more recent steps along the same trajectory.  This 
general process of global development accompanies a tendency for population numbers 
to increase long-term. 
 
Darwin’s claim is surely well-founded that, ‘empire (where different communities fall 
under a common ruler) has been the default mode of political organization throughout 
most of history…The history of the world, it is tempting to say, is an imperial history, a 
history of empires’ (2007, pp.23, 491).  Plainly, given their prominence in recorded 
history and the generality sought here, empires warrant particular scrutiny.  As regards 
the issue of definition, a consideration of work of Abernethy (2000) and Motyl (see 
Mackie, 208, p.44) brings forward these key ideas:  that empire is a relationship of 
domination and subordination between one polity (the ‘metropole’) and one or more 
other territories (‘colonies’) claimed as its lawful possessions; also, that it may be 
understood in terms of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, where a relatively complex metropolitan 
core dominates people to whom it is not accountable and there exist culturally and 
administratively distinct peripheries.  Of course, it is the case that empire has taken many 
different forms over extended periods of time.  One can note, for instance, the distinction 
between maritime and land-based empires and also that between states which were 
empires (e.g. Russia with its incorporation of Siberia) and states which possessed empires 
(Great Britain).   
 
 171 
For our purposes Ferguson’s rather different (informal) notion of empire is also 
suggestive for he defines it as an organization for extracting goods or services people 
would not offer voluntarily in a free market, or would not offer at the discount enforced.  
This might mean, for instance, that empire forced them to hand over their land, or to 
export raw materials on ships or through ports of the metropole, or to agree to reduce 
trade barriers or tariffs.  The definition helpfully reminds us that empire is 
quintessentially a partially-integrated set of organizational and institutional arrangements 
with coerced cooperation at its core. This underlines the point that empire produces clear 
‘losers’, both those who lose their lives who might not otherwise do so or those who lose 
out materially, and yet there are reasons for judging that in the longer-term it may tend to 
lead to overall population increase.  
 
The direction of argument is readily illustrated by reference to the European maritime 
empires.  The explosive penetration of the Spanish into the American continent was 
accompanied by epidemics, war and elemental exploitation resulting in great population 
loss.  Particularly between 1750 and 1870 there was the subordination or removal of 
indigenous populations from vast areas of American, Australasian and South African 
temperate zones. Yet the land use changed fundamentally from relatively extensive 
methods of exploitation to relatively intensive ones. Indeed the explosive European 
penetration paved the way for these ‘neo-Europes’ – as they are sometimes termed – to 
be drawn in as integrated parts of a wider European-led economy.  In association with 
these kinds of changes, empire – whatever the short-term population losses from 
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particularly warfare and epidemics - placed the populations of colonies and former 
colonies on an altogether higher longer-term population trajectory.    
 
As is particularly illustrated for North America, it was not infrequently the case that the 
way the natives had already modified the ecology on land helped to create conditions 
which the superior technology of the newcomers could readily exploit, particularly in 
respect of fertile soil, game, timber and fisheries. Crucially too the colonists introduced 
European fauna and flora calculated to sustain their way of life in a way which Crosby 
has characterized as ecological imperialism and amounting to ‘the biological expansion 
of Europe’ (Crosby, 2004).  That author also summarizes in an interesting way the 
ecological relation between the Amerindians and aboriginals more generally and 
subsequent European invaders, viewing the former ‘as the shock troops, clearing the way 
for the second wave, with its more complicated economies and greater numbers’ (Crosby, 
quoted, Williams, 2008, p.163). 
 
These are striking instances concerning the implications of empire for population, but to 
grasp the position even more generally it is helpful to bring into play, and even extend, 
the theme Ferguson (2003) develops which is that – particularly major – empires such as 
Rome and nineteenth century Britain provide public goods for colonies and perhaps even 
internationally.  In this connection it is worth focusing on the basic point that the 
metropole imposes some degree of order within its territory, with its politico-social and 
cultural elements.  No doubt the detail varies greatly, but the paramount state uses its 
power to impose rules upon what might otherwise be a relatively anarchic configuration 
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of states or communities. In the latter connection the paramount power may indeed be 
said to confer the ‘public good’ of peace (even despite the phenomenon of suppression of 
local rebellions), it being a clear possibility that without its contribution the constituent 
elements might themselves be involved in local wars.     
 
The metropole may often be seen to impose a politico-legal framework, together with 
language and religion; there may also be expansion of literacy, but this is emphatically 
not to say that cultural diversity within the empire is eliminated (just as local religions 
were tolerated in the Roman Empire alongside emperor worship).  The use of more 
effective technologies may be extended over a greater area. The public goods conferred 
may also include laws and institutions for the protection of property rights (see, for 
instance, O’Brien, 2002, p.4).  However, one clear consequence is that within the context 
of the imposed order there are new possibilities for cooperation, necessarily including, of 
course, the coerced type. Once the full range of ‘public goods’ is considered it becomes 
apparent that such elements as peace, language, institutions and technology may point in 
the direction of a modified pattern of cooperation associated with a rising population.  
Plainly this is more likely to be realized where the empire endures. 
------------------- 
Case Study: the Chinese Empire  
For illustrative purposes, let us consider a land-based empire of huge importance in Asia, 
the Chinese, which most certainly did endure, focusing particularly on conditions under 
the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), and prior to the changes forced on China by Britain in 
1842.  The approach to empire in that context may be characterized as relatively 
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unchanging and traditional.  China’s name in Mandarin means ‘the Central Kingdom’ 
and the emperor was considered as ruling by ‘mandate from heaven’.  Politics and 
administration were underpinned by a religious outlook embracing the teachings of 
Confucius, a thinker who legitimized the agrarian state by arguing that agriculture was 
the true basis of economic, political and moral well-being.  Imperial control of such a 
large country was maintained by the use of civil officials (whom Europeans called 
‘mandarins’) together with a social elite of scholar-gentry or degree holders who 
performed many essential functions of government in the localities. 
 
It seems that the long period of political and social peace following the stabilization of 
the Qing dynasty was an important permissive context for something of a population 
boom. The amount of food available per head increased with the introduction of 
American food crops (notably peanuts, maize and sweet potatoes) in the seventeenth 
century; and agricultural productivity rose sharply in the eighteenth. The civil officials 
regulated movements of resources such as rice around the empire and, more generally, 
maintained a buoyant system of internal trade between regions, thereby helping to sustain 
a growing population numbering around 150 million in 1700, approximately 313 million 
in 1794 (Rowe, 2002, p.475), and perhaps 400 million in 1842 (Hack, 2009, p.9).  
However, there was also, during this period, a situation of relative ‘technical stasis’ in 
China, constrained by ‘an elite culture hostile to borrowing, adaptation and innovation’ 
(Waites, 2009, p.126).   
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Up until 1839 the Qing dynasty had extended its territorial control essentially by 
accretion from surrounding areas.  Military campaigns were conducted against bordering 
kingdoms mainly to the north and west; which were often then turned into provinces.  A 
characteristic modus operandi consisted of a ‘tribute system’.  The ideologically-rooted 
notion was that foreign states should and would acknowledge Chinese superiority 
through words and tribute, in return for which they received gifts; in actuality this 
sometimes amounted to inter-state trade accompanied by required deference and 
formalities.  A further ‘internal’ feature of China’s imperialism must be noted.   The 
Manchu rulers of the Qing dynasty were, as the name suggests, of Manchurian origin and 
they always remained to a degree separate from the ethnically different, mainly Han 
population.  Hence the Chinese empire may be thought of as ‘internal’ in respect of the 
domination of the Han and other groups; but ‘external’ in respect of control over 
territories conquered or brought into relations of tribute.  However, the overall conclusion 
must be that the empire exhibited a tendency to expand its land area, drawing in adjacent 
peoples, but it did so in such a way that its overall population and population density 
tended to rise.  The Chinese case is illustrative of  the point that the empires even of 
despotic states can provide public goods within their borders – such as better 
communications, and free(r) movement of (at least some) people and goods, and unifying 
institutions and language – which provide conditions for population growth. 
------------ 
In considering the overall impact of an empire on population numbers there is a need to 
examine both the period in which it endured and its - possibly considerably extended - 
aftermath. For illustrative purposes consider the ancient civilizations and empires of the 
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Greeks and the Romans.  In this connection it is not difficult to highlight - should one feel 
inclined to do so - highly negative features such as the fact that both were based on 
slavery and Roman government was at times dominated by something resembling mafia 
families; the deaths and injuries arising from the activities of the Roman legions were no 
doubt massive.  However, it seems likely that long-term each impacted positively on 
population growth:  after all these may properly be viewed as ‘seed-bed’ societies within 
western civilization. Each contributed in science and technology. Of strategic importance 
too are considerations to do with language and institutions.  In each case language 
constituted a lingua franca which continued to be of prime importance for centuries after 
its specific ancient empire had disappeared, and it was via these languages that great 
knowledge and understanding were passed to much later generations.  Latin formed the 
basis of the Latin languages upon which the unity of western European national groups 
such as those in Gaul and Iberia became based (superseding tribal loyalties); again, 
Roman law played an important long-term role in Europe. The Roman Empire ceased to 
exist but the Christian religion which was institutionalized within its boundaries 
continued in both its Latinate and Greek forms.  A tentative conclusion is that Greece and 
Rome played their part in the long-term population growth of Europe as well as more 
widely.  
 
Thinking more generally about imperialism and post-imperialist phases, one can perhaps 
risk the tentative assertion that the longer-term consequences are likely to be more 
marked where the empire had longer duration and where the cultural and institutional 
integration had been greater; there is also the matter of whether colonies were - in any 
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sense  - ‘prepared’ for the post-imperial phase. In a suggestive study Abernethy (2000) 
considers empire and end-of-empire over the period 1415-1980 and makes an important 
point concerning political legacies. He argues (Abernethy, 2000, pp.367-9) that the 
chances of successful post-independence democracy are influenced by how far colony-
wide representative institutions had been in place, and functioning effectively, before 
independence.  He tabulates former metropoles against the degree of freedom in their ex-
colonies.  The British Empire, however belatedly, did extend representative assemblies to 
most colonies, and a majority of its colonies exhibit greater degrees of freedom, while the 
empires characterized by more authoritarian rule, such as those of France and Portugal, 
produced ex-colonies with much lower degrees of freedom – assessed by him as of the 
year 2000.  At least one can say the more the ‘idea of liberty’ was rendered concrete in 
pre-independence territories, the greater their chance of having more democracy after 
independence.  More generally, one can identify circumstances when a ‘carry-over’ of 
institutions is more likely, and where particular institutional configurations may promise 
more in terms of population growth (modern India providing an illustration). 
 
In a suggestive way Ferguson widens his analysis to examine the provision of public 
goods by hegemonic states, where this influence may be judged to go beyond the 
confines of conventionally defined empires. He has in mind the wider role of Britain in 
the nineteenth century and of the USA in the later twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries.  Ferguson’s essential point is that the paramount state or ‘hegemon’ may 
provide ‘public goods’ on a wider basis and other nations benefit; for instance, that state 
may maintain a degree of order and use power and persuasion to impose flexibly 
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enforced rules upon an otherwise potentially anarchic system of international relations.  
Thus he judges that the British Empire ‘acted as an agency for imposing free markets, the 
rule of law, investor protection and relatively incorrupt government on roughly a quarter 
of the world’ and encouraged those things in still more countries by ‘the imperialism of 
free trade’ (Ferguson, 2003, pp. xix-xx).  He goes on to argue that ‘no organization in 
history has done more to promote the free movement of goods, capital and labour than 
the British Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries’, as well as ‘to impose 
Western norms of law, order and governance around the world’ (pp. xx-xxi). No doubt 
some will take issue with the detail of the account but his point is surely well made that a 
hegemonic power may sometimes extend widely the availability of public goods.   The 
net result may be that the scope for possible cooperation is extended with positive 
implications for population growth. 
 
A world of nation states 
It is appropriate at this point to move the focus of discussion from the historically 
important phenomenon of empire to the arguably more modern conception of the nation 
state.  There is a marked difference between political organization in the Middle Ages 
and that evident today.  Whereas at the earlier time the human population was organized 
around empires and world religions which often lacked precise political boundaries, what 
one now finds is the division of geopolitical space into fixed, bounded territorial entities. 
Particularly since the Second World War when European powers divested themselves of 
former colonies, a worldwide system prevails, whereby humankind is organized into 
approximately 190 exclusive communities, or nation states. In political terms there has 
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been a tight in-filling of space, in marked contrast to the position in former times.  It is 
important for present purposes to examine the origins and significance of this now highly 
familiar phenomenon. 
 
Five elements seem to be involved in the nation-state system (see McGrew, 2004, p.133).  
A principle of territoriality operates whereby there is organization into discrete 
territorially-defined political communities.  The notion of sovereignty is forwarded as, 
within its territory, each state or national government claims supreme and exclusive 
authority over its people (formerly viewed as subjects but increasingly defined as 
citizens), while also, in some sense, seeking their allegiance. A principle of autonomy 
separates the internal domestic sphere from the world outside:  the individual countries 
are responsible for and, in a sense, ‘contain’, the political, social and economic activity 
within their fixed borders.  States have primacy within the political landscape since they 
control access to the natural and human resources within their territories. Finally, there is 
a principle of responsibility, whereby states are understood to be responsible for their 
own survival and integrity – they must ‘look after’ themselves - while also being 
responsible for the security and well-being of their citizens, and, in particular, protecting 
them from outside interference. They do so within the context of an - at least potentially - 
relatively ‘anarchic’ international ‘system’. 
 
This particular set of arrangements whereby humanity is organized is referred to as the 
Westphalian System and it is significant that it is judged to have its origins in Europe and 
in the Peace of Westphalia (1648 AD).  At that date European monarchs agreed, ‘to 
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recognize each other’s right to rule their own territories, free from outside interference’ 
(McGrew, 2004, p.133).  Around that time the population of Europe was tending to grow, 
increasing the tendency for the peoples of individual states to inter-affect or interfere with 
one another, and there were important religious (especially protestant and catholic), 
linguistic and other cultural lines of division; the continent had been racked by territorial 
claims and disputes often resulting in war.  This was also the period when European 
powers were beginning to see more opportunities for expansion overseas than within 
Europe itself.  Absolutist monarchs were finding themselves endlessly at loggerheads, 
but, nevertheless, this development represents a highly strategic extension of the 
cooperative framework.  The essential point is that it introduced relatively more 
predictability and security into the frameworks of the lives of Europeans; hence it 
increased the likelihood of population growth.  It exemplifies the pattern whereby 
extensions in the framework of cooperation and population growth inter-affect one 
another. 
 
Of course, it was only in the twentieth century and particularly following the Second 
World War, with the dismantling of European overseas empires, that ‘statehood and 
national self-determination finally became the sole principles by which the world’s 
peoples came to be politically organized.’ (McGrew, 2004, p.133)   But what exactly had 
happened to transform a European into a worldwide phenomenon?  The main factor was 
that, in the meantime, empires had come to dominate virtually all the world’s inhabitable 
territory, thereby making certain public goods more widely available, as discussed earlier.  
European colonial powers and those subject to their influence increasingly operated with 
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the system of concepts underlying the nation state.  Competing European powers came to 
define boundaries between their spheres of influence; they also created sub-territories or 
quasi-nations within their empires.  As already indicated, it was also generally the case 
that, despite the occurrence of many wars, empire tended to put colonial territories on the 
trajectory of increasing population. Vitally, too, it was the experience of subjection to 
European power that created, particularly in educated elites in colonial territories, the 
aspiration to independent statehood. Thus the end of empire led to the birth of numerous 
nation states whose boundaries had been determined by colonial powers, rather than ones 
which arose from indigenous – for instance, tribal – differences.  Hence the phenomenon 
of empire is a vitally important causative influence on the creation of a comprehensive 
nation state system.  Nevertheless, in sum, a fundamentally cooperative organizational 
and conceptual framework had been created on a worldwide basis which opened the way 
to further population growth. 
 
Further developments since the war plainly have been shaped by power differences 
between nation states. However, in connection with a consideration of the contribution of 
hegemonic or relatively dominant states (of the type provided earlier), the error is to 
conclude too readily that their actions and the consequences of those actions are to be 
understood simply by reference to the idea that they are self-serving. (An equivalent error 
may be made in respect of the contributions of individuals.)  Thus dominant powers at the 
end of the Second World War came together in the creation of the United Nations 
Organization (UNO), when, no doubt, each one had an eye to its own national interest 
(and which interests are manifested to this day in the composition of the UN Security 
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Council).  Nevertheless, virtually every nation state in the world now belongs to the 
United Nations which advances common interests on the widest basis; it has also 
developed its own powers and authority.  Its overall contribution is such as to reduce 
tension and conflict in the world and is supremely illustrative of the general pattern in 
human life whereby, where there are groups who are constantly squabbling and fighting, 
higher-level cooperation is expressed in the creation and contribution of overarching 
bodies which moderate and serve to diminish the occurrence of violence.  
 
More generally, the pattern evident in geopolitics since the Second World War may be 
characterized in the following way.  Although nothing has emerged which remotely 
constitutes world government, there has been a considerable build-up of international 
governance, with such bodies as the UN, The World Health Organization, the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization playing prominent 
roles.  Again, there have emerged supra-national regional groupings of considerable 
importance such as the European Community or mutual defence associations such as 
NATO.  Thus it has been a period especially marked by higher-level cooperation, by 
which is meant cooperation over and above that which is proceeding within the confines 
of particular nation states. While it is the case that these bodies are geared to achieving 
differing objectives, it is noticeable that many are concerned with such matters as orderly 
resolution of disputes, or setting the terms upon which parties may relate in an orderly 
way, or assisting parties who are temporarily in difficulties; there is also the recurrent 
idea that lower-level entities (such as firms) should be enabled or constrained to relate or 
compete ‘on a level playing-field’.  In a complex world with such a large population and 
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experiencing globalization – itself a phenomenon manifested at several levels from the 
individual to the supranational - the potential for conflict which could lead to violence is 
particularly great.  Nevertheless the tendency is for structures of higher-level cooperation 
to play an ever-more-prominent moderating role, thereby creating the conditions for 
further population growth.  (A consolidated review of the significance of violence and 
war in the human story is provided in the final section of Chapter 8.)  
 
----------------------------------------- 
Summarizing conclusion 
This chapter has focused on how changing patterns of cooperation have tended to 
generate population increase throughout prehistory and history.  The population of 
hunter-gatherers tended to grow through expansion in space.  Significantly, the crucially 
important phenomenon of agriculture arose independently in at least seven regions of the 
world.  The emergence of agriculture may only be understood once it is appreciated that 
various incremental stages are involved as are differing associated phenomena such as 
domestication, cultivation, herding and sedentism; there is also the important distinction 
between hoe agriculture and plough agriculture and the need to take full account of 
technologies of intensification.  Population pressure contributed by leading hunter-
gatherers to spread in ways made possible by technical modification, but the same kind of 
pressure sometimes resulted in intensive adjustment involving technical and 
organizational change.   
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A further evident tendency was for there to emerge more institutionalized social 
formations (states) and complex concentrated settlements (cities).  The human tendency 
towards aggression played an important part.  In association with these changes there is a 
tendency for kinship to decline in relative importance as a structuring principle although 
it always retains importance. That the same trends – towards food production, social 
complexity and urbanism – are found as independent developments in different parts of 
the globe points to the importance of gradual yet systematic change in social and 
technical organization i.e. in the pattern of cooperation. 
 
Warfare between cities and states played its part in the formation of ever larger political 
entities.  Recorded history is marked by the emergence of empires and nation states.  
Attention has been drawn to the way in which, in respect of empire, the metropole 
confers a range of public goods throughout its territories thereby tending to generate a 
wider pattern of cooperation associated with a rising population.  Empire and population 
growth both played a part in the emergence of the nation-state system, initially in Europe.  
Despite the occurrence of wars, a fundamentally cooperative organizational framework 
was thereby created – eventually on a worldwide basis.  More recently there has followed 
a build-up of international and supra-national governance i.e. structures of higher-level 
cooperation which perform a moderating role.  There is evidently a dynamic setting, 
conducive to a steadily rising population growth.      
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Chapter 8:  Complex societies  
In this chapter the attempt is made further to situate complex societies within an extended 
discussion of the ways in which human cooperation may tend to give rise to a growing 
population.  Given the nature and degree of that complexity the approach adopted is 
intended to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, concentrating on the most strategic 
aspects.  Thus consideration is given as to how orderly cooperation is sustained and 
extended in larger populations.  In this connection, the development of the built 
environment, money and technologies of communication plays a key part.  The attempt is 
also made to situate the notion that there has been extension in the scope of rational 
action.  It becomes apparent, given patterns in Western societies, that there is a 
discernible approach to a limiting point in terms of the scope for communication to give 
rise to cooperation. This brief review of some key elements is again suggestive of the 
idea that the single most important variable mediating between the occurrence and 
expansion of cooperation and the build-up of population is the development of the 
division and specialization of labour.  Finally, in the chapter, the perennial phenomenon 
of violence and war is considered. 
 
(a) The built environment 
Cooperation emerged and first developed between people who were physically close.  
With the coming of sedentism use would have been made of the home base and 
movements of people assisted by the creation of paths and the use of animal tracks.  
Overtime the domestication of animals came to play its part in the transport of people and 
goods.  More recently there have been many important technical advances in respect of 
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means of transport. It may be judged that these are highly significant in relation to the 
elaboration of the division and specialization of labour, most notably in respect of its 
spatial aspect, and are interdependent with population growth. 
 
A main pattern to note concerns co-action.  It is plainly the case that humans change the 
physical environment in semi-permanent ways.  Through their patterned activity and 
cooperative efforts they are provided with the physical means which they rely upon to 
sustain their way of life.  Consider in this connection the nature of a house.  The rooms 
are designed for and lend themselves to various uses, but they also proclaim those uses. 
Newcomers generally know what to expect. Hence the design lends itself to orderly co-
action; for instance, one person may be washing up while another makes the bed and a 
third uses the toilet. The design accommodates patterned use in respect of both space and 
time; there is a minimal tendency for people to interfere with one another in unexpected 
ways. 
 
A semi-permanent structure such as a house represents an investment in its own use with 
substantial implications for future action, although of course it could be adapted – at cost 
- for other uses.  There is a sense in which a house encourages people to live in it 
(consider the phenomenon of squatting), which itself has implications for population.  
Significantly, where the housing stock of a given area consists of two- and three-
bedroomed houses, this itself seems to carry the implication that families may be 
expected to consist of parents with three or fewer children rather than parents with ten.  
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Semi-permanent structures and artifacts convey information and implications for 
expected behaviour.   
 
The same goes for the physical environment outside the house.  A path provides a surface 
upon which to walk but, more than this, it provides a recognized route.  Roads are 
transformed surfaces linked within a network upon which vehicles readily move but they 
also proclaim their own use.  Notably there is an elaborate associated system of signs and 
communication both regulating and facilitating their use; systems operate whereby 
attempts to interfere with orderly movement of vehicles are cut short.  Those 
encountering and using roads know what to expect. Physical movement is maximally 
assisted – while of course being at cost - but the likelihood of people hindering or 
impeding each other minimized. Hence individuals are presented with a greater range of 
options in respect of those with whom they may have face-to-face contact, while the 
possibilities in terms of co-action are maximized e.g. one drives to work and after work 
to the supermarket, which has meanwhile received a fresh delivery.   
 
It is important to stress that the system of signs and communication associated with semi-
permanent change in the physical (built) environment includes both permissions and 
prohibitions.  For instance, given the institution of private ownership, there is 
understanding of what a house, a farm, or a factory is, but also that one would normally 
only enter for limited periods when permitted to do so by the occupier/owner. The effect 
is to lead the majority of the population to expect to be excluded from large areas for 
extended periods of time.  Nevertheless the orderly arrangements are such as to increase 
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the predictability of successful passage, to reduce the chances of people interfering with 
one another, and hence reduce the likelihood of conflict leading to injury or death.     
 
These semi-permanent created features of the physical environment generally change 
very gradually overtime. (A counter example is presented by the occurrence of war.) It 
would be unthinkable to relocate all the buildings located in, and functions performed in, 
London to (say) Llandindrod Wells in quick time.  Manifestly the preservation and 
gradual development of these features is sustaining of the overall societal division of 
labour and the large population with which it is interdependent; indeed, the improvement 
of the facilities could more readily accompany a rise in the population using and 
dependent upon them. 
 
(b) Writing  
Two centrally important points about writing as opposed to oral communication concern 
time and objectively-given – potentially public – shared reference.  The human memory 
is perhaps surprisingly good, but it is by no means infallible.  Things of great importance 
may nevertheless be forgotten and there can be endless disputes about what was said or 
agreed.  Hence effective human cooperation in a practical sense is powerfully advanced 
by the coming of writing.  Above, the notion of cooperation giving rise to shared ‘mental’ 
maps of an area is advanced.  When these kinds of maps are supplemented by physical 
ones, there is potentially more reliable information and shared reference sustained 
through time.  Significantly, writing, as noted in Chapter 7, first emerged in several 
regions as a device for record-keeping in hierarchical (priestly) and/or bureaucratic 
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contexts in the ancient world. No doubt, even given a social system of highly unequal 
power relations, it played a major part in regularizing transactions and making them more 
predictable, hence diminishing the tendency to provoke unintended conflict.  Of course, 
from the outset there is the potential for differing types of writing expressing various 
types of interest – the religious and artistic concern with calligraphy would be illustrative 
– hence bringing people together on various bases. 
 
Importantly, as is suggested by its origins, writing is relevant to a range of what might be 
termed ‘second-order’ phenomena and activities, associated with and arising out of 
‘primary activities’.  Once organization gets at all complex it is difficult for people to 
know precisely what is expected of them and how differing contributions connect up.  
Writing can provide the agreed reference point.  The central feature of a modern rational 
bureaucracy is decision-making by reference to written rules. It is also the case that 
particular documents and particular formulations which may be embodied in documents 
acquire a special status. In a religious context particular formulations acquire ‘canonical’ 
authority as scripture. Also highly strategic are precise legal formulations embodied in 
documents which govern activities within and beyond courts, and secure the status of 
other documents. The law and scripture powerfully legitimate and regulate in their 
differing ways on the widest basis.  On a specific point, a property transaction as 
expressed in a deed may be taken as definitive of the transaction.  Paper money on its 
face bears witness to what is owed but also constitutes the monetary value in itself. These 
materials acquire their significance from associated second-order cooperative activity, but 
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they then play a fundamental role in shaping orderly activity and the division of labour in 
their various spheres.   
 
There is no reason to believe that the underlying intellectual powers of humans have 
altered radically since the invention of writing but their intellectual achievements have 
expanded exponentially.  This is because writing facilitates every type of second- or 
higher-order, shared, ‘mental’ activity.  Prior to writing, mathematical knowledge was 
rudimentary, but it flowered with the coming of writing. Without any type of external 
representation of number, people could perhaps count up to four or five, but it would 
have been next to impossible to do the equivalent of calculating in one’s head 14x15, 
leaving aside the issue of motivation for so doing.   With the coming of external 
representations as with the abacus and writing things get altogether easier; even then the 
adoption of a convenient notation is crucial.  Individuals interact with writing when 
seeking to engage in disciplined inquiries and writing enables the individual contributions 
to build. Thus writing powerfully assists even rudimentary investigation of a scientific or 
technical type.  Yet those investigations may also open the way to practices enabling a 
larger population to be sustained. 
 
(c) Money and capitalism 
Of strategic importance in the human story is the emergence of money.  A specified item 
comes to be used as a medium of exchange in, for instance, markets; this has included 
livestock, stacks of grain and cowry shells.  A very early example comes from 
Mesopotamia where ‘values of account were being given in measures of grain or silver 
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before 2000BC’ (Roberts, 1980, p.104).  Whether or not items are easily transportable is 
highly relevant to their ease of use – a factor favouring precious metals; true metal 
currency arises, for instance, when ingots are officially sealed.  Many peoples in the 
ancient world got along for centuries without money but there was, nevertheless, a 
tendency for that institution to arise, expand in scope and ramify in its implications.  
(Davies 2010; Ferguson, 2012)  Significantly, where money is initially used within a 
particular administration its use tends eventually to extend beyond that administration; 
also currencies become convertible.   
 
Where there is simply barter or a (purely) administered economy the fact that the trading 
relationship is directly associated with the physical conveyance of goods for collection 
and delivery, tends to confine the activity to a limited locale.  On the other hand, where 
there is an easily transportable medium of exchange – a stock of value – there is the 
ability to trade over a wider area and with a wider population.  Money facilitates and 
promotes cooperative trading relations with populations whose individual members are 
not known or identifiable in advance:  it lends itself to the development of markets in 
both goods and services.  There can also be borrowing and lending, so ties originating in 
this way may again involve those who are relatively remote geographically.  Of course 
there are stages in the precise use of money (with use of coin and paper coming later), but 
with extension in the geographical range of individual currencies and their tendency to 
become inter-convertible, a process is set in train whereby the populations drawn together 
in an economic sense tend to expand without limit.  It is not too much to claim that the 
introduction of money is an early harbinger of globalization. 
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Money tends to develop markets for labour power and (even) people themselves, as with 
slavery.  Clearly money gives rise to specific roles such as money lender, but more 
generally it assists in the development of the division and specialization of labour. With 
the coming of coin and paper particularly, money as a readily partible medium of 
exchange lends itself to action on the basis of a calculation of relative value.  Someone 
engaged in a specialized role or a set of anticipated roles can do so in the expectation that 
they can afford to meet their other needs from the proceeds.  Again, they can plan to 
achieve a surplus.   
 
There is a specific and important way in which money contributes to the development of 
cooperative relations in respect of trade in goods and services, while also sharpening the 
division of labour.  It is implied by Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage.  Suppose 
there are two individuals or groups of any size (e.g. nations).  Suppose also that the first 
individual or group is good at producing food and very good at producing clothing, while 
the second is bad at producing food and very bad at producing clothing.  Given this 
circumstance most people tend to judge that it would be in the best interests of the first 
party to walk away from the second; but Ricardo showed that this would be an error.  In 
fact, both parties stand to gain by specializing - the first in clothing, the second in food - 
and trading their surpluses.  When generalized, these same sorts of considerations point 
to the gains to all flowing from free trade.   The key point to arise is that given the 
institution of money and the way it comes to define interests and relative values, there 
will be a tendency through extended time for parties to realize there are gains to be had 
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by their entering these kinds of relations i.e. there is a tendency for the potential to 
cooperate in trade relations to be realized.  Since this argument is general and has 
application at so many levels, it could hardly be of greater significance in the 
understanding of how cooperative relations tend to develop without limit.  (I am indebted 
to Mark Pagel for alerting me to the significance of the argument of this paragraph and 
for the very details of the example used here to convey it;  see Pagel, 2012, pp.104-5) 
 
It has been stressed in this account that there is a tendency for orderly cooperative 
behaviour to be promoted and for interference with cooperation to be minimized. This 
provides useful context within which to understand the coming of insurance.  Clearly 
with the build-up in trade following upon the use of money, it would become apparent 
that potentially valuable cooperative relationships could be disrupted by chance events or 
by other parties with ulterior motives.  A party could, for instance, have commenced 
cooperation but then because of interference be unable to go through with it.  Insurance 
helps to overcome the disruptive effects of adverse possibilities and thus facilitates more 
readily sustainable patterns of cooperation. 
 
As has been particularly thoroughly documented and researched by historians and social 
scientists, a whole configuration of elements came together at a particular time and in a 
particular geographical area to give rise to and form a developing capitalist economy.  
Besides the prior existence of a money economy, a large number of other preconditions 
and conditions – particularly legal and financial – underlie this particular institutional 
form.  Not just this, but there is point to the suggestion that the motivations of those who 
 194 
came to play strategic roles at an early stage within that institutional context were in part 
of religious origin. At roughly the same time too religion was playing a part in the 
emergence of other strategic roles such as that of scientist and technologist.  Partly as a 
consequence, the nations concerned were becoming relatively more powerful than others 
in military terms.  These developments were preconditions for the phenomenon whereby 
populations underwent the ‘demographic transition’ (considered in Chapter 9).  The point 
to stress at this stage is that though these developments associated with the emergence of 
the capitalist economic system occurred in a particular geographical region, there is every 
reason to expect that the pattern would not remain confined but would be extended much 
more widely. 
 
Money lends itself to the development of a chain of cooperative links between those who 
are remote geographically. However, associated with this, there is expansion in the range 
of unintended consequences of action. Thus people in one place who refrain from buying 
a particular good may, as a consequence, give rise to unemployment of workers in a place 
remote from them.  Again, within a developed capitalist economy, the patterned actions 
of large numbers may be seen to give rise to conditions of ‘boom’ and ‘bust’ without 
anyone really intending it; indeed, governments may be observed to struggle 
unsuccessfully to arrest the tendency.  The institution of money is thus central to the 
phenomenon whereby patterned instances of cooperative action generate indirect 
consequences which ‘escape’ easy cooperative control; further cooperative efforts are, 
however, typically forthcoming which, in their turn, address those consequences, perhaps 
leading to the amelioration of problems.   
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(d) Extended scope of rational action 
The general human capacity for rational action has already been firmly asserted, but it is 
notable that many theorists point up the strategic importance of that type of action in the 
modern era. Particularly influential is Max Weber’s view that a rationalization process 
has proceeded over the centuries in Western societies (Gerth and Mills, 1998); one may 
add that the scope of that type of orientation would appear to have been even further 
extended in association with globalization.  In his analysis of action, Weber distinguished 
between rationality in relation to a value and means-ends rationality but it is the latter 
which receives most attention. As noted already, that author also highlights the central 
importance of the use of rational bureaucracy for formal organizational purposes.  The 
notion is that people have tended increasingly to adopt a rational approach in their lives, 
meaning that they proceed in a calculative way by selecting the most (objectively) 
effective and efficient means in order to achieve ‘concrete’ goals i.e. goals which 
correspond to the realization of an empirically identifiable state of affairs as opposed to 
(say) spiritual ends. (The discussion of religion of Chapter 5 provides a contrasting 
instance:   attention is there drawn to the kind of quasi-rationality expressed even in such 
a practice as human sacrifice but reasons are given as to why that practice might be 
expected to decline or disappear in the longer-term, given the ‘costs’ involved and the 
non-demonstrability of its effectiveness.)    
 
The more systematic adoption of a rational approach is bound up with the emergence of 
particular institutional forms, perhaps most notably with a money economy and 
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capitalism. The point about a money economy and markets of the type with which we are 
familiar is that one has ready access to information about price and the ability to make 
fairly comprehensive comparisons across an extended range. The notion of what is in 
one’s interest may now be used in a comprehensive and integrated way and is widely and 
publicly understood.  Most obviously it is in anyone’s interest to sell at a higher price and 
buy at a lower price, because being left with a larger sum of money enables you to do 
anything you could do with a smaller one but also able to do more:  it simply increases 
absolutely one’s range of options.  Importantly, economic actors who fail to act in ways 
which serve their self interest in this sense will tend to be driven out of the market. Hence 
it proves to be helpful within economics to operate with the notion that prices and the 
allocation of scarce resources can be explained by the rational maximization of utility by 
economic actors.  However, it is of the essence that stable relationships of exchange 
depend upon the cooperation implied by the existence of trust and law enforcement i.e. 
the extensive adoption of a rational approach depends upon an institutional context with 
cooperation at its core.  
 
Further to this strategic example it may be judged that wider adoption of a rational 
approach is highly bound up with there being publicly available systems of recording and 
measurement – as there is with money.  The modern approach to the rational organization 
of work is dependent upon monetary calculation but also upon the accurate measurement 
of space and – especially – time:  the characteristic patterns of industrial societies arise in 
this way. The operation of rational bureaucracy is itself highly dependent upon the 
keeping of accurate written records. In a further highly strategic example it may be 
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suggested that the development of an institutionalized rational approach to science and 
engineering was interdependent with the recognition of the value of accurate recording 
and measurement of such variables as time, space and mass, ultimately taking in the very 
large and the very small.  (As Weber himself points out in a rather different example, 
people orient more rationally in the production and consumption of music given that 
standardized musical notation has been developed.)  
 
A rational – in combination with a more humane – approach is also evident in penal 
policy.  There is now a vastly diminished tendency to wish to cause offenders pain for its 
own sake or as revenge.  No doubt too one reason for the savagery of past centuries was 
that it was hard for the central authorities of states to know about and control behaviour 
throughout their territories:  in effect, they sought to control even in remote places by 
putting the population into a state of extreme fear (often amplified by the religious 
context) through the exemplary punishment of unfortunate individuals.  By contrast, 
prisons are now designed to confine and monitor offenders but also with the goal of 
rehabilitating them. In many modern democracies the killing and maiming of offenders 
has been eliminated entirely.  One could fairly say that these types of society seek to 
incorporate everyone – whatever their past behaviour - into the overall framework of 
societal cooperation.    
 
A further basic point is that people are more likely to orient instrumentally where the 
suggested means to a given end is of greater reliability.  Given the central concern here 
with population and population growth, a further highly strategic example would be 
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change in the approach to child-bearing and rearing.  Now in the foregoing it has been 
stressed that since they first understood, albeit in rudimentary form, the link between 
sexual intercourse and subsequent child-bearing, humans have sometimes tried actively 
to intervene so as to reduce the likelihood of childbirth. However, until relatively recently 
in situations where heterosexual desire was given expression, it was relatively hard to 
produce a deterministic outcome in terms of restriction of childbirth.  The significance of 
the innovations of the nineteenth century and in particular the vulcanization of rubber is 
that this begins to change; the advent of the contraceptive pill of the nineteen-sixties is 
even more decisive. The change in outlook which this made possible in Western societies 
in the last two centuries may be summed up in the phrase family planning:  there was 
now some real hope of controlling the numbers and timing of births. The resultant 
changes in behaviour contribute to the population patterns of the last few centuries which 
are considered in Chapter 9. 
 
(e) Globalization  
A consideration of the built environment and transport, money and writing sets the scene 
for a more general characterization of the process underway in respect of human 
cooperation.  That process is highlighted to an even greater degree once full account is 
taken of recent developments in information and communication technologies. The term 
most often used to encapsulate the pattern of global change is globalization.  In one 
particularly succinct account this is viewed as a process involving stretched social 
relations, intensification of flows and networks of interaction and interconnectedness that 
transcend nation states, interpenetration of economic and social practices, and the 
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development of global infrastructure. (Cochrane and Pain, 2004, pp.15-17)  Also 
pertinent for present purposes is the notion of time-space distanciation.  Conventional 
face-to-face interaction involves people being co-present, but interaction can become 
‘extended’ in space and time, with the parties no longer being co-present. (Held and 
Thompson, 1989, pp.7-8; Giddens, 1990)  This type of distancing has plainly been 
facilitated by new forms of transport and communication.  For instance, the telegraph 
enabled people to communicate quickly when at a distance. The central focus here is on 
cooperation between embodied persons and patently the possibilities in this respect have 
developed massively as have those in respect of the creation and maintenance of 
extended cooperative frameworks; no doubt too there is massively expanded scope for 
the latter types of frameworks to inter-affect one another.   Among other things, with the 
assistance of newer technologies, there is a growing capacity for nation-states and other 
agents to store information about populations and thereby to monitor and potentially 
control their activities.  
 
As noted already money facilitates trade over a greater area and with a wider population; 
additional (invented) financial instruments ensure payment at some future date.  One may 
now engage in financial transactions with those on another continent by electronic means 
and at the press of a button. Again, with the coming of social networking sites, there has 
been rapid advance in the ability to gain information rapidly about previously unknown 
people.  In sum, there is a greater ability to cooperate at a distance on various bases, 
alongside a greater ability to determine with whom one may wish to cooperate; this may 
be followed as appropriate by in-person, face-to-face contact. 
 200 
 
It may not be too far-fetched to suggest that the patterns evident particularly in western 
societies are straining towards what may be characterized as an ‘ideal type’ pattern, 
although subject to severe resource limitations.  In saying this one has in mind several 
elements. Supposing every residential unit – or even every adult – has ‘personalised’ 
transport such as the motor car, then the possibilities for bodily in-person contact are in 
effect maximized, accept that they would be even greater with the help of personalized 
aircraft (!)  Meanwhile electronic communication maximizes the possibilities for contact 
where the parties do not need to be co-present, and also facilitates the selection of co-
respondents.  Certainly the possibilities for cooperation seem to be in sight of a maximal 
limiting point.  More than this, without being too speculative, there does seem to be a 
perceptible tendency for information which people were previously content to remain 
‘private’ to be reclassified as that which should be able to be accessed more widely e.g. 
through social-networking sites.  Were this tendency to develop further it would only 
serve to enlarge the pool of information which may inform the choices of potentially 
cooperating parties.  When account is also taken of other strategic developments – for 
example, that in respect of the built environment - a pattern becomes apparent:  
cooperation gives rise to conceptualization of the external world, but then humans set 
about changing the external world so as to maximize the possibilities for cooperation 
within it. 
 
Patently, too, the various elements of globalization bear upon the tendency for the 
world’s population to grow steadily.  Plainly, for instance, global infrastructure 
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contributes directly through a cooperative enterprise such as the World Health 
Organization; and the input of that organization is essentially dynamic:  it is trying 
constantly to innovate and improve performance.  Many other elements of infrastructure 
provide systematic and innovative contributions which bear indirectly upon population 
growth.  The steadily advancing improvements in transport and communication are of the 
essence e.g. in enabling people to seek help when in difficulty and in mounting a 
response. 
 
Developments occurring at this time in education are also indicative of a transformation 
from face-to-face cooperation to cooperation on the widest conceivable basis, the point 
being that anyone with an internet connection can have access.  For instance, proceeding 
beyond the traditional model of a university with its lectures and tutorials, we may now 
all benefit from ‘massive open online courses’ or ‘Moocs’ (Agarwal, 2013, p.31).  This 
online learning is said to promote active learning, with learners watching videos and 
engaging in interactive exercises.  Moocs enable instant feedback through automatically 
graded exercises, self-paced learning, and peer learning through online discussion. Front-
rank academics and educationists contribute in innovatory ways and data collected online 
contributes to research on how students learn most effectively.  Use is even being made 
of artificial intelligence to help teachers assess students’ work.  The striking claim made 
is that, ‘Moocs make education borderless, gender-blind, race-blind, class-blind and 
bank-account blind.’ (Agarwal, 2013, p.31)  At any rate, there does appear to be an 
underlying potential for universal reach. 
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The significance of violence and war 
The reader may well be conscious of a source of difficulty for an approach which focuses 
on the notion that characteristically human cooperation gives rise to population growth, 
particularly when taken together with the assertion that there is no naturally given 
tendency for there to be positive attachment between unrelated persons.  That difficulty 
concerns the marked human tendency to threaten, and not infrequently to resort to, the 
use of violence.  This tendency is perennial and has been manifested at every level from 
the individual through to the supra-national; it is not just that humans show a marked 
tendency to squabble but things frequently go from bad to worse and they resort to 
fighting and war. (Junger, 2010; Keeley, 1996)   Plainly this seemingly points in a 
direction different from the thesis being considered here because cooperation in the use 
of violence or in war results in death or injury: it increases mortality and loss of potential 
fertility.  This topic is in a sense ‘worked through’ in the evidence and discussion of 
Chapter 7, but it may be valuable to provide a more succinct, integrated response at this 
point.  
 
At the risk of being pedantic, the connection between cooperation and war may be 
expressed in the following terms.  A conventional war in which there are two opposing 
armies or sets of forces – of which there have been a great many in human history – is not 
an instance of cooperation between them, and the resulting maiming and mortality results 
from their failure to cooperate. Indeed the failure to act cooperatively typically stems 
from the rejection by one or both sides of the possibility of coerced cooperation i.e. 
where one side capitulates and is effectively dominated or even enslaved by the other; on 
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the other hand, during combat there is cooperation within each side.  Hence the actuality 
of violence and war could be said to represent a failure to realize a latent potential for 
there to be cooperation between the two sides.  However, typically war does end with 
cooperation between them, which is not infrequently of the coerced type.  There is a 
clearly identifiable pattern whereby all higher-level cooperation between representatives 
(which itself could be coerced i.e. undertaken subject to duress) during and at the end of 
the conflict – taking the form of negotiation (directed to achieving an outcome ‘on the 
right terms’) - concerns the basis for further long-term cooperation between the two sides.   
 
It is worth reflecting that human beings could have evolved to be less antagonistic and 
belligerent than they are towards members of their own species if it served that species 
well, but they have not done so; this reflection points to the position being more complex 
than initially appears.  Thus a key point in response is that conflict leading to violence, 
just as is the case for coerced cooperation, has played its part in creating the conditions 
for population growth. Consider for instance the tendency for early humans to spread 
throughout the habitable parts of the globe.  It seems likely that this tendency to spread 
originates at least partly from the tendency for potentially violent conflict to arise 
(including between blood relatives) once the population locally begins to exceed the 
carrying capacity of the land; but it was this very tendency for the population to spread 
which more nearly maximized overall numbers at that stage.  Also, where a settled 
agricultural population extends its range by force to displace hunters and gatherers this 
might well lead to overall population increase, which could even be the case where the 
former proceed to dominate and enslave or destroy the latter.  Again, where whole 
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continents such as North America and Australia are thinly occupied by hunter-gatherers 
and others using simple technologies, patently their substantial displacement by settlers 
with superior agricultural and general technologies opens the way to greater population 
growth.  Considering the tendency among humans cooperatively to threaten and 
sometimes to resort to violence, it seems likely that its positive implications for longer-
term population growth through its potential to create the conditions for it, more than 
outweigh the negative implications of violence lacking in that potential.  However, there 
is also good reason to believe that human cooperative activity of a ‘higher level’ type 
tends also to come into play to limit the losses in numbers sustained from this source.  
 
Indeed, arising out of the review provided in Chapter7 of developments in prehistory and 
history, the key point may be made more sharply:  that the threat of violence or the 
actuality of that threat may be the critical causative factor in societal or institutional 
change of long-term significance for extending the scope of cooperation and thereby 
making population growth more likely. As already noted Diamond (1998) draws attention 
to the contribution of war to the amalgamation of societies:  creating larger entities which 
from that point on draw together previously conflicting parties within a more integrated 
system of control.   As has been shown, from Ferguson’s (2003) work one may draw the 
theme that following upon the creation of an empire, the paramount power may be said to 
confer various ‘public goods’ for its colonies – including (relative) peace – which are 
conditions for extension in the scope of cooperation, again with positive implications for 
population growth.   As has already been explained, empire was itself an important part 
of the context giving rise to the fully-developed nation state system with which we are 
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familiar and that development, too, may be seen to have positive implications.  The point 
is not that the likelihood of waging war is thereby eliminated - far from it - but that it is at 
least significantly diminished because the scope of the authority of individual 
governments is clarified and agreed in respect of internal affairs within defined 
boundaries, thereby increasing the security and predictability of life for their populations.  
Additionally relevant is the pattern experienced in living memory whereby, within the 
context of that nation-state system, there is a massive build-up of international 
governance directed at maintaining and developing cooperative relations between the 
governments and populations of differing nation states.  Hence sense may be given to the 
assertion that societal and institutional change overtime has tended increasingly to realise 
a latent potential for cooperation without recourse to violence and war. 
 
A specific aspect concerns change in social organization in anticipation of possible 
violence or war; this could be associated with either an aggressive or a defensive stance.  
This typically involves the use of centralized authority to reorganize and redirect 
resources.  Therefore there is a stimulus to state formation or to the further strengthening 
of central state institutions.  Significantly too, it is virtually always in the interests of the 
authorities to be able to call upon greater manpower.  Plainly the position will be helped 
by a larger availability of younger adult males; were the requirement to persist for 
extended time the number of male children and the fertility rate would be of concern.  
There is also a discernible pattern whereby states not infrequently hire mercenaries to 
fight on their behalf.  Yet necessarily their ability to generate resources enabling them to 
do so has some relation to the size of their own populations.  Hence there is at least an 
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underlying interest in there being a rising rather than declining population; of course, so 
also would there be an interest in making good the losses sustained from actual violence 
or war.  
 
The links between war and population may also be illuminated through consideration of 
the histories of particular geographical areas.  A state, empire or nation-state associated 
with a particular area may perhaps be characterized as a human macro-cooperative 
endeavour, but it is not a naturally occurring phenomenon in any other sense.  England 
(or Great Britain) may be a ‘green and pleasant land’ but there is no natural conjunction 
between that particular area on the globe and (latterly) a democratic political entity of 
English-speaking people:  that came about as a complex resultant of Anglo-Saxon 
invasions, the Norman Conquest and innumerable other occurrences.  At various times 
external adversaries have needed to be tackled or repelled while internal conflicts have 
also played their part in its developing nature.  Plainly fighting and war has been part of 
the means by which that particular national entity emerged and persisted through 
extended time.  It will also be readily granted that conditions were created (inter alia 
endogenous change was generated) which gave rise to considerable population growth, 
without that necessarily being a national objective at any time.  Hence, one can say that 
some cooperation issuing in violence and war – thereby giving rise to mortality – has in 
practice been a necessary condition for population growth within the defined area of 
Great Britain. 
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As is also illustrated by the case of Great Britain, systematic (endogenous) institutional 
change plays its part in reducing the likelihood of internal violence; in this connection the 
institution of the law is strategically central but other institutions are involved.  However, 
systems of social control are not static but are emergent and develop in response to felt 
problems.  Thus, in our type of society, what typically happens is that there is an 
accretion in law (perhaps both civil and criminal) to accommodate, and have application 
to, all the various sets of circumstances which present themselves; the whole point of the 
law being to reduce the likelihood of disputes getting out of control. The common law 
system of England where the state of the law is determined by binding precedent taken 
together with the continuous input of statutory law is illustrative of a pattern of growth by 
gradual accretion. Not just this, but other changes concerning for instance the existence 
and operation of a police force are introduced to reduce the likelihood of violence in civil 
society; the very notion that in a society like ours the state has a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of violence points in this same direction.  Hence the occurrence of violence 
within a society tends to bring forth the institutional developments which make its re-
occurrence that much less likely.  This is the main reason why, as the population of an 
individual society grows, the occurrence of violence within it may do little more than 
increase pro rata with population size, in a way which the authorities find broadly 
tolerable.  Hence although there is a loss in numbers from this source it is not enough to 
arrest overall population growth. 
 
In exploring the links between war and population it must also be borne in mind that war 
is a major source of social change, both internal to the societies involved but also more 
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widely.  War prompts change in the political and social ‘agenda’ as people grapple with 
both shorter- and longer-term considerations.   Hence care is needed in the attempt to 
specify the population-implications of a particular war.  Briefly reflecting on the Second 
World War, the direct losses – particularly in central and eastern Europe and especially in 
the Soviet Union – were massive.  However, that war also ushered in an extended period 
marked by all manner of developments in transnational governance geared to reducing 
the likelihood of further wars and promoting economic growth and welfare.  The 
emergence at an early stage of such bodies as the United Nations Organization, The 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Health Organization and 
institutions addressing the large-scale problems of refugees is particularly well-known, 
but there have been all manner of further developments over subsequent decades; no 
doubt too that war provided context for the emergence of pro-welfare policies within 
individual nations.  So it would not be claiming too much to say that the occurrence of 
that particular war played its part in the creation of conditions lending themselves to 
further population growth across large parts of the globe.   
 
Reflecting more generally on the persistent human tendency to devote significant time to 
killing and maiming one another, there is a discernible contrast between the position 
following the emergence of human cooperation and that apparent today.  As already 
noted the tendency for hunters and gatherers to spread throughout the habitable regions of 
the globe was maximally promising for overall population growth given the way in which 
conditions on the Earth’s surface naturally vary.  However, it was helpful in another way 
too because, given a dispersed population with simple technology including that of 
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warfare, there was maximum likelihood that local flare-ups would remain local and each 
one threaten only a tiny proportion of the total  population.  It need hardly be said that in 
this respect the situation is very different today where a conflict between nations 
possessing nuclear weapons could have continental or global consequences.  One may 
conjecture that in the early stages following the emergence of characteristically human 
ways of cooperating, the benefits flowing from cooperation enabled the population to 
grow given both natural conditions and despite the human tendency to get into physical 
conflict.  As time passed, broadly speaking the losses in conflict tended to increase as the 
population increased, but they nevertheless remained insufficient to arrest the tendency 
for it to grow in the medium term (true even of World War I).  However, with the coming 
of nuclear and other – dare one say – ‘weapons of mass destruction’ there is certainly a 
major potential source of instability which did not exist following the early dispersal of 
population, because ‘the population eggs are (increasingly) in one basket’.  Nevertheless, 
that does not change the overall direction of argument.  Even following a nuclear conflict 
impacting on (say) one or two continents, it remains more likely than not that the 
depleted world population would subsequently exhibit a tendency to increase.   
 
It may be helpful to identify a general problem bearing heavily upon the dangers in 
respect of hostilities and war in the modern era.  In modern societies the roles of 
(research) scientist and technologist are institutionalized (notably in universities and 
firms), so that scientific and technological advances are continually coming on stream. 
The motives for the activity are sometimes purely to do with ‘knowledge for its own 
sake’, but are much more often commercial; in other cases military applications are 
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themselves the goal.  It is worth interjecting that it is not at all clear how any ‘authorities’ 
could intervene to bring this general process whereby advances are continually coming 
on stream to a total halt, even should they wish to. No doubt many of the research 
advances are benign or beneficial and bear directly or indirectly on the creation of 
conditions which enable further population increase to take place (without that 
necessarily being the explicit goal).  Yet – the point of particular relevance here - it is 
almost impossible fully to identify the potential consequences of any particular research 
advance, which in practice may ramify in several directions.  Perhaps the most familiar 
example would be the way that the theoretician Einstein and the experimentalists 
Rutherford, Cockroft and Walton would have had no idea that their seemingly pure 
scientific contributions might have a bearing upon the later production of nuclear 
weapons.  Fleming ‘stumbled’ upon penicillin without even fully realizing its beneficial 
potential (later identified by Florey and Chain), but a research scientist could almost as 
easily stumble on some compound or organism which could form the basis of a ‘weapon 
of mass destruction’.  Now of course, some systems of regulation and control bearing 
upon the direction and use of scientific work are in place, but there is good reason to 
believe that they could prove to be quite insufficient at any time.  (At the time of writing 
the widening availability and use of drone technology looks to be of a kind that could 
come back to haunt us.)  One can risk the general assertion that the pace of scientific and 
technical advance has a marked tendency to outstrip developments in the societal means 
of exercising social control over its consequences.  
 
------------------------------------ 
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Summarizing conclusion 
The overall thesis being evaluated is that cooperation tends to give rise to population 
growth and there emerge en route complex societies.  In this chapter strategic aspects of 
such societies are identified which sustain and extend cooperation, thereby providing 
context for population growth.  A key element, the semi-permanent built environment 
both facilitates and constrains use while also constituting a system of signs and symbols 
whereby understanding as to that use is maintained and extended.  It is a fundamental 
condition sustaining and accommodating change in the spatial and temporal aspects of 
the division of labour, itself probably the single most crucial element implicated in 
population growth. 
 
A second element, writing, gives semi-permanent physical expression and thereby 
potential shared-reference to thought, but it also facilitates that thought particularly in 
respect of more abstract processes.  Writing is vital in the coordination of activity 
underpinning, for instance, developed legal systems and the workings of modern complex 
organizations.  A third element, the institution of money, in its physical form constitutes a 
focus of shared reference, at once symbolizing and constituting value.  It promotes 
cooperative trading relations of a market-type of goods and services on a geographically-
extended and virtually open-ended basis.  To be more precise, its very existence 
structures interests in such a way that there is a tendency for the underlying potential to 
cooperate in trade relations to be realized together with a sharpening of the division of 
labour; its apotheosis is reflected in free trade.  The institution has in-built dynamism 
tending to give rise to further related developments such as systems of borrowing and 
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lending (perhaps at interest) and insurance; that dynamism is further manifested in the 
emergence of capitalism and ultimately finds expression in globalization.  
 
In the human story rational action is evident from the outset but that type of orientation is 
more widely and more systematically expressed in association with the emergence of 
particular institutional forms – such as money.  Of particular importance is means-ends 
rationality where an objective judgment as to effectiveness and efficiency of means may 
be made in relation to the achievement of an empirically identifiable end. Here conditions 
conducive to the wider and more general application of a rational approach have been 
identified; particularly germane to population is the rationality implied by the notion of 
family planning employed in recent centuries.   
 
The process underway at the present time, arising out of cooperation and giving ever 
greater scope for it, is globalization.  That process involves many elements and operates 
at many levels; perhaps most obviously there is a tendency to transcend the confines of 
individual nation states,    Attention has been drawn to the pattern whereby cooperation 
has given rise to technologies and expert systems which in their turn maximize the scope 
and nature of possible further cooperation and extended cooperative frameworks.  The 
various elements of globalization bear upon the tendency for the world’s population to 
grow steadily. 
 
Extended consideration has been given to the significance of the ubiquitous phenomena 
of violence and warfare.  While increasing mortality and maiming in the shorter-term, a 
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key idea is that they have played a necessary part in the creation and persistence of 
circumstances conducive to longer-term population growth.  In this and the previous 
chapter various tendencies in prehistory and history have been noted which are 
interdependent with population growth.   In this connection the emergence of differing 
kinds of political entities – including states, empires, and nation states – is of fundamental 
importance.  As has been argued there is good reason to judge that within these kinds of 
units conditions tend to be created which are favourable to population growth.  However, 
it is unclear that any such entity could have emerged and persisted without some use 
being made of violence and war.  On the historical and (such as it is) pre-historical 
evidence we have, the only route through to such entities involves fighting and war which 
is then also prominent in the way they are sustained.  However, there develop in parallel 
systems of higher-level cooperation which increasingly realize a latent potential for 
cooperation. 
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Chapter 9:  The Demographic Transition and its Aftermath 
Some recent population patterns 
 
As stressed throughout, evaluating the central thesis of this work involves considering 
whether the characteristically human way of cooperating tends towards a large and 
steadily growing population, where the unit of analysis consists of those drawn together 
within a cooperative framework.  In respect of earlier times this would appropriately 
involve consideration of isolated societies (approximately true for Tikopia considered in 
Chapter 6) or (relatively) isolated civilizations, such as those in the New and Old Worlds 
prior to the fifteenth century.  Clearly at the present time one cannot proceed simply by 
consideration of individual societies because effectively the vast majority of the world’s 
population is drawn together through frameworks of cooperation; this stems from the 
process of globalization which is underway.  One can nevertheless usefully look at 
patterns across the various societies of the world.   Attention has already been drawn to 
the acceleration of the world population growth rate since about 1750AD i.e. from around 
that time a larger rate of population growth than that averaged previously became 
sustainable. In fact many points of significance for the thesis may be derived from a 
consideration of the evidence of recent centuries. A useful starting point is to note that the 
patterns in differing types of societies which have contributed to overall world population 
growth in recent centuries led to the formulation of a putative theory of the demographic 
transition. 
 
This theory – popularized particularly in the early years after the Second World War - 
was relatively congruent with at least some known facts about mortality and fertility.  It 
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was viewed by some as an explanatory account of the impact of economic development 
on the decline of mortality and fertility and involves distinguishable stages.  The initial 
stage is one of high birth and death rates and because the two are approximately equal the 
natural increase is around zero, but perhaps with a slight increase.  At the second stage 
there is a high rate of population growth because a decline in the death rate is proceeding 
at a faster pace than any decline in the birth rate.  At the third stage the rate of population 
growth is lower than at the second stage, because the birth rate is falling more rapidly 
than the death rate.  In the final stage, population growth is small or even negative, since 
the magnitudes of the low birth rate and death rate are approximately equal.  Those 
popularizing the theory judged that the simultaneous occurrence of economic 
development, industrialization and urbanization was a cause of the initial decline in 
mortality and subsequent decline in fertility.  This was more plausible in respect of 
mortality since economic development led to higher living standards including nutrition, 
better sanitary facilities and improved medical care.  However, the impact on fertility was 
less clear.  Nevertheless many demographers accepted this broad pattern of explanation at 
least for a time.  
 
Then fresh data for populations after the Second World War cast doubt on the seeming 
neatness and adequacy of the theory.  For instance, some populations supposedly at the 
fourth stage – such as the United States - experienced higher levels of fertility after the 
war than those preceding it and this persisted even after the supposed ‘bulge’ period due 
to babies perhaps postponed because of the war. (Heer, 1968, p.11)  Attention then turned 
towards such explanatory factors as changes in age at marriage and of child-bearing.  
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However, fertility tended to stay at a higher level and the population rose even during a 
period which saw increased industrialization, urbanization and economic development.   
 
Nevertheless the demographic transition model roughly draws together some discernible 
patterns across a wide range of societies.  One pertinent observation is that many 
societies at both the first and the fourth stage experienced modestly increasing 
populations.  In addition, for populations at the first stage there was indeed often a 
relatively rapid decline in mortality, brought about partly by such dramatic actions as 
spraying malarial swamps from aircraft.  Now it might have been the case that the high 
fertility would have continued unchecked in those societies for an extended period 
perhaps at a later point leading to suddenly increasing mortality as some sort of crisis 
developed; perhaps that crisis might then have been addressed to be accompanied and 
followed, however, by other crises stemming from continuing high fertility.  The point 
one is making is that the process whereby mortality and fertility rates diverged and then 
came back to be closer was not in fact ‘bumpy’ in this kind of way but relatively smooth, 
no doubt at least partly because the fall in mortality itself caused a decline in fertility.  
However, it became apparent as more data became available that in most of the (less-
developed) societies the rate of natural increase continued to remain high while the 
(more-developed) societies at the fourth stage tended to have rather lower or even in a 
few cases negative rates of natural increase.     
 
As one would expect, social scientists have explored in some detail the interconnections 
of the demographic variables.  In connection with the demographic transition attention 
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was drawn, for instance, to a pattern arising out of the patriarchal character of many 
developing societies.  With a society at the first stage it seems that many male household 
heads (of joint families, for example) were highly fertile because they hoped to live into 
old age and wished to have adult sons who would support them in their declining years; 
yet child mortality was high and only just over half of births were male.  In this context 
very young children constituted a drain on household resources (but by no means a 
massive one), although the age at which children would be expected to begin to 
contribute to household income would be young by Western standards.  The subsequent 
decline in mortality was generated, as already noted, at least partly by factors associated 
with economic development which could also bear, if less directly, on fertility, but it 
seems clear that the declining mortality itself had an impact.  So, for instance, associated 
with economic development the value of relatively unskilled child labour may have eased 
making the overall burden of young children somewhat greater.  On the other hand, the 
patriarchal fathers experienced declining infant and child mortality and then could 
somewhat reduce their fertility while retaining a similar degree of confidence about their 
old age. Also, where there are fewer children more resources may be devoted to each one, 
thus aiding their survival.  Thus proximate factors may be identified making it clearer 
how fertility and mortality might move closer.   
 
As stressed above virtually the whole of the world’s population is at the moment being 
sustained within a partially integrated cooperative framework and that population is 
indeed growing.  Importantly, patterns of migration are implicated in the process. Overall 
world population growth in recent centuries has tended to be accompanied by migration 
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from areas of rapidly growing population into areas where population is growing less 
rapidly.  Formerly this meant an outward expansion of the European population, but more 
recently it has meant migration from less-developed to more developed nations.  In sum, 
in recent decades by far the greater part of the growth of the population of our inter-
dependent world has originated in less-developed nations, but some of that growth has 
been continually transferred to the more-developed through migration.  There has also 
been a massive shift of people from rural to urban areas to the point where the urban 
regions are growing more rapidly than ever before in history.  On the other hand, in many 
developing societies (such as Mozambique and Bangladesh) families have become 
smaller but they tend to be smaller in urban than rural areas (Rosling, 2013). In moving 
beyond the theory of the demographic transition it has proved useful to give separate 
consideration to particular aspects thus focusing on transitions in health and mortality, 
fertility, migration, age distribution, urbanism, and family and household.  The average 
annual rate of growth of the world’s population peaked in 1970 at 2.04 percent but it has 
exceeded a figure of 1 percent since 1950. (Weeks, 2008, Table 2.1, pp.33-4) 
 
Population policies 
While actions by the political authorities have had considerable implications for, and 
impact upon, population throughout prehistory and history (being mentioned, for 
instance, in the Bible), the phrase ‘population policy’ is most often taken to refer to the 
modern era. The usual context is where government or some supra-national body is led to 
formulate policies understood to bear directly or indirectly on population, which it then 
seeks to implement.  In this connection there may be a – perhaps momentary - initial 
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tendency to take governmental action as in some sense definitive and determining which, 
of course, it is not.   The government is no more or less than one ‘actor’ in the play of 
forces determining population outcomes in a particular society and, though it may be the 
single most influential such actor, it may also be – probably typically is - less powerful 
and determining than combinations of the other forces in play.  Specifically, in respect of 
fertility, it is not at all easy for government to impact successfully upon the intimate 
familial sphere.  A further point to note is that within a society government is not, of 
course, to be thought of as some primal or ‘first cause’, but rather its actions are to be 
understood as a resultant flowing from the various influences upon it.  Thus the 
governments of (predominantly) Roman Catholic countries have tended to pursue pro-
natalist policies, including making abortion illegal.  Of course, it has frequently been the 
case that governmental policies and actions reflect the concerns of elites rather than those 
of the mass of the population.  Not infrequently, too, governmental actions are informed 
by current theories or doctrines within which population notions are strategic such as 
Malthusian, Neo-Malthusian or even eugenic theories. 
 
In this study it is vital to focus on tendencies and a further basic one must be noted here.  
Given an absence of world government and a relatively ‘anarchic’ international scene 
(Waltz, 1959, 1979) with competing and potentially conflicting nations and blocs, 
national governments seek to increase their relative external power rather than see it 
diminished; no doubt there are a whole number of sources of power such as economic 
strength and military power, and power may sometimes be ‘soft’ as well as ‘hard’, but 
population numbers are understood to be implicated.  Typically, political authorities wish 
 220 
their states or societies (or blocs) to become (relatively) more powerful rather than less 
powerful and, most often, they see this objective as being served by a (relatively) 
growing rather than a declining population.  In this connection, one of the basic facts 
about the modern era is that an increasing number of states collect reasonably reliable 
demographic data – most obviously in the census and the registration of births, marriages, 
deaths and migration - and hence are in a better position to assess the population position 
and can formulate and track the effectiveness of policies directed at it.  Plainly relativities 
are judged as highly important. Thus in the period between the two world wars France 
pursued – not particularly successfully - pro-natalist welfare policies hoping to reduce the 
population gap, and ultimately the power gap, between herself and Germany.   At least in 
the longer term, it tends to be understood to be in the political, economic and military 
interests of the government of a state for its population to grow relative to that of rivals.  
 
This generalization plainly needs qualification in particular instances.  Where a 
government is dependent for its own power upon a particular subpopulation, then its 
policy focus may be on the relative fertility of that part, or how it may be supplemented 
by net immigration.  Thus, the government of modern Israel – a country viewed as a 
Jewish national home – has been concerned about the relative growth rates of her Jewish 
and Arab subpopulations.  More generally, the government of a country may view or 
specify its population to be ethnically or racially of a certain kind and conduct its 
immigration policy accordingly; Australia with its policy in the early post-Second War 
decades of encouraging the immigration of European ‘whites’ provides an example.  The 
above generalization also requires qualification in respect of (temporary) policies of the 
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two most populous countries.  As is well-known, in 1979 China implemented a one-child 
policy.  In that case it seems China felt she had ‘the power of numbers’ anyway and her 
government acted as it did in the attempt to reduce fertility for economic-development 
reasons and in the attempt to raise the average standard of living.  Another country with a 
vast population, India, for a time and for not dissimilar reasons leant towards compulsory 
measures:  from around 1976 there was effectively a programme of enforced sterilization. 
As a result the number of people who were sterilized rose from 13 million in 1976 to 22 
million in 1977. (Weeks, 2008, p.512)  Highly politically contentious, this approach was 
soon abandoned.  There followed a sustained effort to reduce its rate of population 
growth by emphasizing a two-child family norm, but with limited success.  Despite these 
important variations flowing from particular circumstances, the wider tendency is 
nevertheless for government to judge that (relative) growth of population serves the state 
in respect of its external relations. 
 
Population policies are to be understood as strategies for achieving particular patterns of 
demographic change.  They differ markedly in the overall impact intended and achieved.  
Two important thrusts in recent decades may be identified and are illustrated by the 
Programme of Action arising out of the 1994 International Conference on Population and 
Development.  That programme addressed mortality by seeking a lowering of infant, 
child and maternal mortality and by bringing the AIDS pandemic under control.  
Secondly, it emphasized the importance of women’s social and reproductive rights or, 
more specifically, the importance of ‘empowering women at home, in society, and with 
respect to the availability of acceptable means of family planning’ (Weeks, 2008, p.535)   
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However, while evidence suggests that the drive towards ‘empowering women’ might 
have the consequence of reducing their average fertility, the accompanying effort to 
tackle mortality (while being highly desirable) points in a different direction, for, in its 
impact on population, it might balance or even more then balance the other source of  
fertility reduction.  At the time of writing a centrally-affirmed objective being addressed 
internationally is indeed reduction in child poverty and mortality.  The point being made 
is that although there is much talk concerning the need for overall population control i.e. 
to get world population to stabilise, the programmes and policies actually being pursued 
on the widest cooperative – even global – basis are complex in respect of their 
implications and can hardly be said to be targeted on that goal.  Transnational 
cooperation certainly manifests dominant values of our era (particularly humanitarian 
values which I wholly share), but while it contributes to demographic change, that change 
is essentially subsumed within a pattern of continuing overall population growth.  
 
The significance of contraception and abortion 
There is a tendency to consider that population control by intervention is recent (e.g. has 
followed the vulcanization of rubber in the nineteenth century) but, as noted already, the 
practice goes back into remote antiquity.  On this point the evidence for the tribal society 
of Tikopia reviewed in Chapter 6 was particularly striking for the sheer number of 
methods of population control which were identified.  The pattern appears to be that 
humans have always been prepared to cut off potential recruits to the population, again 
pointing to the importance of activity which is ‘at cost’ to the promulgation of certain 
genes; however, they tend differentially to deploy them when problems are anticipated, 
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such as famine. Of course it is the case that the precise type of intervention relates to the 
extent of practical knowledge.   Early on in pre-history the significance of pregnancy is 
grasped, only later and then gradually is the link between penetrative sex and subsequent 
childbirth understood and acted upon.  At all times human foresight is deployed.  
 
This provides the context against which the modern use of contraception and abortion 
may be understood.  In modern western societies the central fact is that most people 
aspire to have a number of children – perhaps none, but generally between one and six 
and averaging around two – which is considerably less than their potential maximum and 
certainly small when account is taken of the extent of their sexual contact; they have 
other related aspirations concerning such matters as the timing, gender composition and 
setting in which they will have them e.g. within marriage or a permanent relationship.  Of 
course aspirations may be vague and people may fail to achieve their objectives but the 
salient point is that the average of the outcomes is not far away from the replacement 
value.  The use of mechanical and chemical contraceptives or abortion is to be viewed 
primarily as a means by which they may achieve their goals, but those ends are 
essentially independent of the means. 
 
It is common for people to expect the rate of natural increase in Roman Catholic 
countries to exceed that in predominantly (or traditionally) Protestant countries because 
the former church adopts the more critical stance on the use of ‘non-natural’ methods of 
contraception and abortion, while allowing the ‘rhythm’ method.  It is notable, however, 
that in 2007 the crude birth rate per 1,000 and the rate of natural increase per 1,000 in the 
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United Kingdom were respectively 10.7 and 0.6 while in Spain the corresponding figures 
were 10.0 and 0.2, and in Italy 8.5 and -2.0, the two latter countries being heavily Roman 
Catholic (for the data of this paragraph see Weeks, 2008, Appendix). These are 
population data for nations belonging to the European Community and when one takes 
the figures for another Catholic country of a different type they may be seen to vary 
considerably; for instance, in 2007 Brazil had figures of 16.3 for the crude birth rate and 
10.1 for the rate of natural increase. No doubt part of the explanation for these differences 
lies in the shape of the population pyramid: for instance, at that date the percentage of 
each population aged 65+ were for the United Kingdom 15.8, Spain 17.8, Italy 19.9 while 
for Brazil it was a much lower 6.3.  The conclusion must be that it is the type of society 
which is determining the broad pattern of the population data, not the favoured or 
selected method for limiting births (although the latter would contribute to some degree 
through its being a more- or less- effective or efficient method) 
 
No doubt once one proceeds to micro-analysis, decision-making by individuals, e.g. by 
the male or female alone, needs to be distinguished from joint decision-making such as 
that involved in ‘family planning’ (Beshers, 1967, pp.60-1).  A related analytical 
distinction in respect of marriages – also applying to other longer-term unions -  is that 
between those where there are predominantly independent or segregated role 
relationships between husband and wife and those where there are joint role relationships 
(Bott, 1957), but, either way, the foundation of marriage and other unions still consists of 
cooperation (even when sometimes coerced).  No doubt too the development of particular 
techniques of birth control – such as the use of the oral contraceptive - requiring action by 
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the female alone is implicated in wide-ranging social and cultural change. In recent 
decades in western societies married-couple households have tended to become a 
declining fraction of all households.  Also the age of marriage has tended to rise; there is 
an increase in co-habitation and out-of-wedlock births and a rise in the propensity to 
divorce.  Women’s life chances have improved and their labour force participation has 
grown. (Weeks, 2008, p.436)  The coming of the oral contraceptive is indirectly a factor 
in women tending to have children later. 
 
Thus no one could reasonably doubt that in recent decades there have been many changes 
in respect of the position of women and the structure of families and households, but the 
societies experiencing these changes have, nevertheless, still tended to experience 
positive rates of natural increase.  As with other technical advances the development over 
the last two hundred years of effective contraception increases the range of options.  
There is a whole number of proximate factors which could influence decision making in 
respect of fertility such as housing stock, and distribution of houses by number of 
bedrooms. Significantly, during the period marked by innovations in effective 
contraception, there have also been technical and scientific advances affecting mortality 
and extending longevity (and ones even affecting migration).  Regarding population 
policy, an influential view in the light of European historical experience suggests that, 
‘the decisive factors are social and economic change, and the availability of contraceptive 
technology is of little importance’ (Casterline, 2002, p.215).  Significantly, many but not 
all of those societies where contraception and abortion have been substantially practised 
have tended to expand in population.  In sum, the last two centuries are marked by rapid 
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extensions in the practice of ‘family planning’ but also by historically high rates of 
natural increase.   
 
These demographic patterns only become explicable once one foregrounds the impact of 
cooperative genes, which – as already noted in Chapter 2 – points to the importance of 
aggregates as against individuals.  Evidently individuals are rarely acting in ways which 
maximize the likelihood of the promulgation of their own genes, but, nevertheless, the 
overall population continues to grow, even at an historically high rate.  Strikingly, the 
populations of Western societies tend to be rising but the overall demographic pattern 
can nevertheless be said to be substantially ‘at cost’ to the propagation of the genes of 
the majority of individuals who choose to limit their own fertility.   
 
Basic and perennial concerns 
Animals shy away from or actively combat threats to life and limb; so do humans.  The 
effect is to extend individual life further into the future.  At the human level extension to 
life and long-life are generally valued.  Importantly, given human foresight, the tendency 
for longevity to be promoted has an underlying source which has to do with the 
completion or furtherance of projects which occupy time.  If seeds are planted in a garden 
the whole point is that they should flower or bear fruit; delayed gratification is implicit.  
Supposing one is attending an Open University course to deepen one’s understanding of 
modern art; the hope and expectation is that the course will be completed and subsequent 
visits to art galleries enriched. Up to a point children and grandchildren may be viewed as 
‘projects’, or at least potentials that may be realized; their upbringing ‘bears fruit’ when 
 227 
they are fully functioning adults.  Grandparents contribute to the upbringing of their 
grandchildren and would welcome following them through to adulthood; but sadly this 
may be overtaken by events.  So humans may be thought of as hoping gradually to be 
carried towards – and as far as possible, if and when they get there, to enjoy – old age.  
Yet at the same time there is the realization that the main way of departing this world is 
through progressive loss of powers.  Preferably life may be even further extended in 
almost any event, but it is fully recognized that the older person will tend progressively to 
become dependent on younger people. 
 
It was noted above that in patriarchal societies heads of families wish to have male 
children because these may ultimately provide security in old-age.  In preliterate and 
traditional societies the issue is addressed via the obligations of kin and certain principles 
of reciprocity operate between generations. The tendency is to think that things are 
essentially different in advanced societies because of the coming of ‘Welfare State’ 
provisions including pensions, which bear both upon the (considerably extended) costs of 
raising children and the prospects and care of the elderly.  What has happened in Western 
societies is that ‘solutions’ have partly been collectivised via state action.  Focusing 
particularly on the situation of the elderly, the availability of first-rate health care at a 
time of particular need depends upon the availability of qualified, non-elderly staff. A 
pension in this context is to be thought of as a claim on the labour of younger 
generations.  Fundamentally, we all hope eventually to become elderly and the elderly 
have a vested interest in there being enough younger people around to provide for their 
old age. Hence, the underlying pattern of potential dependency of each generation on the 
 228 
following one is basic and perennial and provides a fundamental link between mortality 
and fertility.  In connection with that link it is also of course significant that where the 
elderly have control over property and resources, their departure necessarily involves a 
reallocation of that control (‘succession’) which is generally favourable to the interests of 
future generations. (The departure of the elderly may well be ‘in the material interests’ of 
the next generation.) 
 
Now, against the background of all the uncertainties in life, it is worth asking certain 
rhetorical questions.  If one is the head of a joint family seeking to provide for one’s old 
age would one rather have (slightly) too many sons (children) to achieve this or (slightly) 
too few, for it cannot be weighed to a nicety? (Of course, cost considerations militate 
against there being considerably too many.) Again, if you anticipate being an aging 
member of the population in an advanced western society would you rather the quantity 
of labour in the next generation is more than sufficient to meet your health needs and 
underpin the value of your pension or that the quantity of that labour is less than 
sufficient, for, again, it cannot be weighed to a nicety? (Again, cost considerations come 
into play.)  The former alternative in each case is the more attractive. This is a basic 
mechanism tending towards fertility (somewhat) outstripping mortality in any integrated 
social context: the needs of each earlier generation promise to be best served if a 
(slightly) larger one is following it.  Now, of course it is the case that in respect of 
modern western societies the problem identified is not wholly solved within each 
particular society.  For instance, health workers may be ‘imported’ from developing 
societies and the value of pensions may be underpinned by the labour of workers abroad; 
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but that is simply to say that the underlying problem is being addressed within an 
international rather than a national framework.  This consideration tends to justify the 
(theoretical) position taken here which implies that growth of population may be 
expected not so much within individual societies, but within the widest population 
brought together within a cooperating framework.  
 
In Chapter 10 the question is addressed as to whether humans are ‘naturally’ selfish, but 
it is appropriate here to point up a pattern where a dispassionate observer might be 
tempted to conclude selfishness is involved.  The central point is that foresight gives rise 
to a search for greater security.  It is not just that we want to eat today but preferably we 
want to be sure we can eat tomorrow, next month and next year; the same goes for having 
a roof over one’s head. Sexual access is typically desired not simply in the present but 
preferably repetitively into the future.  Also in respect of basic needs there are those of 
dependants to consider with all their future implications.  Kin are potentially more 
reliable as providers of assistance into the future but they may also require help 
themselves.  Hence there is a marked tendency to seek to ‘store up’ value in the form of 
bank balances, pension entitlements and tradable resources; indeed part of the intention is 
usually to advantage one’s own children through into the future. People are inclined, and 
indeed feel entitled, to accumulate assets in this way despite the fact that they know of 
others elsewhere who have virtually no assets and may even be starving.  The problem is 
often attributed to capitalism and there is reason to believe that that particular 
institutional system sharpens it, whilst also generating massive inequalities. However, the 
search for individual and family security is a marked tendency within virtually any 
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economic system and tends to produce some relativities which might reasonably be 
considered to express selfishness. What is involved here though is by no means simply 
individual ‘selfishness’ but the equivalent in relation to one’s own group e.g. ‘selfishness’ 
on behalf of one’s own children.   
 
Despite this judgment, the pattern is conducive to steady overall population growth 
locally.  Importantly, it expresses reciprocity between generations:  the earlier generation, 
whose welfare ultimately depends upon the later, looks to, and seeks to promote, the 
interests of the latter while it can.   In addition, the ‘selfishness’ on behalf of one’s own 
children means that these offspring are best placed to ‘repeat the dose’ in their relation 
with the subsequent generation.  (Correlatively, it can be seen that when the elderly are 
required to fund their own old-age care it generates controversy because it threatens to a 
degree to undermine the generational pattern as between kin.)  
 
Migratory patterns in recent decades 
A marked tendency in recent decades has been for there to be illegal and other types of 
relatively ‘unwelcome’ immigration into the developed world, particularly the USA and 
the European Community, where the migrants may, roughly speaking, be said to be in 
search of a ‘better life’.  People – especially young adults – are drawn towards resources 
and economic opportunities, but of course when they move they take their potential 
fertility with them.  Indeed had all those who have succeeded in entering these countries 
against the will of the authorities been repelled – say, since the Second World War - there 
is every reason to judge that the populations of these territories would be much less than 
 231 
they are today.  Of the future it is judged that, ‘[d]ealing with the globalization of 
migration will present an extraordinarily difficult set of policy dilemmas for virtually all 
of the wealthier countries of the world…’ (Weeks, 2008, p.534)  This type of 
phenomenon has been important historically and may be subsumed under the tendency 
for the scope of human cooperation to be extended with positive implications for 
population growth. But – it may be objected – surely some or even most of the 
populations of the receiving countries have no wish to cooperate with these potential 
newcomers?  That may indeed be the case, which makes it plain that in this instance, as 
in many others, the cooperation which is giving rise to population growth is not actively 
sought on all sides, or not undertaken on a wholly voluntary basis.  
 
To understand this phenomenon in the present context, a way of putting it is to say that 
the migrants are bringing about a type of forced or coerced cooperation between 
themselves and members of the existing populations of the countries into which they are 
moving. The point is that once they are installed they tend gradually to be integrated into 
the social and economic system of the receiving country; of course, essential twentieth 
and twenty-first century context is provided by various laws and conventions concerning 
human rights.  In general the newcomers maintain ties to their societies of origin though 
these may sometimes become attenuated through physical distance.  Highly significantly, 
they may ‘lever’ additional members of their community of origin into the receiving 
country, particularly people with whom they have ties of kinship and marriage.  
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Quite often the fertility rates of the migrants are higher than those of their new 
neighbours partly because, for a time at least, they continue to reflect the higher fertility 
of the society of origin. In effect, some of the considerable, and typically growing, 
resources of the receiving society (to which migrants contribute) are diverted into coping 
with a population which is experiencing a greater rate of growth, than it would otherwise 
have had.  Since these migrants originate from societies with markedly growing 
populations despite their lower living standards, the net result is to increase the likelihood 
- or even to ensure - that the populations of both the originating and receiving societies 
are rising.  The general position taken here is that there is a tendency for the scope of 
human cooperation to be extended with positive implications for population growth.  A 
major way in which this is manifested in human experience is in the persistent tendency 
for there to be a re-distribution of the potential for population growth in space and in 
relation to economic resources which tends to keep overall population numbers on an 
upward trajectory.  This pattern is illustrated by the early tendency for hunter-gatherers to 
spread throughout the habitable regions of the globe; but it is also manifested in the 
migratory patterns of today.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Summarizing conclusion 
The theory of the demographic transition continues to be of value by usefully 
encapsulating important demographic patterns, but the increases in population 
experienced in differing types of society since the war have tended to exceed those 
anticipated from the theory.  Once one foregrounds the impact of cooperative genes, 
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patterns become that much more explicable. It is of the essence that western societies 
exist within a global system, but, in that context, they have indeed exhibited a striking 
demographic pattern. Most individuals in those countries could behave in ways calculated 
to produce much larger numbers of children than they at present typically do. Given the 
existence of welfare state conditions, were any one person to breed in this relatively 
uninhibited way there is every reason to suppose that they would have twenty or more of 
their own offspring survive into adulthood, which would certainly propagate their own 
genes effectively. On the other hand, were most to do so it would create a crisis. Yet any 
underlying tendency in this direction has been arrested, partly by normative regulation; 
important, too, would be emphasis on other values such as achieving a high standard of 
living.  Nevertheless, although there are exceptions, the populations of western societies 
tend to continue to grow steadily.  This pattern provides an indication of the extent to 
which the selfishness of the cooperative genes is tending to predominate over that of the 
other human genes.   
 
Yet this very pattern could conceivably ‘go global’.  In fact, an increasing number of 
non-western societies are exhibiting the pattern of fertility limitation which originated in 
the west.  That pattern is strongly associated with the advance of a normatively-governed 
notion of ‘family-planning’.  In this connection, the advent of effective contraceptive 
devices and the ready availability of (and legalization of) abortion may be a striking 
phenomenon of recent centuries, but it is to be viewed as a means towards fertility 
objectives, which are substantially independent of the means.   
 
 234 
Globalization means that the vast majority of the world’s population is drawn together by 
frameworks and networks of cooperation.  As already indicated, geopolitics has been 
shaped by the emergence of a comprehensive nation state system, together with – 
particularly in the last century – a massive build-up of transnational governance, but 
without, of course, world government.  In this context political authorities tend to wish 
their states or societies (or blocs) to become (relatively) more powerful rather than less 
powerful and, most often, they see this objective as being served by a (relatively) 
growing rather than a declining population.  The causes and consequences of national and 
international population policies are various and some of the latter undoubtedly embrace 
humanitarian values (such as reduction in child poverty and mortality) but cooperation at 
these elevated levels amounts to one among a set of factors generating a pattern of overall 
population growth; plainly, intimate cooperation continues to bear most directly on 
fertility.   
 
In the explanation of population increase full account must also be taken of the 
interdependence of generations – most notably in the early and later years of life – which 
is basic and perennial and provides a fundamental link between fertility and mortality, but 
the needs of each generation promise to be best served if a (slightly) larger one is 
following it.   In western societies this need is in part met by an inflow of young adult 
migrants contributing to the staffing of health services and care homes for the elderly. 
However, over and above this, a very important phenomenon of our time is substantial 
but sometimes relatively ‘unwelcome’ influxes of migrants to the richer or more 
developed countries.  Here again extension in the scope of human cooperation – even if 
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in some respects coerced -  tends to have positive implications for population growth.  A 
major way in which that extension is manifested in human experience is in the persistent 
tendency for there to be a re-distribution of the potential for population growth in space 
and in relation to economic resources which tends to keep overall population numbers on 
an upward trajectory.  
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Chapter 10:  Understanding Advanced Societies and Culture 
Advanced societies:  the ‘hospital ward’ and the ‘brave new world’ 
In advanced societies a marked pattern of at least the last two centuries has been the 
relatively steady increase in the expectation of life.  In Chapter 9, relevant factors such as 
higher living standards, better sanitary facilities and improved medical care have already 
been noted.  It is fair to say that the impact of science-based medicine has been to sustain 
people who might have died in former times. (I am one such since I had an operation for 
acute appendicitis on my eleventh birthday.)  The decline in infant and child mortality 
has been especially marked but it is not just the already living who are helped for foetuses 
which might have died previously are successfully taken to term.  The impact goes even 
further back onto fecundity and fertility for couples who are encountering problems 
conceiving are now helped e.g. by in vitro fertilization.  The pattern in this respect is thus 
to increase fecundity and then to enable everyone to lead as full a life as possible, which 
includes being able to have children themselves.  
 
It is evident too that people are helped by the health services with all manner of 
conditions which are not immediately life-threatening but they might have impacted on 
their fertility and mortality in earlier centuries. This would be true, for instance, in respect 
of something as familiar as deficient eyesight or hearing, solutions to which may now 
tend to be taken for granted. Substantial help is extended too towards psychiatric 
conditions and it may be noted in passing that in former centuries such sufferers might 
well have fared particularly badly at the hands of their fellow citizens.  Associated with 
this it is accurate to say that significant sections of the population at any one time are 
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being enabled to lead a full life only because of their continuing access to health-related 
facilities.  This gives point to a simile likening society to a hospital ward.   
 
Now there is every reason to believe that this pattern has overtime the effect of retaining 
what are popularly termed ‘genetic defects’ in the population.  Patently where there is 
any underlying genetic factor predisposing to a condition, helping sufferers to survive 
and reproduce is helping to propagate the relevant genes, whereas in former centuries this 
might not have happened to the same extent.  Of course it is only as a result of scientific 
advance that the genetically-rooted nature of some medical conditions is fully recognized, 
although it may have been dimly discerned even in the remote past, since problems might 
have been felt ‘to run in families’.  So here there is a pattern whereby cooperative 
behaviour is leading to the retention in the population of genes, whose action is viewed in 
negative terms.  In sum, one would say an unintended long-term consequence of medical 
intervention from the remote past has been to retain in the population the action of genes 
whose contribution might now be felt to be undesirable.   
 
By contrast, partly flowing from the increasing understanding of genetics, there is a quite 
different tendency beginning to be evident.  This is exemplified by processes where 
selection is made amongst embryos and only some are allowed to develop as foetuses. 
Termed ‘genetic screening’ the idea is that selection be made so that only embryos 
lacking certain defects are allowed to develop. These types of intervention are radically 
different in that they tend to decrease the presence in the population of genes felt to be 
making a negative contribution. 
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Without getting in an unjustified way into futurology, given the scope of the thesis under 
consideration, it is valuable to note possible future developments.  One notion is that 
genetic screening or some other genetic intervention might be used not simply to 
eliminate ‘negative’ qualities but to promote ‘positive’ ones e.g. to produce individuals 
who are more intelligent or more beautiful. Patently this is because would-be parents 
want to have children who are likely to be more ‘successful’ i.e. better placed to express 
or realize certain values while participating in the cooperative life of the community.  
When this kind of possibility is first mooted a common reaction is rather to pooh-pooh 
the idea and to expect governments to ban it, with the full support of the churches.  In 
fact, once procedures become technically straightforward they are very difficult to ban 
where people are strongly motivated and they may be carried out anywhere in the world 
(which could also become true for human cloning). The opinion is ventured here that 
genetic screening for positive qualities is quite likely to happen and may even become 
routine. 
 
The various patterns identified in this section fit in with the thesis under consideration.  
Cooperative behaviour addressed to morbidity and early mortality has led to lower age-
specific mortality rates and thereby boosted numbers.  The aim has been to get and keep 
people out of ‘the sick role’, meaning to return them to a position where they may play a 
full part in the cooperative life of the community, including being able to work.  
However, there has been a ‘downside’ in the form of a tendency to retain or increase 
what are later recognized to be ‘undesirable’ genes in the gene pool.  It seems not simply 
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that this problem will be overcome, but progressively the gene pool will be consciously 
reshaped, in such a way as to increase the likelihood of there being a large and increasing 
population with a distribution of qualities which will enable them to cooperate even more 
effectively, thereby promising further population growth.  
 
Other fauna and flora 
The selfish gene theory applied to human beings is here being evaluated, a theory 
concerned with the propagation of genes.  In this connection there is a distinctive process 
proceeding on the planet whose significance needs to be evaluated.  This is the process 
whereby progressively the genes of other flora and fauna essentially exist and propagate 
on human terms.  There is a sense in which the genes of other life forms come to act as 
hand-maidens to human cooperative genes. The long-term phenomenon at the heart of 
this process is domestication already considered above:  animals and plants have been 
genetically changed through their contact with human beings so that they fit in with the 
developing human way of life. As part of this they are made to conform to the spatial 
division of labour which also includes physical culture and artifacts.  A whole vocabulary 
links to this as we speak, for instance, of animals which are ‘pets’ or, alternatively, 
‘pests’, while others inhabit ‘zoos’.  Again, raising our crops and tending our gardens has 
led us to define certain plants as ‘weeds’ which must be excluded. 
 
Farm animals and crops essentially exist to supply humans with food; they play their part 
in propagating the totality of human genes, both those concerned with cooperation and 
those not so concerned.  Human control is exercised over even the most ‘intimate’ 
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aspects of their lives such as how they reproduce (which is often now by artificial 
insemination).  To use demographic terms one can say of farm animals that humans 
exercise total control over their fertility, mortality and migration; they would largely not 
be on this planet were we all to become vegetarians. Although the same could not be said 
of the larger animals in such places as safari parks and protected areas, those are still 
typical confined, may be ‘culled’ and have an assigned place within the leisure industry.  
Even when humans act to protect species or promote biodiversity, it is still the case that 
the existence of these other fauna and flora is on human terms; temporarily, at least, they 
have an assigned place within the framework of our own cooperative life.  (In Appendix 
4 there is further comment on the position of the human species within the ecological 
system as a whole.) 
 
Of course, there remains the ‘Achilles heel’ of micro-organisms; here the underlying 
problems posed for humanity appear intractable.  In connection with human morbidity 
and mortality there is now something of a race going on between medical researchers 
developing new medicines and organisms which evolve in the context of those medicines 
so as to pose a new threat.  Of course, genetic engineering now plays its part but that is 
all to do with producing life-forms which (normally unseen) fit in with or enhance the 
human way of life. Zoologists have referred to the equivalent of ‘an arms race’ 
proceeding between the evolving genes of predators and prey in promoting, for instance, 
fleetness of foot.  In the human case it is not that the cooperative genes are (necessarily) 
evolving; rather the behaviour to which they give rise includes ‘taking up arms’ on their 
behalf against the threat posed by evolving micro-organisms. 
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Memes 
Following upon the development of thinking regarding the selfish gene, the notion of the 
‘meme’ was introduced, viewed as a second kind of replicator.  The meme is a cultural 
item with a putative tendency to replicate i.e. to be passed on by non-genetic means, 
especially imitation. In one exposition Blackmore (1999, p.43) affirms that, ‘Imitation 
includes any kind of copying of ideas and behaviour from one person to another.’ (See 
also Dawkins, 2003.)  Further to the present study and its concern with cooperative genes 
it may be helpful to inquire into possible implications for the study of memes. In this 
connection one key point is whether light may be thrown on the factors leading to 
increase or decrease in the copies of particular memes or combinations of memes. 
 
The pattern of explanation developed here is that the cooperative genes give rise to 
cooperation which tends to propagate the genes themselves.  The cooperative activity is 
not viewed as static but has an open-ended potentiality for growth and development.  An 
example may help to illustrate the link between changing patterns of cooperation and 
meme propagation. There has been a relative advance in the global use of the English 
language since the Second World War (for example, relative to French) and it is 
instructive to point to one ‘growth area’.  Air travel both of passengers and freight has 
built up substantially during the period leading to the emergence of a dense and complex 
web of routes. There are large numbers of airplanes and also of airports with their 
attendant ground control systems.  Normally in connection with take-off and landing 
there is a need for there to be communication between pilots and ground crew.  The 
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potential problem is the sheer multiplicity of languages facility with which would be 
needed were everyone involved to be able to use the first language of those they might 
encounter.  The problem has been surmounted by the agreement to use English in many 
of these contexts. Of course those concerned will need to be taught at least some English 
and this forms part of the pattern whereby English has come to dominate in non-native 
speakers’ choice of a second language. 
 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider what is even meant by the relevant memes 
in this case of air-travel.  Is one referring to the English language or the particular phrases 
and sentences which pilots and ground crews tend to utter or is one referring to the 
meanings of those phrases (which meanings could be rendered in languages other than 
English)?  Those using the notion of a meme do not always make this clear.  However, 
whatever precisely is meant, a point to arise from the example is that replication of 
memes is an aspect of the growth of instances of cooperation between pilots and ground 
crews.  Hence it is suggestive of the conclusion that the fate of memes is fundamentally 
bound up with associated cooperative activity. 
 
It is informative to ask whether the same type of link is evident in other institutional 
spheres. There are a whole number of situations shaped by technological advance which 
have implications for vocabulary and patterns of communication.  Consider that aspect of 
the use of the hansom cab.  There would have been a technical vocabulary to do with 
building, maintaining and improving hansom cabs, but so would there have been one 
more specifically directed at the teams of horses providing the motive power; also one to 
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do with the interface between potential travellers and that system of transport. Of course, 
with the use of the hansom cab giving way to rail and then car transport one set of 
communicative tools would tend to recede while others would come to the fore. No doubt 
other innovations in technology exhibit the same pattern:  the coming of computers has 
been marked by the emergence not just of sophisticated technical vocabularies but also 
by less technical ones arising out of the use of various devices by the general public. 
Looked at from one point of view half the words in the English language are now 
scientific and technical terms, but this primarily points up that the growth of terms is 
associated with a growth of cooperative contexts in which they are employed. 
 
Science and technology at the present time are among the largest institutionalized 
contexts of cooperative activity and this gives rise to a highly patterned growth of 
memes.  Consider from this point of view the terminology of natural history or biology.  
Major figures such as Linnaeus and Darwin in effect inaugurated or developed further 
taxonomic programmes.  The latter proposed that all species have descended from 
common ancestors and that the branching pattern of evolution resulted from a process he 
called natural selection.  It followed that from that point in time – if not earlier - there 
would be a general interest in discovering new species and adopting and using names for 
them (possibly latinised) which would reflect their newly understood relationships.  
Again, the specific assertion that humans are descended from apes which are also 
ancestors of other living primates is essentially an invitation to identify (e.g. from fossils) 
intermediate forms and to name them in ways which assist understanding of their 
intermediate status.  The development and use of the set of memes is hence essentially 
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subordinate to a cooperatively undertaken scientific programme, to which individual 
investigators would understand themselves to be contributing.  
 
It may be objected that so far in this consideration of memes and their replication that the 
emphasis has been on ‘instrumental’ or ‘utilitarian’  rather than ‘expressive’ contexts, so 
it is valuable briefly to consider the rather different example of religion.  A moment’s 
thought is sufficient to remind oneself that religions are marked by seemingly endless 
repetition in connection with, for instance, prayer, ritual and ceremony; also reciting or 
perusal of sacred texts.  Now although believers may well act in religiously meaningful 
ways in private the activity is fundamentally anchored by the common life of the 
religious community. Significantly, children are inducted into the religious community 
and even from the outset labelled as members; there may also be the practice of recruiting 
through proselytizing. All these kinds of activity are valued within the community.  
However, it is apparent that the fate of religious ‘memes’ is interdependent with the fate 
of the associated community.  Religions exhibit growth and decline.  Zoroastrianism 
flourished for a time with all its distinctive memes but they have receded as has the 
associated context of cooperation.  The difference from earlier examples concerns not the 
link between cooperation and memes but rather the differing kinds of factors which 
would need to be cited to explain the fate of a religion, an understanding of which would 
take one way beyond the meme concept itself. 
 
Turning to a further area with some expressive content, it has been suggested that an 
architectural style or motif is an example of a meme.  Plainly, it is of the essence that this 
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type of meme is expressed in physical form, not simply held in mind.  However, the 
relevant objects are not manifestations of an idea in isolated minds.  Constructions 
expressive of the style will tend to have arisen out of particular relationships, such as that 
between client and architect, and have been physically constructed by teams.  Although a 
particular individual may perhaps have suggested a name for it, the style or motif is 
fundamentally cooperatively defined:  it does not have any substantive existence unless 
people are agreed about it.  It may be worth adding that although a particular style is 
typically expressed in many objects, the extent to which straightforward copying is 
involved is probably limited.  Supposing reference is made to such a phenomenon as 
‘The Arts and Crafts Movement’, while it is the case that particular individuals (such as 
William Morris) were prominent exponents, it has the status of a movement because it 
arose out of patterns of cooperation and networks of artists, craftsmen, clients and others 
through extended time and is, again, cooperatively defined (such movements not 
infrequently produce manifestoes).  As was true for religion, in any sense to explain or 
account for the phenomenon would take one way beyond the notion of a meme:  that 
concept in itself seems meager and hardly suggestive of an explanatory framework. 
 
Focusing particularly on language, one must remind oneself that there are primary and 
secondary usages.  A main way in which languages grow is through metaphor and simile.  
In the middle ages a substantial vocabulary surrounded the practice of torture.  Happily 
that practice substantially died out along with some of its vocabulary, but this does not 
mean every reference to it has disappeared from linguistic usage.  Thus we could say – 
just as Francis Bacon did – that scientific method involves ‘putting nature on the rack’, or 
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that a particular theory or policy suffered ‘the death of a thousand cuts’, without 
necessarily feeling the horror at corresponding human suffering.  However, it is quite 
evident that metaphor and simile are simply the fabric of communication in a whole 
number of cooperative contexts, far removed from those of their linguistic origins.  Those 
metaphors and similes survive and prosper which do valued work within a developing 
way of life. 
 
Given the foregoing discussion, it may be objected that memes are instead to be 
construed as being in individual brains and that they have a substantial life outside 
contexts of cooperation.  Thus any one of us may spend hours musing on various topics, 
often but not always using language; again, an individual may frequently engage in 
private prayer. It has always been something of a problem with memes as to how one 
‘keeps the score’ i.e. strictly determines how their numbers are increasing or decreasing.  
If someone thinks the same thought or prays one hundred times is that to count as one or 
a hundred in the total for memes?  In fact it would be distinctly odd to take the higher 
figure.  The more helpful way of putting it would be to say that that person is familiar 
with and uses a particular idea or that person engages in daily worship using (say) the 
Lord’s Prayer. The more pertinent point then hinges on when one would consider some 
sort of replication has taken place.  This would have occurred when the relevant idea or 
practice has been conveyed to another person previously unfamiliar with it and they 
become fully able to use it.  Thus were a believer to introduce their own child to the 
notion of prayer and the child came to understand it and engage in (perhaps private) 
prayer themselves one would say replication had taken place. However, that pattern 
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simply points up the role of cooperative relationships. The relevant – indeed definitional - 
point is that a cultural item is something shared rather than simply confined to an 
individual. 
 
From these examples it is important not to draw the conclusion that changes in 
cooperative relationships somehow produce changes in cultural items such as vocabulary 
or patterns in language usage; rather these latter changes are an aspect of the former ones. 
But this itself leads to an interesting tentative conclusion.  It is not that one is presented 
with two ‘replicators’, the gene and the meme, which have their own distinctive lives but 
rather that the fate of the latter is interdependent with the activity to which the former 
gives rise, the gene being the single controlling replicator.  The picture is of cooperative 
genes giving rise to cooperative behaviour which tends to propagate the genes, while the 
differing types of meme inhere in differing classes of cooperative relationship.  
 
Even given this consideration of memes, the reader may continue to muse on the scope 
and character of human culture. How is its sheer diversity and elaboration to be explained 
and understood?  It is this last question which tends to mystify observers, particularly 
when a comparison with the life of other closely related animals is being made.  This 
question is next briefly taken up. 
 
The elaboration of culture 
In the understanding of human behaviour the notion of value is perhaps most strategic.  
As already indicated, with the advent of cooperation a main contrast is between the 
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purely animal level, with its sources of gratification, discomfort and pain, and the human 
level where there are defined values.  Importantly the values are shared or at least 
cooperatively defined, while being expressed through the behaviour of individuals as well 
as groups.  Following on from this, some sense may be given to the rather rough and 
ready idea that among humans culture ‘takes over’.  A key point here is that values – 
which may become highly refined – come to structure the detail of human life to the point 
where the animal-level sources of gratification, discomfort and pain seem to be buried, 
although one remains confident they are in there somewhere.  Thus among humans 
having a meal takes a highly elaborate, even ritualized form, although it does involve 
getting food and drink down people’s necks.  One may also note the phenomenon 
whereby gratification, discomfort and pain come into play but the source this time is 
itself cultural, as when humans find a musical composition pleasing or discordant. In this 
connection it may be worth saying that commitment to a value is not so much simply 
asserted by an individual, but rather that which may properly be inferred from the totality 
of their behaviour.   My own behaviour bears witness to the value placed on wine 
consumption (the finer the wine the greater the value, although quality is always relative 
to price).  A human life differs from that of a wild animal because it is essentially shaped 
by adherence to values. However, one may reasonably go on to inquire as to why culture 
comes to be so elaborated. (Boyd and Richerson, 2005) 
 
Culture consists of shared ideas, values and norms; there is also physical culture - 
including artifacts – the status of which is an expression of those ideas.  These elements 
are to be viewed as an aspect of the cooperative life of a population.  The explanation for 
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its diversity and elaboration lies in the fact that particular aspects of culture have an 
essentially open-ended character; also, any increment in or augmentation of culture 
changes the whole which then constitutes a different starting point from which further 
augmentation may take place; differing aspects of culture also inter-affect one another (as 
with religion impacting on art and music). In this process the main impetus for change at 
a given point in time is the scope of human interests (in both senses: what they are 
interested in e.g. music; what serves their interests e.g. a higher standard of living) and 
the main constraint is the ‘given’ nature of the external world.  (Regarding human 
interests it must never be forgotten that humans were entertained by the horrors of the 
Roman arena and even took children to watch public executions.) What follows is 
intended to be suggestive and illustrative. 
 
Language use is the most strategic aspect.  While at any time speakers (for instance) 
invoke already understood vocabulary and existing conventions, the use made of 
recursive rules implies that they can produce a potentially infinite number of new 
sentences.  Also, given the existence of suitable conventions and rules, language enables 
users to extend vocabulary; also, there is the potentiality for development from the 
present indicative (say) towards other tenses and modalities. Speakers are thereby 
enabled to think new thoughts and perform new speech acts.  Any extension or 
augmentation of language itself changes the universe of subject matter and hence 
provides extended scope for the practical production of new sentences. Also, since there 
is generally no essential, intrinsic link between linguistic symbol and that which is 
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symbolized, there is great scope for differing languages and variants on a particular 
language. 
 
The scope of human knowledge of the external world is primarily limited by human 
interest. Even should there be developed a physical ‘theory of everything’, the universe is 
endlessly interesting in its particulars. We know more about the surface of the Earth than 
we do about that of Mercury; we seek to know more about the working of the human 
body, especially as employed in medicine, than we do that of the crocodile.  (An infinite 
number of differing, but factually true, statements could in principle be formulated about 
a finite area of the Earth’s surface, so there is clearly a need for selectivity!)  However, it 
is of the essence that the human population is distributed, from which it follows that 
people require, acquire and lose considerable knowledge germane to their particular 
circumstances.  Knowledge of the present and future always has a different significance 
from knowledge of the past, so what is of interest and the type of interest changes with 
time. (I am a tall person; my wife and I know which ceiling lamps in our present house I 
am likely to hit with my head; this knowledge will tend to recede and be lost should we 
move house, when it will lose even its local interest.)  Particularly vital is knowledge of 
other people; hence the importance of gossip. There is always motivation to acquire 
more.  
 
There are second-order, more abstract developments of ideas. Some similar processes are 
evident in mathematics as in language (the subject is to a degree an extension of logic), 
but given our own modern understanding of this subject there is no real scope for 
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recognizing cultural ‘alternatives’.  Recursive rules and iterative processes come into 
play.  Arithmetic arises out of discreteness and geometry from the continuity of space. 
There are cardinals and ordinals built up essentially from one (or first) together with the 
idea of a successor:  two (second) is the successor of one (first); three is the successor of 
two etc.  Of course, at a particular time human interest may not extend much beyond the 
first four or five ordinal or cardinals, but the process of number production may continue 
without limit.  It proves possible to understand the development of positive and negative 
integers and (even) complex numbers as a process of ‘unfolding’ i.e. in a certain type of 
evolutionary way.  Geometry is in part an abstraction from mensuration and originates in 
such observations as that a (rope-made) triangle with sides of lengths 3, 4 and 5 units has 
a right-angle. 
 
In the arts once values begin to be defined they are subject to augmentation and possible 
refinement in a potentially open-ended way. Suppose, for instance, a cave-drawing has 
been made as an expression of some human interest (perhaps religious or artistic).  
Plainly some capacity to produce such drawings exists from that point. However once 
that work is acknowledged, the visual character of the world can be said to have 
undergone a change:  it consists essentially of everything it consisted of previously plus 
the cave-drawing. Now at that point one can say that whatever interest led to the 
production of that work may come into play afresh but the visual stimulus for its 
expression has been augmented.  It may be, for instance, that the initial drawing was 
recognized and valued, but crude; hence the production of a slightly less crude 
representation of the same animal or object might be appreciated.  Again, once it is 
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recognized that a picture of a bison is valued; perhaps the same may be true for a horse.  
It is easy to see how cultural differences may arise.  Where bison are of central religious 
significance they may be the sole subject; where a larger range of animals are religiously 
significant this may be reflected in art.  
 
It can be suggested that this type of model has application even to the rather different 
context of the development of modern art, particularly given the value placed on 
originality.  Thus the work of Cézanne probably owed something to that of earlier 
Impressionist artists but later Cubist painters gained some of their inspiration in turn from 
the contribution of Cézanne.  Of course it was the case, in addition, that artists of the time 
innovated in choice of subject matter partly because the visual impact of the non-artistic 
environment was itself changing under the impact of urbanization and industrialization.   
 
For present purposes it is also germane that the interest and greatness of art in substantial 
part derives from the fact that such ingredients as scenes and the positions of people are 
interpretable by the viewer in potentially elaborated ways.  A painting of Abraham and 
Isaac may, for instance, convey to us understanding of what may just have happened or 
what is about to happen.  Just as we search for meaning when confronted with an actual 
human group, we find ourselves searching for life in the picture or sculpture. 
(Bockemühl, 2001, pp. 66-77)  It is crucial that theory of mind is thus deployed in our 
responses to representations of people 
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In engineering and design many cultural features and artifacts are to be understood as 
consequent upon the development of earlier elements together with concerns arising out 
of shared experience.  Glass windows are a design feature consequent upon the 
construction of dwellings.  The bikini – a development from the fuller bathing costume - 
is a compromise reflecting the tension between (potential) sexual interest and the 
concerns of modesty or prudery.  Humans have an interest in getting rapidly from A to B, 
hence the invention of cars, but once there are many, they are often crashing into one 
another.  Hence the development of rules of the road as expressed in the Highway Code. 
 
Within historical time and particularly in western societies, there is a discernible pattern 
in the changing organization of what may be termed ‘intellectual labour’, although it has 
innumerable practical implications as well.  Today all manner of academic disciplines 
and associated practitioners may be distinguished:  an indication as to the importance 
judged to attach to them is provided by their forming part of school and university 
curricula.  However, many such academic subjects will be found to be of recent origin – 
such as biochemistry, statistics and linguistics - and almost none will be found to have 
existed in ancient times in anything like their existing forms.   As is particularly well-
known many disciplines arose as off-shoots of philosophy/theology as it existed among 
the Ancient Greeks; to an important extent this is true of the sciences as they developed 
within western European societies. 
 
What seems to happen is that at a particular time intellectual activity and investigation 
within a particular field is associated with a particular community, but as that activity 
 254 
continues there is increasing realization that it is generating, or should be treating, issues 
of rather different types.  Thus the concerns of a philosopher such as Socrates may be 
judged to range between the conceptual, theological, moral and empirical.  Progressively 
the underlying issues have been understood to require rather different kinds of treatment 
and approach.  As is well-known the term ‘natural philosophy’ came to refer to empirical 
science (more nearly physics) by the time of Newton, but since then the individual 
scientific disciplines have emerged and become more sharply distinguished.  Interests 
both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to a particular discipline may impact on its direction of 
development.  Even within a clearly identifiable subject, for instance mathematics, new 
fields – such as topology – emerge requiring the attentions of specialized practitioners.  
There can also be growth points bridging between particular disciplines.  The underlying 
process, at least to some degree, appears to be open-ended (and through the production of 
technical vocabularies is a source of the open-ended character of language itself).   
 
Finally, in this section, it is pertinent to give attention to the highly strategic phenomenon 
of play in human life.  The reference is to a behaviour pattern patently evident at both the 
primate and the human level, and there are underlying continuities.  Two young children 
having a pillow fight may recall not dissimilar behaviour among young chimpanzees.  
Again, in understanding play among humans, there is a need to appreciate that that which 
is intrinsically enjoyable becomes valued and that which is valued may become 
elaborated. Characteristically human cooperative behaviour is the underlying creative 
force. 
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Regarding play it may initially be worth reflecting on the character of human sexual 
behaviour, a topic already briefly taken up in Chapter 4; the notion of foreplay is 
suggestive.  Typically, cooperation through romantic episodes and sexual activity gives 
rise to a persistent cooperative relationship.  The knowledge of the two parties of each 
other and themselves grows in interdependent ways giving rise to a deeper understanding 
informing any instance of sexual intercourse.  Plainly a basic method is to try to 
understand what the other party particularly enjoys and to deploy it strategically; one’s 
actions are quintessentially informed by ‘taking the role’ of the other. Again, pleasure 
may be increased by delaying what each person anticipates will be the culmination of the 
activity viz. coitus.  (Delay plays its part much more generally in human enjoyment as is 
exemplified by drama.)  Sex may be more exciting when one party is ‘surprised’ or 
through a limited ‘acting out’ of a role; it may be recognized that some are stimulated by 
being in a semi-public place where there is an outside chance of observation by third 
parties.  Importantly too there develops a shared conception of what it would be ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’ to do in connection with a couple’s love-making; the relationship exhibits 
normative integration.  It is not too far-fetched to suggest that the shared ideas underlying 
an ongoing sexual or loving relationship (which may or may not be expressly articulated) 
together with the clothing and other pertinent objects and material circumstances 
constitute a kind of ‘mini-culture’ associated with the couple, although it may remain 
purely private to them and is of limited duration. A consideration of sex may even help 
one to tease out elements and a framework for analysis of relevance even to other 
apparently totally dissimilar areas of life. (It is possible that characteristically-human 
cooperation even has its origins in intimate sexual contact.) 
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Vocabulary and etymology assist an understanding of developments:  children play, but 
children and young adults play football; as noted, adults may engage in foreplay; the 
members of an orchestra play their instruments; while many of us enjoy watching a play.  
These usages bear witness to patterns of cultural elaboration whereby the focus may 
change from the intrinsic interest of the activity itself to the interest of witnessing it, or a 
combination of both.  Interest may derive from the exercise of great skill or it may 
involve the element of humour (with skill as a possible sub-text) which in part is a 
derivative of teasing.  Even in connection with pillow fights there is recognition that 
some children are better than others; also, it would not be so much fun to match a very 
large strong child with a small weak one; also some children may be so good at the 
activity, it becomes even of interest for spectators.  From these types of beginnings 
develop the patterns of a modern society.  Football plainly originates in the interest of 
kicking an object around a field or through the legs of another person, seeing how far one 
can kick it or how accurately and so on, but the actual game has been subject to an 
incremental process of rationalization:  at higher ‘levels’ it is now precisely rule 
governed, including in the allocation of space and time.  Getting teams to play under the 
same conditions enables one more readily to rank them; also enjoyment derives from the 
uncertainty of the outcome given that teams are highly skilled but equally matched.  
Audience interest may partly derive from its own identification with a team, which may 
even be said to ‘represent’ a town, or country.  
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The theatre as we know it in western societies appears – like much of art - to have 
religious origins, although it is now generally secular in its character.  In connection with 
religious ceremonial there may well be both important ways in which everyone actively 
participates but also stages where the vital element involves witnessing something 
particularly significant or meaningful performed by priests or other specialists, which 
typically has a relatively stylized character.  In subsequent developments the relative 
value placed on participation or witness may gradually vary; also greater attention may 
be given to individuality.   Added point is given to the theatre from the capacity of 
virtually everyone to act with varying degrees of competence, taken together with the fact 
that discernible role-playing is evident both on and off the stage (hence one can readily 
appreciate the Seven Ages of Man speech in Shakespeare’s As You Like It as well as that 
writer’s use of the device of ‘the play within a play’).  In English theatre there was 
considerable freeing up of subject matter in the passage from medieval ‘miracle’ or 
‘mystery’ plays to the relatively secular Elizabethan theatre; in a relatively short time it 
became an arena for the most profound reflection on life experience.  Remarkably, 
witnessing Shakespeare ‘at play’ constitutes one of the most highly valued elements of 
one’s total life-experience.  That this can be so reminds us that cooperative role-playing 
and the witnessing thereof is central to the human situation. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Summarizing conclusion 
In seeking further to situate advanced complex societies in relation to the main theme a 
couple of images have been used:  the hospital ward and the brave new world.  ‘Society 
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as hospital ward’ dramatises the fact that nowadays large numbers survive and prosper 
only with continuing medical help.  Through their long-term cooperative action – notably 
in the form of medical intervention - humans have borne down upon morbidity and 
mortality, but an unintended consequence has been to retain in the population the action 
of genes whose contribution might now be felt to be undesirable.  On the other hand, 
looking forward in time, the opinion may be ventured that genetic screening for ‘positive’ 
qualities is quite likely to happen and may even become routine.  Hence the gene pool 
will be consciously reshaped, in such a way as to increase the likelihood of there being a 
large and increasing population with a distribution of qualities which will enable them to 
cooperate even more effectively.  
 
It has also been argued that there is a process underway whereby progressively the genes 
of other flora and fauna exist and propagate on human terms, perhaps primarily because 
human ownership of territory implies actual or potential control of habitat e.g. of ants in 
your garden.  Importantly, however, while control over larger land animals is near total, 
humans have cooperatively ‘taken up arms’ against the threat posed by micro-organisms.  
 
Following upon the successful introduction and development of the idea of the selfish 
gene, the notion of the ‘meme’ was introduced, viewed as a second kind of replicator.  
The meme is a cultural item with a putative tendency to replicate.  However, that idea 
lacks explanatory power and cannot perform the role which has been assigned to it.  
Rather, the introduction and propagation of what have been termed memes is itself an 
aspect of the behaviour to which the cooperative genes give rise; hence the only 
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satisfactory explanatory framework involves a single replicator.  The picture that arises 
from the evidence and argument presented here is that of cooperative genes giving rise to 
cooperative behaviour which tends to propagate the genes, while the differing types of 
meme inter alia inhere in differing classes of cooperative activity and relationship.   
 
The explanation for the diversity and elaboration of culture lies in the fact that particular 
aspects have an essentially open-ended character; also, any increment in, or augmentation 
of culture, changes the whole which then constitutes a different starting point from which 
further augmentation may take place; differing aspects of culture also inter-affect one 
another.   Incremental elaboration is exhibited in differing ways by language, the scope of 
human knowledge, mathematics and the arts.  The highly strategic phenomenon of play is 
also subject to incremental elaboration, ramifying in several ways and giving rise to sport 
and the theatre; sexual play may be understood as generating a ‘mini-culture’. 
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Chapter 11:  Human Nature and Modern Life 
A reflection on cooperation and competition 
For several reasons there is a perceptible tendency for both zoologists and social 
scientists to overrate the importance of competition and underrate that of cooperation 
when considering the broad character of human life.  For zoologists the whole framework 
of Darwinian evolution and the ‘survival of the fittest’ idea predisposes them in that 
direction.  For sociologists and others it is probably the perceived character of the 
capitalist economic system which inclines their thinking in that same direction.  There 
can be little doubt that the development of modern capitalism with competition as a 
central feature - which also gave rise to industrialization and urbanization of a modern 
type – played its part in the extended period of European global domination.  Indeed, the 
fate of the whole world now seems to be bound up with that economic system – perhaps 
in some modified form - continuing to survive and prosper. It is only too easy to begin to 
liken the behaviour of firms and individuals in a capitalist context to that of animals in 
the wild, referring for instance to company takeovers using terms such as ‘predator’ and 
‘prey’.  There can also be seen to be competition between political parties within a nation 
and between nation states e.g. in respect of their economic growth rates.  It may be worth 
adding that in their thinking about human life modern observers may also even be 
influenced by the evident importance of sport and such a phenomenon as the Olympic 
Games.  In various spheres competition is seen as being a vital stimulus and humans may 
therefore be felt to be ‘naturally’ competitive. 
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The error – at least in emphasis – is to fail to see that the reference is to human 
institutions; one is concerned in fact with an extended cooperative framework.  The 
competitive arrangements have been set up by humans with specific objectives in mind.  
In respect of capitalism, arrangements ensure people compete on a ‘fair basis’, and that 
the laws of contract are adhered to, and so on; activity takes place within a legal 
framework. The authorities are indeed only too well aware that capitalism only really 
‘works’ where it is hedged around with all manner of rules and regulations:  it turns out, 
for instance, that the average capitalist would prefer to be in a monopolistic position 
rather than to ‘enjoy’ the stimulus of competition.  The whole point is that from the 
perspective of government - and in a democracy in particular in some sense the 
population as a whole - carefully regulated capitalism is judged to be broadly beneficial. 
Again, in politics carefully regulated competition between political parties, and 
associated with it the system of government and opposition, is felt to serve the population 
well, for instance by bringing abuses of power by government to light.  In respect of sport 
given that it too is carefully regulated (so as, for instance, to eliminate or at any rate 
reduce the use of artificial stimulants), the same view is held that it is broadly of value to 
participants and spectators, that it acts as a stimulus to the development of young people 
etc.  Importantly, firms, political parties and sporting teams themselves function on the 
basis of internal cooperation. However, the cleverness of human institutions resides in the 
fact that while benefits are felt to flow from the institutional arrangements, the 
competition between humans is usually confined to a very narrow area and is relatively 
harmless even to losers: it is anything but a fight to the death.  Indeed, the precise nature 
of  the elaboration of the division and specialization of labour found within these 
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institutions serves in fact to diminish the likelihood of out and out conflict between 
humans, so any easy analogy with nature ‘red in tooth and claw’ is notably inapt.   
 
Central to the life of the society is the reaching of agreement regarding how competition 
in these various areas is to proceed; clearly the law is at the heart of this and part of the 
role of government is to promote reform of the law where necessary.  There must be 
agreement on sets of rules and then adherence to them; disciplinary procedures play an 
important part.  In politics the mistake is to consider that this is ‘all about’ competition 
between political parties while failing to see that at the deepest level there is agreement 
e.g. about how elections are to be conducted, who is in government and who in 
opposition. Thus cooperation in arriving at sets of rules and the procedures for reforming 
them lies at the heart of the society and not competition.   
 
There is a certain irony in scientists failing to grasp the central importance of cooperation 
in human life.  It is true that scientific advance is itself widely associated with the 
contributions of particular individuals such as Newton, Einstein and Darwin, but Newton 
is well-known for stating that he had, ‘stood on the shoulders of giants’.  It is true, too, 
that scientists have in recent centuries competed for recognition by, for instance, placing 
reports of their researches (as ‘gifts’ - they are typically unpaid) in learned journals; they 
also compete for funds to continue their researches.  (Hagstrom, 1965)  However, the 
latter activities belong to a period when science has become institutionalized (initially in 
Western societies, then more widely), and, in particular, when the role of scientist has 
itself become established (Ben-David, 1971); thus individual scientists carry on their 
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researches within a wider cooperative framework incorporating, for instance, peer 
review.  Evidently, too, at many of its leading edges scientific work is now being 
furthered in large – even massive - teams such as that associated with CERN and the 
Large Hadron Collider at Geneva. (De Solla Price, 1963; Galison, 1992)  In sum, science 
is in essence a joint enterprise concerned with investigating systematically the totality of 
what is held in common (the ‘external world’).   
 
Are humans to be characterized as naturally selfish? 
Following the publication in 1976 of Dawkins’s book The Selfish Gene, there was 
controversy regarding the issue of human selfishness.  Some of this was misplaced since 
confusion arose between the attributes of genes and of people. The primary meaning of 
selfish refers to having concern for one’s own welfare and interests (usually) when 
accompanied by a disregard for others. In this connection one must distinguish carefully 
between behaviour which is simply oriented to meeting personal needs – perhaps to be 
termed ‘self-oriented’ behaviour – and behaviour which is correctly to be characterized as 
‘selfish’.  If an individual wakes up during the night and feels like urinating it is no use 
their banging on the wall to get a neighbour to visit the lavatory for them, they must do so 
themselves and in so doing they are hardly to be characterized as selfish, even if at the 
same time people are dying of starvation elsewhere in the world. This is but one example:  
in fact we spend quite an amount of time meeting personal needs.  No, selfishness is 
exhibited by situations where people are similarly placed but particular individuals 
advance their concerns or interests excessively and at cost to others.  
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To clarify further it is important to note three patterned aspects of human behaviour:  a 
tendency to be selfish; a tendency to react unfavourably to being a victim of the 
selfishness of others; the existence of a normative framework discouraging selfishness 
(e.g. exhibited in the socialisation of children which is geared to inhibiting that type of 
behaviour).  A helpful orienting idea is that humans do not create norms or rules against 
behaviour which shows no tendency to occur.  Thus there are rules and laws prohibiting 
stealing but plainly many – even most – people occasionally steal, and would do so rather 
more were the normative framework (involving agents of social control such as the courts 
and the police) weaker.  Similarly, the existence of a norm against selfishness is itself 
powerful evidence of a behavioural tendency in that direction.  However, it is equally 
common to feel injured and react against the selfishness of others; nor do people take 
kindly to an accusation of selfishness.  Since all the behaviour humans exhibit may be 
equally construed as ‘natural’, it is appropriate to say that humans are naturally (a) 
sometimes selfish, (b) sometimes may be seen to react unfavourably towards selfishness, 
(c) maintain norms against it. 
 
The error which is often made is to give overmuch attention to (a) and altogether less to 
(b) and (c); significantly too there is an underlying bias towards individualism since (a) 
tends to be understood primarily in individualistic terms while (c) is manifestly a 
collective phenomenon.  Once (b) and (c) are wrongly bracketed out there is a discernible 
tendency for commentators to come forward with assertions such as ‘humans (i.e. 
individuals) are basically selfish’.  However, this is inadequate as a summary because of 
the existence of (b) and (c) and given also that cooperative behaviour is as ‘natural’ as 
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individual behaviour.  Now (a) and (b) include instances of cooperative as well as 
individual behaviour, while (c) is plainly to be understood as an overarching cooperative 
phenomenon.  An appropriate complementary assertion would be that ‘humans naturally 
create norms of behaviour tending to restrict or eliminate selfishness’. 
 
There are, in fact, distinctive patterns in human behaviour discernible at both a micro- 
and macro-level.  Suppose, for instance, three children are attending a party and three 
cakes are supplied for their consumption.  One child is discernibly ‘selfish’ because he or 
she quickly grabs hold of, and consumes, two of them.  What typically happens?  The 
other two children come spontaneously together to voice a complaint and appeal directly 
to any adult arbiters in the vicinity.  Consider next the seemingly very different example 
of nineteenth century capitalism.  In that case employers and employees came together in 
productive activity but the rewards were divided up extremely unequally, with the former 
often becoming wealthy while the latter were on the breadline, despite the fact that, as 
human beings, their needs were essentially similar.  What happened?  A main 
consequence was the development of countervailing trade union power accompanied by 
demands for changes in the laws relating to the labour contract and working conditions.  
Thirdly, consider instances in geo-politics where individual countries become over-
mighty and inconsiderate of their neighbours:  a spectacular example would be Nazi 
Germany at least from the time in 1938 at which she commenced dismembering 
Czechoslovakia.  As is often remarked, this generated a response almost impossible to 
imagine in other circumstances:  alliance between the capitalist USA and the communist 
USSR.  Not just that, but in the aftermath politicians strove to create overarching 
 266 
structures such as the United Nations with its security council to deter the kinds of 
behaviour exhibited by Nazi Germany.  These examples illustrate the way in which 
‘selfish’ behaviour can bring into play cooperatively arrived at structures designed to 
curb it.  It follows that a perspective on human behaviour which finds a place for the 
former type of behaviour while neglecting the latter must be seriously incomplete. 
 
As a footnote one can usefully draw attention to a not infrequent bias arising from 
Christian thought.  The general impression given is that humans are a pretty awful lot 
because they spend much of their time breaking the Ten Commandments e.g. stealing 
from others, killing others and ‘lusting after their neighbour’s wife’.  However, again one 
could just as easily say humans dislike or oppose theft, murder and the lasciviousness of 
neighbours.  More importantly they have established systems of norms in opposition to 
these kinds of behaviours.  As a counterweight to the traditional emphasis, one could as 
easily say that humans deserve credit for having created the Ten Commandments and 
other ethical or ethically informed systems of ideas and law.   
 
Tension between cooperative and other genes 
Broadly speaking the human past, present and future are to be understood as involving 
the working out of the ‘conflict of interest’ between two sets of genes.  As stressed, the 
‘interests’ of the cooperative genes are served by a steady and sustainable increase in the 
aggregate human population, a tendency which may be at cost to the interests of the 
genes located in specific individuals.  On the other hand, the tendencies flowing from all 
the other genes located in individuals continue to express themselves in the kinds of ways 
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evident in other animals, through individual behaviour (most obviously in fending off or 
reducing threats to life and limb) and patterns of behaviour involving blood relatives. 
 
Given the need to make sense of a multiplicity of types of human behaviour, a useful 
orienting feature is the key assertion made in Chapter 1 that an (incipient) normative 
element inheres in cooperative behaviour from the outset.  The point is that presented 
with patterns in human behaviour, it is helpful to inquire as to whether, and if so to what 
extent, these are fundamentally secured by the normative element.  Where that element 
may be identified as being present then there is a thrust in the direction of serving the 
interests of the propagation of the cooperative genes, although that need not be the only 
interest so served.  It has already been noted that that element is present in speech from 
the outset, so, as expected, that basic type of communication – together with other types - 
tends to serve interests at least to some extent going beyond those of the genes of 
individuals.  The action of the other genes is not such as to attach a normative element. 
 
As already affirmed, in the absence of blood ties or sexual interest, there is no naturally 
given attachment between human beings, but there are many potential gains to be had 
from cooperation.  (The custom of minimally greeting others – even relative strangers - 
on their appearance implicitly acknowledges a potential need for cooperation; rules 
regarding politeness have somewhat similar import.)  There is also a tendency for the 
action of the cooperative genes to extend the scope of cooperation, other things being 
equal, conceivably to embrace all those capable of cooperation.  A key reason for this is 
that random others may impinge and adversely affect an existing cooperative 
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relationship.  At the very least it would be welcome were those in the vicinity to 
cooperate to the extent of at least coordinating their activities so as to avoid interference.  
An important additional principle is that the greater the scope of the normatively-
governed cooperation or co-action, the greater is the scope for potential population 
increase and hence the propagation of the cooperative genes.   
 
As regards the interests of the other genes, these are manifested through the other patterns 
of behaviour manifested by individuals and as between blood relatives.  It follows that 
these interests are often served through behaviour which is in a sense ‘local’ and on a 
face-to-face basis, for example within a domestic group.  This may give rise to the 
expectation that among humans one is essentially referring to the contexts of the family, 
marriage and kinship.  Undoubtedly the behaviour at issue is manifested in that context.  
However, one must constantly bear in mind the distinction between the existence of 
blood ties on the one hand and kinship, which is concerned with their social recognition, 
on the other (see Chapter 4).  The point is that patterns among those with blood ties were 
an essential element in the emergence of kinship organization, but kinship organization 
always goes further than that in terms of its significance as is evidenced by the existence 
of heavy normative elements. For instance, it has a great deal to do with the maintenance 
of orderly arrangements both among those who have blood ties but also between those 
who are not close in terms of blood ties (such as a man and his neighbour’s wife).  It 
enables people to ‘know where they stand’ and to identify responsibilities and appropriate 
ways of behaving. This is evident in a pre-literate society but also in a modern one. 
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Furthermore the population of a given area is in need of much more than just an orderly 
family and kinship system in order to survive.  There is a need for an orderly and 
understood pattern of life which keeps to a minimum the tendency for non-kin to interfere 
with one another in ways which might provoke conflict.  This is particularly evident 
within a modern society.  For instance, the whole institution of property and real estate is 
geared to people knowing where they stand in respect of entitlements or the need for 
permission. 
 
A couple of examples are next presented to try to illustrate how the conflict of interest 
between the two sets of genes may express itself and work itself out in practice.  As 
stressed, that conflict is manifested through time, as much in a tribal society as in our 
own.  There is no merit in striving to select examples which seem archaic, so those 
chosen have clear contemporary relevance. 
 
Example (a) Theft by a Gang. A perennial phenomenon in the human situation is theft but 
at this point one is considering its commission not by a single individual but by a group 
of two or more; bank robbery by a gang might be illustrative.  A basic point is that for 
this activity even to be referred to as ‘theft’ implies the existence of a wider normative 
order concerned with property and access to it within which theft is defined and 
proscribed.  That normative order serves the interests of the wider community; 
significantly, no-one wishes themselves to be the victim of theft. To be pedantic one 
could even say that the non-commission of the theft would serve the interests of the genes 
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of the individuals belonging to the wider population, and the cooperation implied by the 
existence of that wider normative order stems from the cooperative genes.   
 
A further basic point is that people stand to gain by theft:  it serves their interests jointly 
and severally and probably also those of lovers and close relatives.  It is a meaningful 
assertion – if, again, seemingly pedantic - that the acquisition of greater resources serves 
the interests of the genes of the two or more individuals.  However, attention must also be 
given to the normative element inhering in their cooperative behaviour.  Essentially, two 
or more persons support each other in the planning and commission of the crime and 
there is, to a degree, ‘honour among thieves’; this last notion typically underpins the 
cooperation which sustains the activity itself.  Of course, their individual interests diverge 
to some extent and they may quarrel over the ‘division of the spoils’.  In addition, it 
might well be that the widely-held feeling that theft is wrong is, to a degree at least, 
shared by the thieves themselves (they might protest were their own houses burgled), but 
not to the point where it leads them to refrain from committing it. (Many people ‘fiddle’ 
their tax returns and insurance claims while feeling a bit rotten about so doing.)  
 
Hence in this example the tension between the interests of the two sets of genes is 
evident.  However, an associated complication of the analysis is that individual interests 
and cooperative elements are involved on ‘both sides’, both that of the thieves and that of 
the wider population   The key difference though is that the normative element in the 
former case is narrower and particularistic in that it simply operates between the thieves, 
while the normative element in the latter case applies more widely, even potentially 
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universally. The key assertion being made here is that it is the cooperation proceeding on 
the wider basis which tends to hold out most promise for overall population growth, and 
the maximal realization of that cooperation implies people refraining from theft. (The 
same would apply to the filling in of tax returns and insurance claim forms.) 
 
Theft is a ubiquitous problem where the institution of property exists.  It may properly be 
thought that the next selected example is altogether more parochial in place and time.  
Since the argument is intended to have the widest possible application, why on earth 
choose an institution of recent origin in a particular western society for illustration?  Part 
of the explanation is that it demonstrates the kinds of issues involved in a particularly 
pure form and is centrally concerned with population, or, more specifically, the way in 
which society may bear down on morbidity and mortality; a further reason for the choice 
is that the reader of this work is likely to be ‘familiar with the territory’ i.e. someone 
abreast of social issues in western societies and readily familiar with how these are 
debated; finally, the underlying issues are in fact perennial because the tension between 
obligations to kin as opposed to obligations to non-kin is centrally involved. 
 
Example (b) The United Kingdom’s National Health Service.  The UK government 
created in 1948 and has subsequently maintained the NHS providing medical treatment to 
Britons at the point of need and irrespective of their means.  It is in everyone’s interest to 
be in good health and this constitutes a collective solution to the problem of providing 
health care.  The institution embraces many normative elements, including notably the 
overarching notions  that society should address the health needs of individuals 
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irrespective of their means and should do so in a way which is ‘fair to all’.  Put in this 
form one could say that it serves the interest of the propagation of all the genes, both 
cooperative and other.  (In fact, there is a qualification to be made here:  there would be 
particular genes whose propagation is directly furthered or directly threatened by medical 
intervention itself; but that does not undermine the argument being made.)    
 
However, some of the wealthier members of society seek to gain an advantage by ‘going 
private’.  For many this amounts simply to furthering their own interests i.e. it is non-
normative in that there is no claim that they ‘ought’ to do it.  For others there is a 
normative element, for instance when parents say they should do this because it is their 
duty as parents to do the best for their children; hence a behavioural tendency is 
reinforced by the particularistic norms associated with the kinship system.  The latter 
behaviour serves the interests of the parental genes.  However, the scope of cooperation is 
greater in respect of the NHS as a whole than that manifested in the family lives of those 
‘going private’. 
 
Again, as in the previous example, there is a need to scrutinise a certain complexity in the 
normative structure.  The notion that parents ought to look after their own children is a 
universalistic principle – we very widely adhere to it - but its application is particularistic 
in the sense that it applies to people only in respect of their own particular others.  In 
effect this is an ‘approved’ way the naturally given tendency for people to favour their 
own children and relatives is properly allowed to express itself within a modern kinship 
system.  On the other hand, the normative notion that a health service should be provided 
 273 
which is fair to all is a purely universalistic one which applies equally to all; there is no 
inbuilt particularistic element.  Hence there is parallelism with the previous example 
where the notion that theft is wrong and should be against the law is a purely 
universalistic one, while the ‘honour among thieves’ idea is particularistic in its 
application. 
 
The general assertion that may be made is that the universalism inhering in a normative 
order strains towards having wider application and it is that tendency which maximally 
serves to propagate the cooperative genes.  The tendency for principles to go wider in 
their application may indeed be illustrated from the above.  Supposing one holds that 
there should be an NHS which is ‘fair to all’.  Already, by implication, the application of 
this principle is understood to go wider than the existing population, because it is felt that 
it should have application to generations yet unborn or continue to apply to a population 
changed by immigration or emigration. Again, the NHS is simply a particular institution 
within the UK, but once the underlying principle is agreed its application may be judged 
to be extendable without limit to embrace all mankind.  Similarly, the notion that robbery 
is wrong is not one which anyone who articulates it believes should be confined in its 
application to one country or people or to one era.  (In this connection it may be noted 
that religions – typically transnational cooperating groups  -  in their articulation of moral 
principles, typically seek to extend the application of those principles more widely.  A 
religious group is typically to be found occupying a particular geographical area, but it 
virtually never understands the scope of application of its moral principles to be similarly 
limited or confined, even where it is not committed to proselytizing.) 
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The emerging structural form of geo-politics 
It can help in the evaluation of the perspective developed here to consider the world’s 
(possible) emerging political and economic structural form. (In this connection, again, 
there is no intention to engage in futurology.)  Noting Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of 
history’ thesis, let us imagine that in political-geographical terms the whole of the Earth’s 
surface is covered by liberal and social democratic (capitalistic) nations and supranational 
units (such as a politically integrated European Community), together with an elaborated 
system of world governance with the United Nations at its strategic centre.  On what core 
principles are human affairs then being conducted? 
 
To assist in addressing this question, first let us specify the arrangements in rather more 
detail.  Let it be said that the nation states are formed on the basis of self-determination, 
so they are meaningful in a cultural sense.  Next, for all the complexities and variations of 
institutional democracy, each nation state possesses as its overarching governmental 
structure an entity derived from treating its adult citizens as formal equals i.e. they have 
governments elected through the ballot box.  Adult citizens are formally equal and the 
whole is governed by considerations of fairness and justice:  thus there is a drawing 
together to give a sense of direction to the national group while expressing the principle 
of (adult) equality.  Hence there is a definite sense in which the overarching 
governmental framework and action derives from the collectivity which is the aggregated 
population of the nation.  Now within that context the notion that citizens are free to act 
as they please within the law is affirmed.  Flowing from this they are free to act in their 
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own interests and they may seek to gain all manner of relative advantages for themselves 
and their relatives.  Each economy has a capitalistic nature but there are regulations 
secured by government to prevent citizens taking undue advantage of each other and an 
elaborate system of welfare arrangements for those falling upon hard times (which makes 
it more meaningful to speak of equality of opportunity for children). The division 
between public and private expenditure (the former dependent upon taxation) is an 
indicator of the relative emphasis being placed upon collectively-defined as distinguished 
from privately-defined interests (and public expenditure is around 40 percent in western 
European democracies).  Subject to the governmentally-maintained (including legal) 
framework and action, individuals and families are free to pursue their own interests. 
 
Meanwhile the system of transnational governance operates on the basis of universalistic 
principles.  It is fully recognized that states differ in respect of political and economic 
power but there is determination to hold the balance between any and all of them.  
Machinery exists to deter and mediate when aggression is threatened by one state or 
group of states against another.  The World Trade Organization seeks to liberalise trade. 
From the highest level – that of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank - 
through into the individual nation states efforts are made to promote economic growth, 
taking due account of the interdependence of economies.  Importantly, the rights of 
individuals are affirmed through a series of documents commencing with the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948).  At the highest level interventions are such as to 
place all citizens of the world on a formally equal basis. Thus the UN High Commission 
for Refugees acts to secure the interests of refugees simply on the basis of their plight and 
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circumstances and regardless of their nationality.  The World Health Organization and 
individual nations’ health services address the health needs of their citizens in a formally 
egalitarian manner.  Age specific mortality rates are also kept low given that 
arrangements are in place to make the likelihood of war minimal. 
 
Let us explicitly add to this picture a further element.  This is to the effect that there is a 
comprehensive commitment at the highest UN level and down into the individual states 
to safeguard the interests of future generations.  There is a determination that each 
generation will leave the world and the environment as far as possible either in the same 
or preferably a better state than it found it.  This places the environment and 
considerations of ecology at the forefront. As far as possible human life is to be sustained 
upon the basis of replaceable resources or ones never likely to be in short supply.  A UN 
Declaration of Human Responsibilities affirms the more detailed implications for 
individuals and groups. Hence it may be judged that at the supra-national level, the 
overarching framework of international governance derives from the coordinated action 
of the aggregated populations of the nations typically mediated through the actions of 
their national governments.  
 
Attention may be drawn to a further feature of this configuration:  it is one which tends to 
keep coerced cooperation at a low level.  A residual way in which coerced cooperation 
persists is, of course, in respect of containment of the prison populations.  However, the 
generally low level of coercion contributes to the overall stability of the system, for it is 
generally the case that those subject to coercion radically alter their behaviour once its 
 277 
source is removed.  Probably the major overall way in which people are linked within the 
model is through the world capitalist system within which their relations are maintained 
on a voluntary rather than a coerced basis. (It is probably the case that the long-term use 
of money in transactions tends towards the overall reduction of coercion:  where 
everything tends to have its price there is at least in principle a legal route to obtaining it.)  
It may be objected that capitalism tends to generate gross inequalities forcing people into 
work roles for demeaning rates of pay; but this rarely amounts to coercion in the strict 
sense.  Furthermore, although it is certainly the case that capitalism tends to generate 
great inequalities, a further feature of the model being considered is that it provides scope 
for these to be addressed politically.  Hence it represents a relatively stable framework 
giving expression to world-wide cooperation, but substantially not of the coerced type. 
 
The reader may well find that the arrangements being described in this putative world 
structural model are hardly startling, but essentially amount to the state of affairs to 
which many liberal-minded people aspire in present circumstances.  That can serve to 
indicate that dominant systems of values in our time underpin efforts to approach and 
realise that state.  In effect the accumulated experience of humanity down the centuries 
points to the desirability of moving to that state.  Yet when one reflects on it, its 
structural form nicely articulates the tension between the cooperative and the other 
genes.  There is a clear sense in which population members are considered as formal 
equals and their aggregated position is secured as far as possible by coordinated action at 
the highest (governmental or supra-national) level.  In addition, however, within that 
cooperatively-defined framework, there is manifestly scope for interests and concerns 
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originating from the level of the individual and the family to be expressed. It is not too 
much to claim that the character of these national and international arrangements 
recapitulates something of the dynamic tension of the structure of the genes, but, 
significantly, the overarching framework derives from coordinated action conducted on 
the widest possible basis. The cooperative genes are therefore arguably ‘in the driving 
seat’.  Notice a further feature:  given the argument and evidence of earlier chapters, there 
is every expectation that within the context of these arrangements the human population 
would tend to continue steadily to increase.  At the same time the human presence would 
continue to be interdependent with a continually changing pattern of other life forms, 
including, perhaps notably, the microscopic. 
 
It is important to be as precise as possible.  Of course when one is concerned with 
populations numbered in millions there can be co-action (as when people vote in an 
election held on a specific day) but that does not amount to cooperation between them all 
as originally defined; rather, they are agreeing to conform to a framework of rules and 
with an understanding of its purpose and significance.  In government and in the arenas 
of international governance it is representatives and delegates who enact the various 
measures:  that is the level where cooperation in the strict sense takes place.  To use 
Lincoln’s phraseology, what is going on is ‘government of the people, by the people, and 
for the people’ mediated through the cooperative activities of the representatives and 
delegates. Thus the strategic (higher-level) cooperation derives from and is oriented 
towards the largest possible human population.  
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----------------------------------------- 
Summarizing conclusion 
Reasons have been given as to why zoologists and social scientists may have tended to 
overrate the importance of competition and underrate that of cooperation when seeking to 
grasp the broad character of human life.  Competition is an essential ingredient but the 
failure is to grasp the fundamental contribution of the cooperatively-created institutional 
setting.  With respect to modern democratic societies, for instance, there is plainly 
competition between firms, between political parties and between athletes, but the 
controlling power resides in the legally-secured institutional settings of these activities 
which ensure competition is carefully regulated and wider public interests thereby served.    
 
Confronted with the topic of the selfish gene, sitting-room discussion often moves to a 
consideration of whether humans are ‘naturally selfish’.  As already pointed out, the 
connection being made is faulty, but the issue of selfishness is strategic; it is important to 
describe the associated patterns of behaviour in an accurate and comprehensive way. 
Human behaviour often needs to be self-oriented but, beyond that, it is as true to say that 
humans are sometimes selfish as it is to say that humans tend to react unfavourably to 
selfishness in others and ‘naturally’ create norms of behaviour tending to restrict or 
eliminate selfishness. 
 
There is, to an identifiable degree, what may be termed a ‘conflict of interests’ between 
the cooperative and the other human genes, which is working itself out in human 
experience.  Where a normative element inheres in patterned behaviour, that is a sign that 
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the behaviour tends to favour the propagation of the cooperative genes.  Two examples 
have been presented to illustrate how the conflict of interest may work itself out in 
practice, one concerning theft by a gang, the other the UK’s National Health Service.   
From the examples it may be seen that a normative structure may incorporate both what 
are termed ‘particularistic’ and ‘universalistic’ elements.  It is significant that it is the 
universalism inhering in a normative order which (in an identifiable sense) ‘strains’  
towards having wider application and it is that tendency which maximally serves to 
propagate the cooperative genes. 
 
With the help of Fukuyama’s ‘end of history thesis’, a model has been constructed 
representing the (possible) emerging structural form of geo-politics.  It is argued that the 
structural form nicely articulates – and in a sense resolves - the tension between the 
cooperative and the other genes.  Significantly though, within the overarching political 
framework, the various key functions, activities and initiatives are normatively-governed 
on the basis of universalistic principles.  Again, this implies cooperation on the widest 
basis is of a type tending to give rise to population growth.    
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Chapter 12: Conclusion 
At the outset it was indicated that this work has the form of a ‘feasibility study’ whereby 
there is an attempt to test the theory of the selfish gene in relation to the human 
population.  It is now judged that quite a lot of evidence – direct and indirect – as well as 
associated argument may be assembled in support of the selfish gene theory as applied to 
humans.  With a focus on genes giving rise to characteristically-human cooperation it 
proves possible to situate a whole range of patterned behaviour and phenomena, even 
including celibacy, the use of contraception, and war, which at first glance seem to 
present insuperable difficulties.  The key to so doing is to note that the behaviour to 
which the new ‘cooperative’ genes give rise necessarily involves more than one person:  
it is not to be analyzed as a summation of individual behaviours.  Crucially, it follows 
that the behaviour which tends to propagate the cooperative genes may be ‘at cost’ to the 
genes of some who may be party to the cooperation itself (see Chapter 1).  That being so, 
evaluation of the selfish gene theory hinges on whether or not it can be shown that 
cooperation tends to give rise to growth in the aggregate population of cooperating 
people; a weight of evidence suggests that it does.  
 
An insight of primary importance (see Chapter 2) is that cooperation itself gives rise to 
full human conceptualization of the external world and their own place in it as embodied 
beings, which conceptual advance inheres in human practical activity.  Also strategic – 
and arising out of theory of mind – is a tendency towards bifurcation in respect of types 
of explanation or understanding, between explanation by reference to purposive causation 
and explanation by reference to non-purposive causation; among other things, the 
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existence of this bifurcation helps to explain the origin of religion.  Rational action puts 
these types of understanding to effective use. 
 
It is also of the essence that cooperation has itself a core normative element (typically 
expressed using the word ‘ought’) while also giving rise to, and expressing, values and 
interests; it is also the source of the socially regulative pattern, morality.  The existence of 
these elements makes behaviour within a locality more understandable and predictable, 
providing context for population growth.  Significantly too, human behaviour acquires 
flexibility from the fact that action may be ‘desire-independent’, as when means are 
chosen to reach an identifiable goal.  Again, in seeking to understand the implications for 
population growth, full account must be taken of the phenomenon of coerced cooperation 
and of the pattern whereby cooperation between embodied persons may, in its turn, give 
rise to extended cooperative frameworks.  
 
Given full conceptualization of the external world, humans are thereby empowered:  in 
particular, they implicitly, and progressively explicitly, grasp the three-dimensionality of 
their physical surroundings, which are also understood to change with time, itself initially 
grasped in a serial sense.  Practical action in respect of the vital processes is thereby 
shaped (see Chapter 3).  Cooperation impacts on fertility through a pattern of increasing 
control informed by foresight, for instance of potentially failing food supplies (illustrated 
for the tribal society of Tikopia in Chapter 6).  Cooperation leads to population growth 
because it tends to bear down on morbidity and mortality (with the important exception 
of cooperation in violence and war, considered below), often in small increments but with 
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substantial cumulative effect in extended time.  Reductions in morbidity and in the 
occurrence of accidental injury – particularly in younger age-groups – have positive 
implications for subsequent fecundity and fertility.  The impact of cooperation on 
migration is such as to increase potential numbers in association with extension in space, 
while also redistributing population within a (potentially relatively stable) overall spatial 
division of labour.  Population growth may also be understood to be interdependent with 
incremental enhancement of the human forces and relations of production.  
  
A vitally important longer-term process - the domestication of animals and plants - is 
made possible by human capacities underlying the ability to cooperate; the geographical 
redistribution of such species means that the Earth is able to sustain a progressively larger 
human population.  A further basic point is that, in the human case, the widest but 
appropriate context within which judgments as to the ‘fitness’ of particular categories of 
humans are to be made is increasingly the human cooperative framework itself:  it is that 
feature which places the cooperative genes fundamentally ‘in the driving seat’.  Indeed in 
assessing fitness in relation to the human position within the ecological system as a 
whole, consideration must be given (even) to the expression of moral and aesthetic 
values, since these bear upon how humans re-shape the environment.  (Appendix 4) 
 
In understanding how human life has developed it is only to be expected that extended 
consideration is given to the implications of the ‘biological basics’ of sex and of the 
existence of blood ties.  However, it is also essential to grasp that those implications 
change fundamentally with the advent of characteristically-human cooperation (Chapter 
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4).  Evaluation of the significance of that element enables one to understand the 
difference between animal and human sexual behaviour, while bridging the gap between 
a zoological focus on blood-ties and the social anthropological focus on kinship, meaning 
the social recognition of blood ties.  With regard to sex a key point is that there arises a 
range of options with the implication that sex may be an ingredient of differing types of 
cooperative relationship and may become economically significant, as when a couple (or 
family) is a unit of economic production or consumption (or - rather different – 
economically significant in the relation between prostitute and client).  While 
understanding how cooperation gives rise to kinship and marriage, one is also led to 
understand how it is the origin of differing kinship systems, thereby providing insight 
into a source of cultural variation.  An expanding framework of affinal and kinship ties 
renews and integrates society:  it is the primary system of cooperation, co-action and 
coordination. 
 
Economic and property relations are as basic as kinship and marriage. Taking full 
account of the cooperation involved in the development of various modes of production 
together with that involved in their use, it is evident that they arise from human 
cooperation and are sustained by it.  Domestic cooperation in food preparation and the 
rearing of children is ubiquitous.  Importantly, patterns of exchange are often of more 
than narrowly-conceived economic significance, thereby making an additional 
contribution to conflict reduction.  Kinship and economic considerations bear heavily on 
the bases of differentiation found in early societies:  sex (or gender); age-grading; 
ranking, hierarchy and stratification.   
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Also basic in the generality of the human situation is the neighbouring relation.  This type 
of relation tends to exist between equals or near-equals and those people who find they 
can sustain cooperative relations with neighbours (even when this involves a degree of 
coercion) will tend to survive and flourish as compared with those for whom this is not 
possible.  Kinship, economic ties and neighbouring shape local communities and there 
are associated patterns in the outlook on ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’.  Rising population 
numbers have important consequences, but – notwithstanding the value of the idea of an 
‘imagined community’ (Anderson, 1991) - larger as well as smaller groups arise out of 
cooperation and continue to depend upon it. 
 
Cooperative activity may express or concern speculative thought just as it may be 
directed at more immediately practical concerns. In this connection, religion is important 
for several reasons (see Chapter 5).  It is highly systemic with many ‘degrees of freedom’ 
as to the precise form that it may  take, but it is strategically vital in that it legitimates the 
widest range of behaviour; there are also good reasons to believe that the religious 
outlook is inevitable in the early circumstances of mankind.  Religions have also brought 
together the largest human groups, the largest contexts of cooperative activity.  Despite 
variations in their detailed regulation of practices bearing upon population (including 
marriage, timing of sexual intercourse, celibacy and monasticism), there is good reason to 
judge that the predominating influence on fertility of those religions which have tended to 
survive long-term, is such as to incline population firmly on an upward trajectory.   
Plainly a practice of historical importance with contrary implications is religiously-
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inspired human sacrifice.  Given a particular world view that can be a meaningful way of 
acting, but there is nevertheless reason to judge that where it is viewed as a means to an 
end, the practice will tend to decline in the longer term; in the short term, it may tend to 
be undermined by countervailing interests. 
 
An anthropological study of an island-based tribal society – Tikopia – lays bear the many 
mechanisms of population control used even in a relatively simple society, a crucial 
influence on their deployment being consideration of potential food supplies (see Chapter 
6).  Future-time reference is evidently crucial in maintaining the condition of the 
population, so that numbers may recover quickly once a sustainable increase in food 
supplies is achieved.  Importantly, pre-literate cultures have the ability to limit family 
size but they exercise it not to maintain a balance between fertility and mortality at a 
subsistence level, but to maintain an economic surplus.   
 
Understanding the transition from simple to complex societies is challenging particularly 
given that between non-relatives – in the absence of sexual interest – there is no naturally 
given affective tie, so as the population grows there is greater risk of quarrels and 
violence.  Hence in the larger group there is a need for centralized authority which seeks 
to monopolize the use of force and promote conflict resolution. The central authority may 
also usefully receive and re-distribute surpluses of goods.  Associated with this, there are 
good reasons for thinking that competition between societies at one level of complexity 
tends to lead to societies of a greater level of complexity where conditions permit. In this 
connection, the broader picture is not that various independent variables simply ‘cause’ 
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growth in the dependent variable of population size but rather that various analytically 
distinguishable elements – such as societal complexity, the rate of technological 
innovation (seen as evolutionary), food production, and population size and density inter-
affect each other. Perhaps the most strategic aspect of all is development in respect of the 
division and specialization of labour; crucially, that development tends to increase 
average product per person while reducing the tendency for conflict to occur, conflict 
which might lead to maiming and increased mortality.  Interestingly, in settled societies 
the designation of space from which people are substantially excluded may indirectly 
give rise to population growth.  An abstracted model has been presented (Chapter 6) to 
assist understanding of the interdependence between change in the cooperative 
framework and the tendency for population numbers to grow.  
 
In evaluating the thesis being advanced here against the fully-rounded evidence of 
prehistory and history, attention must be directed at the significance of patterns and 
developments (as in Chapter 7). Everywhere humans gain access to the means of their 
subsistence cooperatively, but how they organize to do so develops in patterned ways.  
The tendency for the population of hunter-gatherers to spread is one such, as is the 
crucially important phenomenon whereby agriculture arose independently in at least 
seven different regions of the world. The emergence of agriculture may be situated given 
that it is understood that various incremental stages are involved as are differing 
associated phenomena such as domestication, cultivation, herding and sedentism; also 
important is the distinction between hoe and plough agriculture and the contribution 
made by technologies of intensification.    
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A further evident tendency was for there to emerge more institutionalized social 
formations (states) and complex concentrated settlements (cities).  That the same trends – 
towards food production, social complexity and urbanism – are found as independent 
developments in different parts of the globe points to the contribution of basic facets of 
human cooperative behaviour.  There evidently occurred patterned change in the structure 
of cooperation, a key aspect being change in the division or specialization of labour, with 
an important spatial dimension.  These developments push further the relative decline of 
kinship as a structural principle.   That relative decline leads, for instance, to an 
increasing problem in legitimating leadership and hence helps one to understand the 
elaborate social organization concerned with the stylized or idealized portrayal of leaders 
and deities, together with the evident propaganda and stage-managed public 
performances (not entirely absent from a modern democracy – consider the State 
Opening of Parliament!)  
 
Of considerable prominence too, through extended time, have been the phenomena of 
empire and of the nation state.  It is argued that empire, despite the contribution of the use 
of force to its creation and maintenance, tended to have positive implications for 
expansion of cooperation and longer-term population growth; the European expansion 
into the relatively sparsely populated continents of North America and Australia would 
be the most spectacular example. While enlarging the scope of its rule, the paramount 
power may confer various ‘public goods’  such as language, the law, a common currency 
and relative peace on it territories (even despite a frequent need to suppress local 
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rebellions and defend or extend boundaries).  An institutional basis is thereby provided 
upon which commercial and other types of cooperation may develop; a case study of 
China illustrates the links between expansion of an institutional base and population 
growth.  Significantly too, the importance of its institutions may sometimes outlive the 
empire as with Roman law and the Greek and Latin languages and their associated 
cultures. 
 
There may be an initial – but perhaps mistaken - tendency to associate the nation-state 
system with the occurrence of war and high mortality (epitomized by the First World 
War).  Yet that development points in another direction, towards the clarification of 
individual governmental responsibility for a defined area; a fully developed system also 
reduces the occurrence of squabbles over resources since these are firmly allocated on a 
near-global basis: in this respect the system is much more stable than is empire, since it 
has greater legitimacy.  Hence the nation state may be viewed as an institutional 
development introducing greater clarity and predictability into lives, providing a context 
for more intensive cooperation and population growth.  Significantly too, associated with 
the emergence of that system, there has been an ever-developing system of transnational 
governance, although this has not – perhaps significantly - extended into world 
government.  This elaboration of governance is illustrative of the general pattern in 
human affairs whereby systems of higher-level cooperation tend to be instituted which 
resolve sources of conflict at lower levels.  There is plainly too a pattern whereby larger 
and more stable political entities tend to emerge over extended time – states, empires, 
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nation states – providing a more predictable and secure context within which populations 
may grow.    
 
In the account – particularly with an eye to complex societies with large populations - 
attention has been drawn (in Chapter 8) to ways in which orderly cooperation is sustained 
and extended.  Particularly important is the semi-permanent, built environment.  Most 
obviously this at once facilitates and constrains use, but it also functions as a system of 
signs and communication implying permissions and prohibitions which facilitate orderly 
co-action.    The significance of writing, as opposed to oral communication, concerns 
time and objectively-given, potentially public, shared reference. Writing also facilitates 
every kind of second- or higher-order, shared, ‘mental’ activity such as that involved in 
mathematical, scientific and technical enquiry, as well as administration.  The institution 
of money has powerfully promoted the expansion of the production, distribution and 
exchange of goods and services; significantly, transactions are typically consensual so 
money represents a vital step away from (potentially unstable) coerced cooperation.  The 
advent of money may be viewed as a harbinger not just of capitalism, but of 
globalization.   
 
Proceeding further, it is argued that the more widespread and systematic adoption of a 
rational approach to many aspects of life – often highlighted as progressively developing 
within western societies or judged characteristic of our times - is grounded in the 
emergence of particular institutional forms.  Regarding population, a rational orientation 
finds particular expression through the idea of family planning.  No doubt, too, it is the 
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development of an elaborated configuration of institutional and other elements – 
including new forms of transport and communication – which underpin the process of 
globalization.  A marked feature is the way in which interaction and cooperation can 
become ‘extended’ in space and time, with the parties no longer being co-present. It is 
not too much to claim that while cooperation gives rise to human conceptualization of the 
external world, through their activity humans are proceeding to reconfigure the external 
world so as to maximize the possibilities for their own cooperation within it. In particular, 
cooperation has given rise to technologies and expert systems which in their turn 
maximize the scope and nature of possible further cooperation and extended cooperative 
frameworks.  The dynamism inherent in globalization bears upon the tendency for the 
world’s population to grow steadily.  
 
It may be felt that the frequent occurrence of violence and war is evidence against the 
thesis advanced here, most obviously because cooperation against an adversary typically 
increases mortality and loss of potential fertility.  However, there are reasons for judging 
that the threat or actuality of violence has played its part in creating the conditions for 
population growth (just as has coerced cooperation) (see Chapter 8).  Where a settled 
agricultural population extends its range by force to displace hunter-gatherers this might 
well lead to overall population increase; again, as implied above, when European settlers 
used force to displace Amerindians and Australian aborigines it opened the way to more 
rapid population growth across whole continents. This must be taken in conjunction with 
the general point that the threat or actuality of war may lead to the amalgamation of 
societies or creation of empires, drawing together previously conflicting parties within a 
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more integrated system of control, and thereby creating conditions for extension in the 
scope of cooperation.  It is notable too that for extended periods wars led to the rise and 
fall of particular states and empires without arresting the tendency for there to be overall 
population growth within a particular region of the world.   
 
The threat of war and its frequent occurrence also led to the development of the nation-
state system which provided political context for the unprecedented population increases 
of recent centuries.  Crucially, it is unclear that any political entity judged to be 
conducive to population growth – including states, empires and nation states – could have 
emerged and persisted without some use being made of violence and war.  At the same 
time, there is also good reason to judge that societal and institutional change overtime has 
tended increasingly to realize a latent potential for cooperation without recourse to 
violence and war. The magnitude of losses in war may for extended periods have tended 
to keep in step with a rising population without arresting it, but since the Second World 
War it has dropped considerably below that level.  
 
Globalization means that the vast majority of the world’s population is drawn together by 
frameworks of cooperation.  Therefore to evaluate the thesis under consideration by 
reference to the evidence of recent centuries, attention must be directed at population 
patterns across the world, rather than simply those within individual societies.  The main 
way in which those patterns have been encapsulated is in the theory of the demographic 
transition (Chapter 9).  In that connection social processes have been identified which 
help to explain why falling mortality leads to falling fertility, but post-war evidence 
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shows a tendency for populations unexpectedly to go on rising even after completing the 
transition.  The greater part of the population growth of recent decades originates in less-
developed nations, but part of that growth is effectively transferred to the developed by 
net migration.  
 
Despite the massive build-up of transnational governance it is an essential fact that there 
is no world government.  An individual national government is an important, but by no 
means decisive, ‘actor’ in the play of forces determining population outcomes in its own 
society, and also to a limited extent elsewhere.   Given a relatively anarchic international 
scene, there is a tendency for individual political authorities to wish their states or blocs 
to become (relatively) more powerful and, most often, they see this objective as served by 
a (relatively) growing population.  In recent decades a widely agreed and centrally-
affirmed objective is to reduce child poverty and mortality, but in itself that directly 
points to increasing rather than decreasing numbers. 
 
Fertility limitation is not an invention of recent centuries but the modern era is marked by 
important technical advances in that respect, together with – particularly in western 
societies – the advance of a normatively-governed notion of ‘family-planning’.   There is 
little doubt that the advent of the contraceptive pill is heavily implicated in change in 
family life and, particularly, in the position of women.  Nonetheless, the populations of 
these societies have in the main continued to rise relatively steadily.  In respect of 
contraception and abortion there is plainly a developing range of options, yet it appears 
that these methods essentially constitute means by which fertility goals are achieved, but 
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the goals are essentially independent of the means.  Strikingly, overall populations are 
increasing but this is ‘at cost’ to the propagation of the genes of the majority of 
individuals who choose to limit their own fertility.   
 
A basic and perennial concern is hoped-for security in old age when one’s powers are 
waning.  While in traditional societies the issue is addressed via obligations of kin and 
involves a principle of reciprocity between generations, to a degree in modern western 
societies the solution to the problem has been collectivized via state action.  However, 
there continues to be a pattern of potential dependency in old-age of each generation on 
the subsequent one.  This contributes to fertility tending to outstrip mortality because the 
needs of each earlier generation promise to be best served if a (slightly) larger one is 
following it.  A further salient issue of the modern world is that of persistent, but 
sometimes ‘unwelcome’ and even forced, immigration into developed or wealthier 
nations.  Again, this provides an example of a ubiquitous tendency which is for there to 
be an – often partially coerced - re-distribution of population in space and in relation to 
economic resources which tends to keep overall population numbers on an upward 
trajectory.  As regards the present position of ‘island Earth’,  overall population 
expansion continues but looks likely to become increasingly difficult in the medium term, 
but some people even now speculate about ‘colonising’ and populating other planets.  
One thing is certain:  were a planet faintly resembling an unpopulated Earth to appear 
nearby our population would rapidly expand on to it. 
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In the long term cooperative behaviour has borne down upon morbidity and early 
mortality thereby boosting numbers.  However, there is point to the suggestion that 
advanced societies have tended to become like hospital wards, retaining what are termed 
‘genetic defects’ in their populations, but a countervailing tendency is beginning to be 
evident (see Chapter 10).  Genetically-informed interventions may lead to the elimination 
of these types of defects while also resulting in such ‘positive qualities’ as intelligence 
and beauty becoming more widespread in populations.  However, the changed 
distribution of qualities will enable people to cooperate even more effectively, thereby 
indirectly giving rise to further population growth. 
 
There is a developing contrast in the human relationship with macro- and micro-
organisms.  The importance of domestication has been pointed up more than once in this 
study, but a more general process is evident:  the genes of other flora and fauna 
increasingly tend to exist and propagate on human terms.   At least that tends to be true 
for macro-organisms such as lions and redwood trees, but it is some way off for the 
population of micro-organisms (!)  Efforts in that direction are being hampered by the 
fact that the gene pool of micro-organisms changes rapidly in part interacting with the 
limited, but expanding, efforts of humans to exercise control.  
 
Following upon the understanding flowing from the concept of the gene, the notion of the 
‘meme’ was introduced as a putative second kind of replicator.  However, changes in 
respect of memes – cultural items of various types - may be judged to be associated with 
changes in patterns of cooperative relationships. The position tentatively developed here 
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is that the gene is the single controlling replicator and that cooperative genes give rise to 
cooperative behaviour which tends to propagate the genes, while the differing types of 
meme inhere in differing classes of cooperative relationship.  Nevertheless, without 
reference to the notion of the meme, it can be readily appreciated how human cultures 
have at times become so diverse and various.   
 
Reasons may be advanced as to why both zoologists and social scientists have tended to 
overrate the importance of competition and underrate that of cooperation when 
considering the broad character of human life; it is hoped that this study contributes to 
restoring balance (Chapter 11).  Further evidence of misdirected thinking has been 
evident in discussion, following upon the publication of The Selfish Gene, concerning 
whether human beings are naturally selfish.  In this connection confusion results where 
there is a failure to distinguish between self-oriented behaviour – for instance, meeting 
personal needs (such as urinating) – and behaviour which is properly to be judged selfish. 
The key to further understanding resides in the use of the phrase ‘properly to be judged’ 
in the previous sentence.  The whole point is that judgements of selfishness are made by 
reference to criteria which humans have themselves created.  It is as true to say that 
‘humans are sometimes selfish’ as it is to say that ‘humans naturally create norms of 
behaviour tending to restrict or eliminate selfishness’.  It would be similarly jejune to say, 
‘humans sometimes act unfairly’ without adding that ‘humans disapprove of unfairness’:  
indeed, the only fairness in the world is that which humans have introduced into it (so we 
can’t be that bad!).  It is hoped that this is a further topic which is illuminated rather than 
obfuscated by the approach taken here. 
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The focus in this account is on the multiplication of human cooperation and the way in 
which it gives rise to systems of co-action and coordination. That structural elaboration is 
interdependent with the high degree of flexibility which humans exhibit.  Fundamental to 
the latter is the aforementioned capacity to act in ways which are ‘desire-independent’:  
this gives rise to a behavioural ‘range of options’.  Even with regard to such a basic area 
as that of sexual behaviour, once it becomes cooperative there is a range of possibilities; 
for instance, as indicated, a couple (or family) may become a unit of economic 
production or consumption.  The development of the division and specialization of labour 
– vital to the process whereby numbers grow – requires individuals progessively to play 
widely differing roles and one person often to play a variety of roles at different or even 
the same time. Although it is of the essence that cooperation develops in tandem with a 
normative order, it is judged too that humans are very ‘flexible’ normatively i.e. in 
radically changed circumstances their behaviour appears readily to involve the adoption 
of standards different from those seemingly adhered to previously (as for some whose 
lives included, but extended beyond, the Nazi period in Germany).  Again, a striking 
aspect of human flexibility concerns the interplay between cooperation and power.  The 
fact is that humans can be observed to survive – and propagate – in very unequal 
situations and even when subordinates in coercive-cooperative relationships such as 
slavery.  
 
Human life is indeed notable for the co-existence of essentially different kinds of 
behaviour, including the self-oriented, the selfish, the routinely cooperative and the 
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altruistic; indeed the whole seems to comprise disparate kinds of elements in dynamic 
tension. The theory of the selfish gene in its existing form fails to grasp this complexity.  
It is the move to focus on co-operative genes which provides the needed additional 
element, the key to grasping complexity.  The fact is that even the most altruistic type of 
person must occasionally simply orientate to their own needs.  Again, seemingly highly 
selfish individuals may be seen sometimes spontaneously to cooperate in other-regarding 
ways:  a member of the mafia may give directions to a stranger who is lost in a city.  The 
mélange of tendencies evident in all of us is what is to be expected given that the human 
organism contains genes giving rise to cooperation alongside other genes and that the two 
sets of genes express their ‘selfishness’ in ways which are sometimes aligned and 
sometimes at variance.  The perspective developed also sits easily with the notion that a 
lot of human brain power is concerned with understanding the minds of potential and 
actual friends and enemies, mapping relationships and the external world, and out-
thinking other animals. (Radford, 2011, pp.8-9)   
 
It is judged that the human past, present and future are to be understood as involving the 
working out of a partial ‘conflict of interest’ between two sets of genes:  the cooperative 
genes and the others.  In this connection, presented with patterns in human life, it is 
helpful to inquire as to whether, and if so to what extent, these are fundamentally secured 
by the normative element (i.e. involve ‘ought’).  Where that element may be identified as 
being present then there is a thrust in the direction of serving the interests of the 
propagation of the cooperative genes.  A further, related tension concerns obligations to 
kin versus obligations to non-kin.  This is illuminated in Chapter 11 by a consideration of 
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two examples: (a) theft by a gang; (b) (issues concerning) the U.K. National Health 
Service.   The general assertion arising out of that discussion is that the universalism 
inhering in a normative order strains towards having wider application and that is a 
tendency which serves to propagate the cooperative genes.  The first part of this assertion 
would be roughly illustrated by the way we in Britain feel it would be better for everyone 
in the world were they all to have the same rights and personal freedoms which we enjoy, 
and – even more – by the action tendencies which flow from that feeling. The second part 
is illustrated in this way:  were we to reduce worldwide child mortality to the U.K. level 
this in itself would lead directly to overall population growth (of course, there would be 
additional indirect effects) . 
 
In a related way and without getting inappropriately into futurology, further support for 
the position developed here, arises out of consideration of the world’s (possible) 
emerging political and economic structural form. In Chapter 11, a model is presented, 
constructed with the help of Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) ‘end of history’ thesis, whereby 
it is envisaged that the whole of the Earth’s surface is covered by liberal and social 
democratic (capitalistic) nations and supranational units (such as a partially politically-
integrated European Community), together with an elaborated system of world 
governance with the United Nations at its strategic centre.  Following upon analysis of 
the core principles upon which human affairs would then be being conducted, the 
conclusion may be drawn that that the model’s structural form nicely articulates – and in 
a sense resolves - the tension between the cooperative and the other genes.  This is a 
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particularly striking feature of geopolitical arrangements which could conceivably come 
to embrace the totality of humankind. 
 
This account has centered on the notion that the genes giving rise to characteristically-
human cooperative behaviour are propagated ‘at cost’ to the genes of persons identifiable 
by reference to that cooperative behaviour itself.  Attention has also been drawn to the 
phenomenon whereby in modern societies, given an understanding of genetics, a 
consciously undertaken restructuring of the human gene pool is beginning to get 
underway. In the consideration of the interaction with other fauna and flora it is noted 
that progressively the genes of other life forms exist and propagate on human terms.  
Hence, in a parallel way, one can say that the propagation of the ‘cooperative’ genes is ‘at 
cost’ to some of the genes of other life forms, which forms are identifiable by reference 
to human cooperative behaviour itself.  What is unique about human beings is the way in 
which the propagation of their cooperative genes is potentially ‘at cost’ to the 
propagation of any of the other genes of other life forms on this planet (and conceivably 
also elsewhere).  That is the full measure of the extent to which these genes concerned 
with cooperation are selfish. 
 
On a final point arising out of this study, the reader may be inclined to inquire as to 
whether the view taken here is that the underlying pattern identified is the only 
transcendental purpose of human life.  In response, since genes do not have purposes, the 
most that could be claimed is that what is being examined is the main transcendental 
tendency of a biological type.  Nor is there good reason or evidence sufficient to justify 
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belief in the existence of any (more conventional) transcendental purposive agent. As 
regards purposes or the meaning of life more generally, the essential contrast is between 
the transcendental and immanent options, where the latter approach is that, ‘[t]here is 
nothing beyond or apart from the processes of life’ (Blackburn, 2009, p.171).  This last is 
the view taken here as is suggested by the way in which our values, knowledge and 
understanding have been treated as core elements of a life process arising from the action 
of cooperative, in conjunction with the other, human genes.  However, the understanding 
of the origin and nature of that life process itself forms a not unimportant part of the 
meaning to be found within life itself.  
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Appendices 
The four appendices which follow concern topics which may be fitted into the overall 
argument.  However, it is judged that had they been incorporated into the main text they 
might have made that argument harder to follow – by seeming to interrupt its ‘flow’.  In 
Chapter 1 language use is situated within the broader context of cooperation.  Some more 
detailed points regarding speech acts, language and cooperation are provided in Appendix 
1.  Proceeding further, cooperation between embodied persons – the focus of this study – 
may be distinguished from the important phenomena of coordination and co-action in 
social life. In Appendix 2 this distinction is clarified and it is indicated how the latter two 
are fundamentally dependent upon cooperation; the contribution of ‘collective actors’ is 
also situated in relation to the main discussion. Appendix 3 rather follows on from the 
consideration of morality in Chapter 2.  The related phenomena of empathy, torture and 
coerced compliance are examined and situated in relation to the main argument.  A rather 
different topic is addressed in Appendix 4.  It forms a sequel to the consideration in 
Chapter 3 of fitness in social context, concerned with factors conducive to differential 
survival and reproduction.  In the appendix further consideration is given to the human 
position in the light of the notion that fitness must be judged in relation to a species’ 
position within the ecological system as a whole.   
 
Appendix 1:  Speech acts, language and cooperation 
The focus of this study is on cooperation employing theory of mind.  The linguistic 
content of cooperation varies:  in some instances human cooperation may not be 
accompanied by spoken or written communication at all.  However, the general position 
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appears to be that language inheres in most human cooperation and develops in 
conjunction with it. However, in properly situating it in relation to the overall argument, 
the complexity of linguistic usage must be noted.  No doubt language is important for 
conveyance of information but its various uses extend considerably beyond that; for 
instance, the imperative mood employed in situations of dominance and submission 
comes to us from pre-history.  A particular style of linguistic usage is typically embedded 
within a type of cooperation.  Additional clarification is provided in this section.  
  
For information to be imparted there must be involvement of both speaker and listener:  
effective conveyance of meaning is achieved jointly (despite, for instance, differences of 
power or status).  Hence language use seeks to generate, or forms part of, at least a 
minimal type of cooperation. (Dunbar, 1996) A consideration of speech acts clarifies the 
differing ways in which language is deployed.  There are indicative and interrogative uses 
and, reflecting on modern languages, Searle (2010, p.69) discerns five possible types of 
speech acts:  assertives (descriptions etc); directives (orders etc); commissives (promises 
etc); expressives (apologies etc); declarations. In thinking about the evolution of 
linguistic representation no doubt it is strategic that what often gets communicated is 
information about the world.  Searle suggests that sentence structure may reflect ‘the 
object salience of our perceptual phenomenalism’ (2010, p.78), objects with their 
attendant qualities being prominent features of the environment.  
 
For our purposes here, it is an essential point that for meaningful communication to take 
place, speakers need to invoke already understood vocabulary and existing conventions 
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of a language.  There is also the need for speakers (implicitly) to know how to produce a 
potentially infinite number of new sentences which involves them in utilizing recursive 
rules (Searle, 2010, p.79).  These conventions and rules arise out of prior usage.  
Importantly, given the existence of suitable conventions and rules, language enables users 
to extend vocabulary, to use tenses and modalities and thereby to think in ways 
unthinkable without language.  Where numbers (and numerals) are introduced, for 
instance, there is the potential to count indefinitely.  Evidently a fundamental feature is 
the ‘open-ended’ character of language, which may be expected to move in step with the 
cooperative framework within which it is embedded.  
 
Significantly in his analysis Searle (2010, p.80) goes on to point up the ‘deontological’   
element in actual language use, which is here termed ‘normative’ i.e. that it necessarily 
involves social commitments.  In this regard it is of the essence that speech is public (or 
at least shared with another) and the speaker is thereby committed to something in front 
of others.  Searle points out that when one makes a statement one is committed to the 
existence of a fact, when making a promise one commits to the performance of a future 
action (2010, p.88). (Of course people sometimes lie, break promises etc but these are 
secondary phenomena made possible precisely because they are exceptional.) Hence 
speech may be said at root to involve a normative element, just as it is being asserted here 
that that is the case for cooperation in general. This helps us to understand the nature of 
speech as a particular type of cooperative activity while acknowledging that language 
may also be said to accompany or inhere in other types of cooperative activity.  
 
 305 
Appendix 2:  Cooperation, coordination and co-action; collective actors 
In this study the notion of cooperation between identifiable, embodied persons is at the 
centre of an account which incorporates consideration of the emergence and functioning 
of larger groups and societies.  The latter type of phenomenon is what is being got at, for 
instance, where there is reference to the creation or existence of a ‘wider cooperative 
framework’.  For the argument to be sound it must be shown in what sorts of way these 
larger entities and structures may emerge from cooperation as understood in the usual 
sense and how they continue to depend upon it.  While the viability of organizations, 
institutions and social groups such as nation states plainly crucially depends upon 
cooperation, it is also apparent that they involve much more than some sort of 
quantitative expansion of what is going on in small face-to-face cooperative groups such 
as teams.  In fact, in the generality of situations, care must be taken to distinguish 
cooperation from co-action and the co-ordination of activity. The intention in this section 
is to provide elucidation.  It is judged that this topic is germane to widely differing types 
of societies and social groups, but partly for ease of exposition the illustrations are mostly 
taken from familiar western societies.  
 
The first aim is to clarify how cooperation may be more sharply distinguished from other 
ways in which the actions of people are coordinated.  The general intention is to use the 
notion of cooperation in as natural a way as possible, but there are nevertheless difficult 
or marginal cases to consider.  Arising out of this, various other types of links are 
identified and distinguished from cooperation between embodied persons, for instance, 
those simply involving co-action or coordination of action, including, for instance, cases 
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where relationships are materially mediated (as with workers on a conveyor belt).  
Included too are some links implied by the existence and activities of so-called 
‘collective actors’ e.g. organizations and institutions, which entities are not in themselves 
embodied persons.   Then, having identified other kinds of link, the second aim is to 
show that these arise out of, or are products of, previous cooperation between embodied 
persons and also that they continue to be dependent upon that type of cooperation.   
 
It may help to commence with a suggestive example.  In a study seeking to link 
cooperation and population, consideration of transport systems is plainly relevant since 
they play a crucial role in sustaining large populations; so let us focus briefly on the road-
traffic system. There is highly patterned behaviour of drivers and associated movements 
of their vehicles on our roads.  Cars are using lanes and overtaking in orderly ways; they 
can be seen to be conforming to the dictates of traffic lights.  However, one would not 
wish to say that all the motorists in a given area are cooperating with each other; that 
would somehow be to claim too much.  Instead, we would say this is primarily to be 
considered as a context of co-action and coordination rather than cooperation.  (There is, 
for instance, co-action in that they are all driving on the left in the U.K. and coordination 
between vehicles when overtaking.) The point is that drivers are most of the time acting 
in patterned ways because they understand and are conforming to the rules of the road 
(expressed in The Highway Code).  However it is instructive to go beyond this to inquire 
into two further highly strategic aspects:  how The Highway Code is compiled and its 
status ratified; what happens when things go wrong on the roads.   
 
 307 
On the first point one can be reasonably confident that, although its creation would arise 
within the context of an official bureaucratic process involving consultation of interested 
parties such as the Automobile Association, the finalization and confirmation of the 
status of a particular formulation of The Highway Code would emerge from the type of 
actual human cooperation involved in the meeting of committees.  Similarly, on the 
second point, one can feel confident that in the event of, for instance, a serious accident, 
actual cooperation will come into play in response, as when phone calls are made, police 
temporarily redirect traffic and ancillary health workers attend to injured persons.  The 
conclusion to be drawn is that the system of co-action and coordination that is road-traffic 
is fundamentally created and maintained by actual human cooperation.  In this connection 
it is significant that where the content of a task involving many people is at least to a 
degree non-routine, it is controlled by cooperation between embodied people.  
 
There are other instances where it is patent there is coordination between the actions of 
individuals but it falls short of cooperation. Consider the relations of workers on a 
moving production line.  Of course their contributions may follow in a predetermined 
sequence but the workers may hardly converse or even acknowledge each other.  This 
particular link between staff does not in itself amount to cooperation; rather it is mediated 
by a physical system.  However, one may again fruitfully consider how this state of 
affairs was brought about and what happens when things go wrong.  On the first point, it 
can readily be envisaged that much actual cooperation would have gone into even the 
decision to set up the production line and probably a cooperating team would also have 
directed its installation. Again, when things go wrong – perhaps the line breaks down – 
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although this possibility may well have been envisaged and even planned for, its solution 
cannot be ‘programmed’ as can the movements of the line itself. Actual people will 
cooperate in helping to put things right or in calling for technical help. The example is 
revealing in the respect that when things are proceeding in a predictable, programmed 
way the link is not that of cooperation, but when things go wrong it may soon become of 
that type.  The conclusion is similar to that drawn earlier:  that physically mediated 
systems of co-action are created and maintained on the basis of cooperation between 
actual people. 
 
The last example naturally leads on to a more general consideration of the activities of 
‘collective actors’ such as organizations and governments. These types of entities do all 
sorts of things: they can for instance be said to have interests; they cooperate with other 
organizations as well as with individuals, and so on.  Nevertheless, they are 
fundamentally controlled by, and also derive from, the actions of cooperating embodied 
individuals.  For instance, where an entity such as the U.K. government takes action the 
strategically relevant cooperating individuals are senior ministers and civil servants; 
where a firm it might be the managing director and the chairman of the board plus a few 
others.  No doubt too there would be innumerable instances of cooperation at lower levels 
to carry forward work tasks (as well as many instances of informal contact not so 
motivated!).  In this context a  civil service bureaucracy or a firm’s system of line 
management are to be thought of as the means by which things get done; a moving 
production line which coordinates workers is essentially an elaborate tool.  
Administrative and technical tools such as these are vital in sustaining the economy and 
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society of a highly populous modern state, but these coordinating arrangements between 
people have been instituted or set up by cooperating individuals (either directly or using 
other organizational tools) and their effective maintenance similarly derives from 
contemporaneous cooperation between embodied persons. 
 
Again, the national entity the U.K., a particular type of social group, is a social fact 
fundamentally arising out of, and sustained by, cooperation between embodied persons, 
but it would be straining the use of the term to say that its reality consists of cooperation 
among all British people (leaving on one side the relations with those abroad).  Rather, 
part of that reality consists of systems of co-action.  Thus its governmental system has as 
a basic element not a gigantic mass meeting of its citizenry, but a system whereby 
formally atomized individual citizens vote in elections.  The legal, administrative and 
indeed detailed practical working out of the electoral process exemplifies what is meant 
by an ‘enlarged cooperative framework’, in this case one underpinning the reality of a 
modern democratic nation state. The indicated phrase is referring to a wider group or 
system of relations fundamentally regulated by actual cooperation between embodied 
persons but also incorporating conformity to rules together giving rise to co-action and 
the coordination of action among larger numbers.  As already indicated, it is strategic 
within the overall argument that even where very large systems of relations are involved 
– as in the case of the nation state – the creation and maintenance of that entity flows 
from cooperation between embodied persons.  This is not presented as a particularly 
startling assertion, but rather because it is significant within a study concerned with the 
long-term implications of cooperation. 
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In a related way the influential idea of ‘imagined communities’ may be situated.  The 
contribution of this widely-used concept may be dramatized through the contrast between 
a small community of (say) fewer than 150 people with one where the population is in the 
hundreds of thousands or even – as with a modern nation state – millions.  Whereas in the 
small group such notions as ‘our people’ are underpinned by actual observation and 
experience of everyone, this cannot be the case for the larger group.  To assist 
understanding of what is involved in these types of situations Benedict Anderson 
introduced the notion of ‘imagined communities’ (Anderson, 1991).  This means roughly 
that members hold in their minds a mental image of their affinity.  In a modern nation 
state, for instance, people recognize and respond in distinctive ways to the national flag, 
the national anthem and the actions and appearances of their leaders - perhaps most often 
accessed via the mass media.  Plainly people can also operate with shared notions as to 
such characteristics of their fellow nationals as their typical appearance, language and 
accent; they may well understand themselves to have a shared history.  Anderson sought 
particularly to understand the phenomenon of nationalism, but, more generally, it is 
plausible that people’s imaginations contribute rather differently when they orient in a 
whole variety of ways towards a large group than when they orient to a community 
whose members are all known individually. 
 
While agreeing on the contribution of the imagination, an assertion of importance here is 
that, nevertheless, all the various actions and activities involved in the reality of the larger 
group arise out of actual human cooperation or are controlled by it.  Imagination may 
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inform or inhere in behaviour but it is not in itself human action; rather it has to do with 
the content of individual action, or of cooperation or co-action.  Thus it might be said:  
that two people are jointly raising the national flag (an instance of cooperation); that 
senior cabinet ministers are meeting (cooperation); that a general election is being held 
(involving cooperation, coordination and co-action); that there is a party-political rally 
(involving cooperation, coordination and co-action).  Importantly, too, no assertion is 
here being made that other social scientific disciplines cannot contribute to the 
understanding of associated phenomena; far from it.  To take an example:  the 
charismatic influence of Hitler over his followers at mass meetings may be illuminated 
by the discipline of social psychology.  That is true, but it nevertheless remains the case 
that the objective behavioural reality of such a phenomenon as the Nuremberg rally arises 
out of human cooperation and involves cooperation, co-action and coordination.  
 
It is instructive briefly to proceed to note how complicated, in a society such as ours, the 
inter-connections are.  Consider, for instance, the action of an individual who is 
withdrawing money from a cash-point.  It is apparent that for this to occur involves all 
manner of conditions and preconditions.  For instance, it may depend upon the previous 
joint action of two workmen who came round and fitted a cash machine securely into the 
wall; again, it depends upon there being a factory somewhere producing notes of 
currency and a firm delivering money to the machine.  Not just this, but there are all the 
processes involved whereby sterling is itself secured as a currency involving the 
workings of the Bank of England.  Without all these elements being in place one would 
not be withdrawing money from a cash-point.  However, it would clearly be too much to 
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assert that all these parties – users of the cash-point, workmen, delivery men, the staff of 
the Bank of England - are ‘cooperating’, so instead one would refer to the coordination of 
action through time or perhaps ‘co-action’ when similar actions are (understood to be) 
proceeding at the same time. The action of withdrawing the money is possible given 
many conditions and pre-conditions which themselves arise out of cooperative activity. 
 
Finally, on a rather different point, it is plainly also the case that, in the generality of the 
human situation, later cooperation within a persisting relationship is typically informed 
by understanding of earlier cooperation by the parties themselves as well as by associated 
cooperation involving others.  In this connection formal processes (such as those 
involved in occupational appointment) and rites of passage are highly strategic.  Suppose, 
for instance, two people have been processed through a marriage ceremony with its 
central cooperative elements.  Subsequently they then know they are married which 
fundamentally shapes what they do.  Most notably, they know that in their married state 
they are (normatively) expected to cooperate in patterned ways.  This structures their 
behaviour even though subsequently there may be instances of antagonism or non-
cooperation; again, actual conditions giving rise to breakdown of the relationship flow 
from the expectations integral to marriage. (It is relevant to the consideration of kinship 
and marriage – a topic of Chapter 4 - to note that an underlying source of problems for 
married people is that while they expect themselves and are expected by others to 
cooperate, this is made harder because they are not linked by a blood tie, whereas each is 
so linked to their own children and respective parents.)  
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Appendix 3:  Empathy, torture and coerced compliance 
As is often asserted, a sympathetic response to the plight of others may well be prompted 
by empathy.  By this is meant the power of entering into another’s personality or situation 
and imaginatively experiencing or identifying with his or her experiences.  For present 
purposes it of the essence that this capacity is akin to, without being identical to, the 
ability to ‘take the role of’ the other; the former has more to do with feeling states, the 
latter, as indicated earlier, more to do with grasping intentionality in context.  It can even 
be said that a response generated in this way almost amounts to the immediate 
commencement of cooperation with the other party.  Suppose for instance one observes 
another person in a dangerous situation and about to be injured.  Were one then prompted 
by empathy immediately to intervene to help them (perhaps at risk to oneself) this 
amounts to commencement of cooperation because it is implied that the other person 
would welcome help even though they may not have requested it:  their situation is such 
as implicitly to ask for it. Hence given a genetic change making characteristically-human 
cooperation possible, altruistic behaviour underpinned by empathy becomes that much 
more readily explicable. 
 
It is abundantly apparent, however, that quite other responses are possible to observation 
of the plight of others.  Empathy implies sympathy but another possible response is 
schadenfreude.  Sadly, it is also the case that humans not infrequently fully understand 
the unfortunate situation of others which they then seek to make worse (their response is 
spiteful):  engaging in physical and mental torture of others is sadly by no means 
uncommon.  However, it is again of the essence that the same capacities are involved as 
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in cooperation.  For instance, frustrating someone typically involves fully understanding 
what would be involved in cooperating with them but then refraining from doing so or 
doing the opposite, which behaviour is itself typically understood by them.  Sadly, 
torture, far from being ‘unnatural’, is a type of behaviour made possible by the genetic 
change highlighted here.  Indeed as a practice it has been institutionalized in the 
treatment of suspected or actual miscreants for perhaps most of history.  Happily, the 
morality of modern societies – particularly democracies – has come to point in the other 
direction:  to condemn torture absolutely.   
 
Yet that very development needs to be situated properly within the context of a study 
concerned with the implications of cooperation for population growth.  Plainly, to torture 
someone is not to cooperate with that person.  Hence the substantial elimination of torture 
within at least certain types of modern societies forms part of a wider pattern whereby it 
may be said that those societies are tending to maximize the possibilities for cooperation 
of the voluntary (i.e. non-coerced) type.  It may be suggested that a consequence is that 
more stable and predictable conditions are created which are conducive to population 
growth. 
 
It is appropriate in passing briefly to link the comments on empathy and torture, taking 
account of human understanding of the past.  To put it directly we empathize with victims 
of torture; at the same time we are aware of the immense number of instances of torture 
which have occurred in the past.  Those occasions are understood by us to be as real as 
present instances, yet we can do nothing to help.  The screams of slaves being flogged to 
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death still ring in our ears.  It is in the nature of the human situation that awareness of 
unalterable horrors hangs over us throughout our lives:  as we seek to lead responsible 
and happy lives there is more to bear than awareness of the inevitability of personal 
death. 
 
It is a familiar fact that the ‘spirit’ in which people cooperate is highly variable and it 
could be asymmetrical between the various parties.  It could be whole-hearted but it will 
often fall short of that; there is also the particular case of coerced cooperation to consider. 
Someone could cooperate because it is spontaneously what they wish to do – it is 
intrinsically worthwhile – or they could proceed simply because they feel they ‘ought to’.  
In addition, cooperative compliance could perhaps be gained on a utilitarian or 
calculative basis, or, alternatively, as with coerced cooperation, the disposition of a 
cooperating party could be negative or alienated.  In a modern society cooperation 
between employer and employee is usually of the former, utilitarian type.  In this case, an 
employee typically knows what is required of them but they may simultaneously operate 
with their own idea of what is a reasonable day’s work; in addition there may be 
discernible periods – particularly when out of observation – when they manifestly fail to 
comply with the employer’s expectations.  At least, however, employees typically choose 
to be there and take part, in which respect they differ from subordinated parties to 
coerced cooperation.  Even in this last case, however, where one may be focusing on 
master and slave or someone cooperating at gunpoint, within the framework of 
communicative cooperation there typically develops an implicit or explicit agreement as 
to what the subordinated party is supposed to be doing or needs to do to avoid negative 
 316 
sanctions (at least temporarily) being applied.  The expectation that such an agreement 
may hold – even in what are relatively extreme circumstances - often comes to have 
something of a normative flavour.  However, of course it is the case that situations of 
coerced cooperation are less stable than others and could be discontinued abruptly.  As 
already noted, a significant feature of modern western societies is the attempt to minimize 
the extent to which cooperation is of the coerced type. 
 
Appendix 4:  Fitness in relation to the ecological system as a whole 
Brief consideration has been provided in Chapter 3 of fitness in social context, but 
additional insight may be gained by addressing directly a highly strategic issue.  As 
Darwin himself stresses, fitness is to be judged by a species’ position within the 
ecological system as a whole.  As will be readily appreciated, the fate of a species is 
bound to be systemically interdependent not just with other local fauna and flora but also 
with the inanimate environment including such connected elements as soil, rainfall and 
hours of sunshine.  At first sight it might seem that the same might be said in respect of 
the human species i.e. that fitness must be judged in relation to the ecological system as a 
whole; but there is an important difference.  As regards animal species, one can make the 
distinction between, on the one hand, animal behaviour – where this is to be understood 
straightforwardly in an ‘external’ behavioural sense – and, on the other, the remainder of 
the objectively identifiable elements in the near-environment.  (Significantly, though, 
some of these latter elements - such as dams produced by beavers - are themselves 
products of the animal’s own activity, giving rise to the important concept of an extended 
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phenotype; Dawkins, 1982.)  In the human but not in the animal case, however, 
behaviour and environment are mediated by, in particular, a normative system.  
 
To illustrate:  what has been called the ‘new animism’ arises particularly from the work 
of the anthropologist, Hallowell, who conducted research among the Ojibwe people at 
Berens River in central Canada in the early twentieth century.  Hallowell (1960) draws 
attention to the outlook of some pre-literate peoples in viewing the world relationally and 
as a personal community, embracing not simply other species but even inanimate objects.  
The new animism may involve, for instance, ‘acting respectfully towards rocks, animals, 
thunder and each other’ (Harvey, 2013, p.142).   
 
This may initially sound odd, but not dissimilar tendencies are evident in modern 
societies.  Thus while humans generally are heavily into exploitative (but nevertheless 
rule-governed) food production, in the context of national parks and reserves they treat 
flora and fauna and even inanimate elements with ‘respect’, in a sense ‘preserving’ and 
‘maintaining’ local ecological systems.  In the human case the distinction between animal 
behaviour in an ‘external’ behavioural sense and the other objectively identifiable 
elements in the environment begins to disintegrate because of the contribution made by 
the human normative system.  For one thing, under the impact of that system the 
environment itself changes – as it does following the designation of an area as a national 
park. Perhaps one can say that the human normative system mediates between that 
species and its changing environment.  
 
 318 
Two other aspects regarding how humans interface with their environment may be noted.  
Some domesticated animals become effectively ‘honorary’ members of the human 
community.  For instance, the dog – as befits an animal described as ‘man’s best friend’ – 
is often not being treated instrumentally; instead it and its welfare are being treated as 
ends in themselves.  Whereas such suppliers of food and clothing as cattle and sheep can 
be thought of as in the human-shaped environment, even this way of wording it seems 
inadequate for at least some pets.  They may perhaps be characterised as beneficiaries of 
an extended human normative framework.  Somewhat similar considerations seem to 
come into play regarding the status of India’s ‘sacred cows’. 
 
Yet it is not simply the significance of the normative framework which needs to be 
appraised, for humans interface with the environment also through the use of aesthetic 
values.  This is perhaps most obviously the case with landscaping and gardening, 
although, thankfully, there is no parallel need to consider flowers as ‘honorary’ members 
of the human community (!)  Putting it generally, it is not just that humans sometimes in 
a moral or quasi-moral way ‘respect’ the environment, they also order it according to 
aesthetic preferences.  However, that way of putting it still points to the importance of the 
wider cooperative framework within which moral and aesthetic values are expressed. 
 
On a rather different point, it is evident that it is not just the ecological system which is 
important but also the degree of human understanding of it.  Plainly there is an intimate 
connection between, on the one hand, the changing human way of life and its associated 
means of subsistence and, on the other, developing human understanding of elements of 
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the ecological system locally and more widely.  In virtually any type of society humans 
are sometimes disruptive of ecological balances: that is not just a feature of the modern 
period.  For instance, they hunted animals to extinction on the American prairies and 
(probably) destroyed the habitat (or consumed the eggs) of mega-fauna in Australia and 
on the island of Madagascar.   These were substantially unintended consequences of 
human action.   By contrast a degree of ecological understanding is exhibited by a farmer 
who allows sheep to graze a hill-side, who keeps foxes out of his hen-coop or who allows 
or encourages bees to pollinate fruit-plants.  In that their population has tended to 
increase given changes in their way of life, humans do not form part of a conventional 
‘balance of nature’. In so far as there is an overall ecological system of which humans 
form part, they increasingly participate in it in ways informed by their developing 
understanding of elements of it. 
 
More generally, the changing ways in which humans relate to everything in the ‘external 
world’ are informed by their developing understanding of it.  It is a commonplace idea 
that humans are constrained by the ‘laws of nature’, but in actuality they are liberated and 
empowered by their very understanding of those laws.  Very strikingly, while constrained 
by the laws of gravitation which prevent them flying like birds, humans have created 
heavier than air machines in which they and their possessions fly around.  Indeed their 
potential ‘reach’ in this respect in the longer term seems indefinitely great.  Already their 
cosmological understanding is considerable and they approach a physical ‘theory of 
everything’.   The potential applications of their developing knowledge are open-ended:  
they do not have power over nature, they have power in nature.  Whereas, for other 
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animals the environment remains in effect the ‘near-environment’, that is only a 
temporary way-station for humans; and it is an environment which they progressively 
reshape.     
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